http://www.tompaine.com/articles/20050922/badr_vs_sadr.php...
Sadr is unhappy at the idea of regional federalism in Iraq, since his power is in Baghdad’s eastern Shiite neighborhoods. Since Baghdad is a multi-ethnic city, many of whose citizens are “Sushis” (Sunni-Shiite mixed), it’s impossible to include the capital in a Hakim-style Shiite Republic. So, Sadr opposes both the constitution and its federalism, and he’s hinting that he might support a Sunni-led effort to Vote No on Oct. 15. If he does so, it will kill the constitution, since Baghdad is its own province and would join at least two Sunni-dominated provinces to vote against the constitution. A two-thirds vote against it is needed in at least three provinces.
Sadr’s relationship with Iran is unclear. Starting in 2003, there were reports that Iran’s intelligence service and Revolutionary Guards were funneling at least some help to Sadr, but it seems that most of Iran’s covert energy is going to support the SCIRI-Badr forces. And Iran seems quite content to build up its power and influence among Iraq’s current crop of Shiite rulers. Sadr, meanwhile, appears to be headed in the direction of a tactical alliance with the Sunni-led resistance—which won’t exactly endear him to Iran’s theocracy.
In any case, what it all means is that the relative stability that has been present in Basra and others towns in southern Iraq may be coming to an end. For the first time, there are insurgent attacks reported in Basra. And the British, who had responsibility for Basra, suddenly find themselves sitting atop a powder keg. My guess is that in the general Shiite population there is no great love for SCIRI. On one hand, many Iraqi Shiites are secular and non-religious, and they don’t like SCIRI’s brand of theocracy. On the other hand, many religious Shiites are undoubtedly attracted to Sadr’s flare for anti-U.S. rabble-rousing, which presents a serious threat to SCIRI’s (and Al Dawa’s) ability to hold the allegiance of the Shiites. (In the election in January, the Sadrs and Hakims held their noses and joined together in the Sistani-backed electoral alliance that garnered the most votes at the polls.
Since 2003, the Bush administration’s one hope has been that it can contain the Sunni-led resistance by betting on the Kurdish-Shiite alliance. But if the Shiites shatter, it’s curtains for the Anglo-American occupation. That is the other exit strategy: not the one in which U.S. forces declare victory and withdraw in orderly fashion, but the one in which we get our butts kicked out of Iraq forthwith.