The US had its own policy and didn't defer to the UN's policy: rather it helped define UN policy and actions in regard to Rwanda well before and during the massacres. The US in 1993 and 1994 actively would not support measures that could have prevented the violence. After the killing began the US actively requested the UN to withdraw UN troops (which did not include US troops) and helped discourage/impede efforts to take effective timely action.
The Clinton Administration simply didn't want to be involved (it had other priorities/issues to deal with, Somalia was still a fresh memory). It didn't want greater UN involvement since that likely would require more from the US in resources and materials even if not armed forces. The US didn't simply drop its leadership role: its leadership supported UN inaction and withdrawl. And weighing things in the balance, pragmatically the Administration had to figure there would be little political fallout from such a policy. It was just Rwanda, after all. (Four years later Kosovo was another matter of course, geopolitically.)
In January 1994 the UN Commander Dallaire advised the UN (he reported to Kofi Annan who was in charge of the UN Peacekeeping forces) that killings were being planned. He wanted more troops and authority to raid arms caches and take other steps to avoid bloodshed. He didn't get it but was told to brief foreign ambassadors in Rwanda, including the US ambassador, which he did. From his view on the ground, the Rwanda genocide was a planned event that could have been stopped even before it began.
From a Human Rights Watch report:
Warnings, Information and the U.N. Staff
A January 11, 1994 telegram from General Roméo Dallaire, commander of the U.N. peacekeeping force, to his superiors was only one, if now the most famous, warning of massive slaughter being prepared in Rwanda. From November 1993 to April 1994, there were dozens of other signals, including an early December letter to Dallaire from high-ranking military officers warning of planned massacres; a press release by a bishop declaring that guns were being distributed to civilians; reports by intelligence agents of secret meetings to coordinate attacks on Tutsi, opponents of Hutu Power and U.N. peacekeepers; and public incitations to murder in the press and on the radio. Foreign observers did not track every indicator, but representatives of Belgium, France, and the U.S. were well-informed about most of them. In January, an analyst of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency knew enough to predict that as many as half a million persons might die in case of renewed conflict and, in February, Belgian authorities already feared a genocide. France, the power most closely linked to Habyarimana, presumably knew at least as much as the other two.
In the early months of 1994, Dallaire repeatedly requested a stronger mandate, more troops and more materiel. The secretariat staff, perhaps anxious to avoid displeasing such major powers as the U.S., failed to convey to the council the gravity of warnings of crisis and the urgency of Dallaire’s requests. The paucity of information meant little to the U.S. and France, which were well-informed in any case, but it led other council members with no sources of information in Rwanda to misjudge the gravity of the crisis. Instead of strengthening the mandate and sending reinforcements, the Security Council made only small changes in the rate of troop deployment, measures too limited to affect the development of the situation.
When the violence began, the secretary-general’s special representative, Roger Booh-Booh minimized both the extent and the organized nature of the slayings. Meanwhile Dallaire was fairly shouting the need for immediate and decisive action. Given the two points of view, the staff generally presented the more reassuring assessment to council members.
By late April, representatives of the Czech Republic, Spain, New Zealand and Argentina sought information beyond that provided by the secretariat and became convinced that the slaughter was a genocide that must be stopped. They pushed the Security Council to support a new peacekeeping operation with a stronger mandate to protect civilians. Had these non-permanent members been fully informed earlier—such as on January 11—they might have found their voices in time to have called for firm measures to avert the violence.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-05.htm#P121_49244And, lastly, subsequent Clinton administration claims that they didn't know what was going on until it was too late have been refuted by information released pursuant to FOIA's.
PBS Frontline Ghosts of Rwanda info:
Timeline:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/etc/crontext.htmlSamantha Power interview:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/power.htmlProgram page:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/"Clinton Kept Hotel Rwanda Open" article:
http://www.alternet.org/columnists/story/20872/National Security Archive articles and source materials:
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/ http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/index.htm