Paraphrased Highlights:
James O'Brien, a special presidential envoy to the Balkans and former senior advisor to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, recalls: "There was an ongoing debate over the role the Balkans should play in United States policy.
There was a strong group arguing that NATO's purpose was to guarantee a Europe whole and free, and we couldn't leave the Balkans out of that. Clark was on that side. Others felt that after stabilizing Bosnia, we should leave."
Clark faxed a letter to Chairman Shelton and Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, alerting them to the growing crisis in Kosovo and recommending diplomacy backed by a stern NATO warning. the response was an irritated late-night phone call from Joseph Ralston, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, telling Clark to back down. He also said Cohen was worried Madeleine Albright would see the fax.
according to Michael E. O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and coauthor with Ivo H. Daalder of "Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo," the chary outlook of the Pentagon translated into lack of real commitment. "I think that subconsciously, Shelton and Cohen were not fully committed to winning the war," says O'Hanlon. "They felt we were spending too much time on secondary missions and our readiness for major war had been degraded."
Indeed, deep into the bombing campaign, when Clark pressed for more resources, he recounts that Ralston responded by asking what would happen if war broke out in Korea and the Gulf.
"Joe, surely you're not saying that we're going to give up the only fight we have going, only to be ready for two other wars that are not threatening in any way now?" Clark said.
And because Cohen was not committed to the conflict, political burdens that would normally fall to the defense secretary instead fell to Clark.
The very attributes that led some uniformed officials to distrust Clark made him popular at the White House and State Department. "He had strong views," recalls James Steinberg, the former deputy national security adviser, admiringly. "He was on the front lines, and it was important for policy makers to hear from him. He did a terrific job."
The State Department's James O'Brien appreciated Clark's breadth of vision: "Clark knew that the solution was promoting democracy in the region. The military had a role, but it had to be supported by civilian operations." In fact, the qualities that made Clark a thorn in the Pentagon's side -- his refusal to separate military affairs from political ones, his willfulness and independence of mind -- may serve him well in political life.
The article demonstrates how Clark made a tactical mistake at one point in Kosovo, then admitted his mistake, corrected it, and went on to win the war.
"He's a little more sloppy than might be expected from a Rhodes scholar, valedictorian, American superhero," says Michael O'Hanlon. But he's also "capable of admitting to himself when he has made a mistake and of taking corrective action." And that may be exactly the breath of fresh air Democrats yearn for in 2004.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2003/10/19/clarks_war/