Katrina gives media permission to trash Bushist Iraq policy

[BurtWorm]

For example, in Time magazine. The situation in Basra will not play any better:


http://www.time.com/time/press_releases/printout/0,8816,1106259,00.html

THE SECRET HISTORY OF HOW THE U.S. MISJUDGED THE ENEMY IN IRAQ

Shortly Before His Capture in December 2003, Saddam Hussein Ordered Associates in Rebellion to Change Target Focus From Coalition Forces to Iraqi Police Stations

New York - More than a dozen current and former intelligence officers knowledgeable about Iraq spoke with TIME in recent weeks to share details about the conflict, and they voiced their growing frustration with a war that they feel was not properly anticipated by the Bush Administration, TIME’s Joe Klein reports in this week’s cover story (on newsstands Monday, Sept 19). The officers believe its a war fought with insufficient resources and a war that almost all of them now believe is not winnable militarily.

Saddam’s Letters - Trying to Stay in Charge of Rebellion: According to documents later seized by the U.S. military, Saddam-who had been changing locations frequently until his capture in December 2003-tried to stay in charge of the rebellion. He fired off frequent letters filled with instructions for his subordinates. Some were pathetic. In one, he explained guerrilla tradecraft to his inner circle-how to keep in touch with one another, how to establish new contacts, how to remain clandestine. Of course, the people doing the actual fighting needed no such advice, and decisions about whom to attack when and where were made by the cells. Saddam’s minions, including al-Duri and al-Ahmed, were away from the front lines, providing money, arms and logistical support for the cells, TIME reports.

Saddam Changes Strategy - Target Police Stations: But Saddam did make one strategic decision that helped alter the course of the insurgency. In early autumn he sent a letter to associates ordering them to change the target focus from coalition forces to Iraqi “collaborators” - that is, to attack Iraqi police stations.

A Focus on WMD: A decision in the spring of 2003-to make the search for WMD the highest intelligence priority-also hampered the U.S. ability to fight the insurgents. In June, former weapons inspector David Kay arrived in Baghdad to lead the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which had 1,200 intelligence officers and support staff members assigned to search for WMD. They had exclusive access to literally tons of documents collected from Saddam’s office, intelligence services and ministries after the regime fell. Kay clashed repeatedly with U.S. military leaders who wanted access not only to the documents but also to some of the resources-analysts, translators, field agents—at his disposal. “I was in meetings where (General John) Abizaid was pounding on the table trying to get some help,” says a senior military officer. “But Kay wouldn’t budge.”

[BurtWorm]

1. kick