BBV: NASS Statement on Security of Voting Systems

[gristy]

I discovered this evening the following statement made by the National Association of Secretaries of State http://www.nass.org/ headed by my very own Mary Kiffmeyer of Minnesota. Click on "NASS STATEMENT ON SECURITY OF VOTING" on the upper right of the page. The statement is below, with my comments. I urge each of you to write your own state's Secretary of State with your own critique of this statement.


NASS Statement on Security of Voting Systems
September 15, 2003

The National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), representing the nation's top state
election officials, has been following the debate on the security of electronic voting systems and
wants to reassure the public about the integrity of our election systems.
NASS has served as the professional organization for secretaries of state for 100 years. Our
members, thirty-eight of whom serve as their respective state's chief election official, recognize
the importance of secure, trustworthy and accurate elections. We also have something that many
of the researchers offering opinions do not: collective expertise in election administration,
including the laws, processes, and procedures involved.

I believe researchers understand well the challenges of administering any election
regardless of the technology used. It is unfortunate that they sometimes do not mention
this in their reports, as I believe such an acknowlegement could help open some ears and
minds. But I also believe that these election administration challenges have no bearing
on the simple fact that with electronic voting and vote counting systems with no hard copy
backup, you are now ENTIRELY dependent on the security of your election system in its
entirety. If a hacker or an insider corrupts the vote, or a machine fails, there is NOTHING to
fall back on, NOTHING to recount.

When we assess the potential for election fraud, we review the security of our systems as a
whole. All elections should have multiple layers of security resulting from the combination of
people, processes and technologies that go into any election. To fully understand real-world
Election Day vulnerabilities, we evaluate our election equipment by examining the technology
along with election administration processes and personnel. Election security and accuracy are
guaranteed on a state-by-state basis through a complex symphony of state and federal laws,

Guarateed? Ms. Kiffmeyer, I suggest "achieved". Or "attempted". It would seem the only way
you could "guarantee" election security and accuracy is if there was no way for an independent
observer to verify the vote count. Oh, ahem, I see. Never mind...

procedures, federal testing, state and local re-testing, on-site verification, public participation,
and above all, the oversight of officials charged with safeguarding the integrity of the process.
As representatives of the tens of thousands of state and local election administrators in this
country, we also want to emphasize that voting security is a nonpartisan issue. The membership
of NASS, like most of our electorate, is even in terms of party affiliation. We do not want any
individuals to use this issue for political or personal gain. We fully support the work of our
colleagues in election administration who are dedicated to making the electoral process secure,
accurate and reliable. These officials have no reason to be anything less than candid about
electronic voting systems and their accuracy.
All new technical advances in voting should be required to meet rigorous testing and voting
system standards, and should not hamper the ability of all qualified voters to vote privately and
independently. With these technical advances, we feel the issue of voting system security needs
a more careful review by the scientific community--in particular, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).

Ms. Kiffmeyer, NIST is a very small part of the "scientific community". It is also "a federal technology
agency that develops and promotes measurement, standards, and technology." as stated on its
web site. The scientific community of merit is the academic community, and this community has
produced countless reports critical of electronic voting. I admit they don't have paid lobbyists
banging on your door and calling you, but you would be well advised to listen to them. They are
very smart people, they are non-partisan, and they are not subject to corrupting business influence.

Under the new federal election reform law, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), NIST is
responsible for chairing the Technical Guidelines Development Committee of a new Election
Assistance Commission (EAC.) The law mandates this body to develop a new set of voluntary
federal voting system standards. NIST will also provide all technical support to the EAC in the
development of those voting system guidelines ? including the security of computers, computer
networks and computer data storage used in voting systems.
HAVA requires voting systems to, among other things, comply with the following standards:
Provide reasonable protections to insure the integrity of the election
Be difficult to manipulate for fraudulent purposes
Be independently tested by qualified laboratories under the Voting

HAVA is a deeply flawed piece of legislation. I urge you and your organization to support
H.R. 2239 and to implement its provisions in each of your states. With its safeguards, our
vote can be verified. Without it, the counting of our vote is based only on faith, not fact.

Systems Standards
In addition to developing those standards, the law requires that NIST identify and monitor the
independent, non-governmental laboratories that will be certifying voting systems. The states are
in need of an independent arbiter to help resolve some of the recent technology questions that
have emerged directly from the HAVA implementation process
The Election Assistance Commission has not yet been established, and Congress has not yet
fully funded the Help America Vote Act. Without full funding of HAVA, the states are being
forced to comply with the new federal law without adequate assistance from the very leaders
who promised to provide the resources to make federal participation in this process a success.
We believe that many of the questions about the future use of direct recording electronic
(DRE) voting machines can and will be resolved once the new Election Assistance Commission
is established and the states receive all of the funding they are due under the Help America Vote
Act. Working in tandem with independent testing authorities such as NIST, the states can
establish the next generation of high-tech voting and the laws and policies that go with it.
Our first priority is always protecting voters.

I suggest that you protect our vote instead. We voters can take care of ourselves, I assure you.

We are dedicated to safeguarding the security
and accuracy of our elections. But elections are not about equipment alone. They involve the
design of our overall system with multiple checks and balances, one that includes people and
processes, as well as technologies.

[4dog]

1. I've sent letters to the governor and AG's office in NJ

(elections are under the AG not SOS here). The gist of the replies is that everything is under control and 'we hope this adresses your concerns.' I can keep this up, but so can they.

[Stephanie]

2. I keep sending them to Spitzer

I think he might look into it. Pataki is ramming these machines through RIGHT NOW, and Spitzer is his likely opponent. Send your info to Spitzer.

[hunter]

3. They need someone to hold their hands...

and Diebold, Sequoia, ES&S, and so on, have promised to do that.

Don't look behind the curtain, don't look under the hood, everything will be all right because the federal government and their friendly private vendors will be there to help you!

You begin to wonder what happened to "We, the people of the United States," a self-sufficient sort of folk who knew how to count votes using their very own eyes and their very own brains.

[punpirate]

4. None of this suggests...

... that the people ultimately making the decisions, the top elections officials, have a clue about the ways in which the systems can be defrauded, and in some cases, undetectably.

If they don't understand the concept of auditability, then they can't possibly understand the deficiencies in the systems presently available, either.

[Bushfire]

5. Nice analysis!

I will keep this thread bookmarked, and ask my State Sec of St for his response while requesting his public support for HR 2239.

[DUreader]

6. kick

[RedEagle]

7. Key is at the state level

The official most likely to have the most influence are the Secretaries of State or whoever functions as the state election official.

Make them explain,in writing, their position, document their references and where they got their information, and ask them to guarantee, in writing, that elections in their state will be free from mistakes, machines errors, and fraud.

Over 1200 computer security experts and scientists say the systems are not secure, and they say it in public on verifiedvoting.org.

Have them ante up their computer experts. Election "procedure" does not apply. We're not talking the exterior frills here, we're dealing with the voting engine itself. No amount of exterior security can protect against built in weaknesses or fraud. And when you come right down to it, any voting systems most vulerable point is insider fraud- and these systems put the potential fault and burden on the poll workers and local election officials. The new DRE's are MORE vulerable to insider fraud, let alone other forms of hacking.

[gristy]

8. kick

:kick: