BBV and paper print outs: My concern with a "hole"

[el_gato]

Shouldn't there be 2 printouts, one to put in a box that gets permanently stored for the sake of verifying that the electronic count is accurate and another for the individual to walk away with.

What is to prevent a printout to read one thing and an electronic tally that registers something different?

[HFishbine]

1. The problem

with a "receipt" that a voter can walk away with is that it could be used as proof of voting a certain way in order to facilitate vote-buying.

[el_gato]

2. that's true

so the printouts required in the Nevada regulations just passed will be stored?

And the Rush Holt legislation would be the same way then?

If that's the case I guess I feel better about it.

[wtmusic]

6. Vote-buying is a federal crime

Is this really something that would be a serious problem? What is one or two or ten votes worth, when faced with the consequences of being caught?

Isn't storing the receipt more of a security risk? What's to stop an evil precinct from printing up thousands of phony receipts?

[HFishbine]

8. Reciept vs. paper ballot

A paper ballot would allow a voter to confirm that it reflects the votes cast on the electronic machine. It would then be deposited in in a ballot box for the purpose of having an auditable paper trail should there be a question with the electronically tabulated results.

If you take your printed ballot with you, there is no paper trail for a recount. Besides, what is the point? Why would someone need a personal copy of their ballot?

[lysergik]

3. No.

There should not be two ballots printed out. One ballot should be printed out and used for counting and recounting. The voter should not recieve a "receipt" under ANY circumstances.

[theorist]

4. Isn't the printout only meant for recounting?

If the electronic tally is suspect, then they'll count the printouts. If the voter can see that what's printed is correct, isn't everything legitimate. I might be missing something here...

[lysergik]

9. Hopefully..

The electronic tally would only be used for a projection. The actual vote would be in form of paper. If the ballot isn't in the box it doesn't count. That way the machines are used as a medium to record the votes, the voter is able to visually verify their vote and then if it is correct they are able to place their completed ballot in the secured box and their vote has been cast as specified.

[el_gato]

5. i was mistaken about the fate of the printout

for some reason I had assumed the voter would get to keep it
instead of it being stored which is what needs to be done

my mistake (i hope)

[wtmusic]

7. But your concern

'What is to prevent a printout to read one thing and an electronic tally that registers something different?'

is a legit one, and one I believe is worth the tradeoff for a limited number of bought votes.

[RedEagle]

10. The Whole Point of Paper Ballots...

...is that they are VOTER VERIFIED.

That creates an independent-of-the-tech ballot.

The voter verifies that paper ballot before it is cast as the vote.

IF the machine and paper are different, you call in a poll worker.

But the vote of record, the legal vote, is the paper ballot.

If the machine messes up, that paper ballot shows how you voted and it is a verified, printed ballot.

In the new systems, the ballots have bar code and random numbers that match the electronic record on them, plus the printed version of the voter's choice. The paper ballots can be audited against the random numbers in the machine. Pretty good way to eliminate ballot box shenanegans, if one could do it. But again, what's on that paper is way, way more then there used to be. ID'ing it as an authentic ballot is going to be more accurate then ever.

The PAPER BALLOT takes precedence in all matters of audit and recount. It is the VERIFIED, physical evidence, not a vapor vote.

[wtmusic]

11. OK, question

Paper is verified against machine, on machine's display--then 1 out of 10 or so votes that machine submits to voting headquarters are skewed toward manufacturer's favorite candidate (not enough to significantly raise suspicion).

Your system is helpless against this type of attack.