As we approach a win on the voter-verified paper ballot, you will see numerous attempts to give in, grudgingly, on something that sounds like that but isn't really.
Let's get it right. This means gently correcting reporters (send them e-mails to correct their usage of the language) and disciplining ourselves to use the words that can't be hijacked away from us.
This is a recap of RedEagle's suggestions. Bear in mind that she is very closely involved with activism on the legislative side of things, and she's seeing how the "other side" is trying to do end runs around the voter-verified paper ballot issue.
1) It's a ballot, not a "receipt"
2) It's a ballot, not a "trail"
3) It's got to be verified, not "verifiable"
4) It's a paper ballot, not an "audit trail"
Here's how they are using language to attempt end-runs around trustworthy voting:
Calling it a receipt: This leads to laws (yes, they already have them in some states) that the voter-verified paper ballot is NOT the legal record of the vote; instead, they say the computer record is the legal record, so if they don't match, they want us to use the computer bits and bytes instead.
Also: This lends itself to the visual image of voters slipping some tiny thing into their pocket and leaving the polling area with it, one of the talking points used by the other side.
Also: This lends itself to the idea of taking it out of the polling place and "selling it," another talking point from the other side.
It is a BALLOT. It must be the legal record of our vote, because it is what we ourselves have authorized.
Calling it a "trail" -- I am still going through and correcting these references in the book. Little did we know they'd try using this language to end-run the purpose of the voter-verified paper ballot. Calling it a "trail" lends itself to things like saying internal machine records that can be printed can be used, or can be twisted into sidelining this "trail" into a position of little relevance and allowing it to be used only in unusual circumstances.
Calling it "verifiable" (meaning, maybe it doesn't get verified)-- This is the way Dr. David Dill has been saying it -- No, we want to VERIFY it, we want to make sure every time we cast a vote we have verified it. "Verifiable" hijacks the system this way -- it lends itself to the ridiculous "VoteHere" solution whereby the machine prints a coded unreadable receipt that the voter can take and look up on the Internet. There are many problems with this method; it is dealt with more in the book.
Calling it an "audit trail" -- this lends itself to getting rid of the paper ballot that any citizen can look at and understand, and encourages solutions that only computer cryptographers can evaluate. We are not interested in a cryptographic "audit trail" that We, the People, cannot read.
Thus, we must train our keyboards, pens and tongues:
"VOTER VERIFIED PAPER BALLOT" --- no exceptions.
(Sorry we have to get into parsing the language like this. They are making us do this with their constant weaseling around the issue).
I fear this post may not get enough discussion -- sounds a bit boring, in fact, but I'm hoping you can keep it kicked for just a while to help give a heads up.
Bev Harris
http://www.blackboxvoting.comhttp://www.blackboxvoting.orghttp://www.BBVreport.org