Scott Ritter was the former US marine captain tasked with finding Saddam Hussein's weapons. Now, in this first detailed account, he reveals how the CIA plotted to use a UN weapons inspection to overthrow the Iraqi regime - and how fiasco turned to tragedy when it failed This is big, Scott," Moshe Ponkovsky said. "We don't share this with anyone." Israel's military intelligence was already assisting us at Unscom (the United Nations Special Commission, which ran the UN's weapons inspections programme in Iraq) by scrutinising the "take" from the American U-2 spy-plane flights over Iraq. It had proved an unorthodox but fruitful relationship for Unscom: the Israeli analysts had proved far superior to the CIA's. But what I was now proposing to the Israelis was a dramatic expansion of this intelligence-sharing.
was asking Lieutenant Colonel Ponkovsky and his colleagues to accept tapes from a secret Unscom-British communications eavesdropping operation that we were planning in Baghdad itself. The Israelis would process the data (ie, break any codes or ciphers the Iraqis might be using, and translate), and analyse them to determine if there was anything useful for Unscom's mandate of disarming Iraq.It was an ambitious, and possibly dangerous, project, but I had the backing of Unscom's senior executives - its chairman, the Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekéus, his American deputy, state department official Charles Duelfer, and Russian arms control expert Nikita Smidovich. By the end of January 1996, the scheme was falling into place: Ponkovsky told me that his boss, director of military intelligence General Ya'alon, had given authorisation. Just one part of the jigsaw puzzle was missing: with Britain providing the intercept team, and Israel doing the analysis, that just left the Americans.
Earlier that month, Duelfer had handed me a paper from the CIA containing a series of questions about Unscom's communications intercept plan. Until then, the CIA had been disdainful of Unscom as a tool for intelligence-gathering, but now they were getting interested. Not that I knew it at the time, but the hidden agenda was regime change.
(...)
The failed June 1996 coup attempt had largely been determined by domestic American political considerations. Like President George HW Bush before him, Clinton and his political handlers were sensitive to public perception in a presidential election year. This shaped both the coup's mission (get Saddam) and its timing (early summer, before the Republicans had nailed down their candidate). Not only was the 1996 plot chiefly a "wag the dog" scenario, but once again, any chance of Iraq disarming under UN supervision had been cynically undermined by the larger US objective of regime change
http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,1579659,00.html(the above is an extract from Ritter's new book
Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of America's Intelligence ConspiracyJust to cast a skeptical eye for a second - why has he waited until now to reveal this? (And per Robert Baer's "See No Evil" - although it's been a long time since I read it so my facts may be off - why did Clinton refuse US support for a coup attempt in (I think) the same year led by the Kurds.