Deep thought of the day

[Philosophy]

I just had a philosophical musing that I want to write down, and since I am here anyway, this seems as good a place as any.

You may have heard it explained that a perfect simulation of a thing can be said to actually be that thing. For example if you had a very powerful computer that could perfectly simulate an apple in a virtual reality simulation that you were in, except due to the foreknowledge that you are in a simulation, you would have no way of knowing that apple isn't a real apple, therefore for all intents and purposes it is equivalent to a real apple which exists in a reality that you also have no way of knowing is not in fact also a highly advanced virtual reality simulation.

The thought I just had is that prior to having the ability to perfectly simulate an thing, one must have complete and perfect knowledge about that thing in the reality state that you mean to simulate as an alternate reality. This perfect knowledge will give one the ability to control that thing in one's current reality to the extant that it is able to be controlled, because part of one's perfect knowledge of the thing must necessarily include the limitations of its ability to be controlled. The ability to completly control a thing then enables one to completely determine all possible states of existence of that thing, and therefore in essence define its existence.

Therefore I propose that merely having perfect knowledge of a thing in any reality where it empirically exists is equivalent to being able to perfectly simulate that thing, and because a perfect simulation of a thing is equivalent to that thing, likewise the perfect knowledge of a thing is also equivalent to that thing. And conversely the existence of any thing is equivalent to and wholly determined by the knowledge of that thing.

Therefore reality is equivalent to knowledge.

Ponder.

[gonefishing]

1. Sounds like some good stuff.

It has been many years since I indulged. I think it was the same night I tried to read Gravitys Rainbow.

Cool thought!

[GURUving]

2. I still want a genuine apple

Perfect knowledge? Not in my world!

:)

[Philosophy]

3. Perfect knowledge is possible

If the universe is finite then any thing contained within it must also be finite and therefore possible to have perfect knowledge of, unless it is so complex as to exhaust the capacity of knowledge storing units within that same universe. The limit of the size of knowledge storing capacity in proportion to the size of the thing that the knowledge is about approaches a one to one ratio. Therefore it is coceivable that an apple can be perfectly simulated in an information storage device of equivalent size, and therefore that information storage device essentially is an apple.

Since then a perfect virtual apple is possible, how do you propose to distiguish such a thing from a real apple?

[GURUving]

4. The universe is not finite?

Information about a perceived object doesn't cause that object to exist anywhere other than in the mind of the perceiver?

Why do you torment my imperfect mind so!

[markses]

5. I'll give it a shot

First, your use of "equivalent" here makes it difficult to analyze these statements, since it does not seem to work according to its technical meaning (equal in valence - or value, or force).

That said, we see here - once again - the anxiety about the slippage between the concept and its object, played out, of course, by Plato and Aristotle, no less than buy Kant, Hegel and company, etc., and even down to Slavoj Zizek, who would no doubt have a thing or two to say about this notion that "we have no way of knowing" whether "reality" is a "highly advanced virtual reality simulation."

But, since we're playing the logic game (or, really, the language game), we should attend to its movements.

So, first movement: Can a perfect simulation of X be said to *be* X? No, because then it wouldn't be a simulation of X, but X itself. This is, of course, the obvious answer, but I think its a problem of terminology: Can a perfect likeness of a rose be thought of as a rose? Well, yes, at the level of the concept, which is to say, only at a level of generality already divorced from the *singularity* of any given rose (the problem of the model and the copy - but not the simulacra, where the simulacra is the bad copy - the one that escapes the concept, as in Plato). But the terminology fails us here. To the extent that *simulation* already includes differenciation, the simulated X will be differenciated from the "real" or model X by definition. "For all intents and purposes" is key here, since both imply cognitive states - the realm of the concept, but certainly not the singularity of the thing. It might *be* the thing "for us," as the Germans like to say, but it wouldn't for all that *be* the thing in itself (die Ding an sich).

Second movement: The first condition is that one have "complete and perfect knowledge." This obviously needs a much more extensive definition before we proceed (say, 2,500 years of epistemological thought). But let's play along. The next two sentences here don't make sense to me: 1) Perfect knowledge = control *to the extent* that X *can be* controlled. You imply here limitations to the capacity to control X. But then we see a slippage: The capacity to *completely control* X gives one the capacity to completely determine its existence. How did we move from the limits of control to complete (i.e., unlimited) control? And wouldn't whatever exceeded control in the first sentence limit the capacity to completely determine its existence in the second sentence? I think your care in the first sentence gets away from you in the second; the care is already bound up in the epistemological problem: What is there in X (as a thing) that exceeds the reign of the concept. This is, of course, Kant's problematic very generally in the Critique of Pure Reason, and it has bearing on the initial condition of "perfect knowledge of a thing" (one wonders about the assumption that makes being into a series of things, but we shouldn't bring up this problem now).

Since the first movement doesn't really hold up (it founders on the notion of equivalence, or X for us = X in itself), and the second movement works through slippage and equivocation (falls short not only on the question of perfect knowledge, but also on the question of control), it is not necessary to answer the conclusion, though the answer is of course implied in the first two criticisms.

One could be more interested to know why you thought you could solve one of the most intractable problems in the Western philosophical tradition (the relation of knowledge and its objects, or the relation between existence and thought) in a two paragraph movement! This very proof was discussed by Plato, and certainly even the pre-Socratics.

[Philosophy]

7. You're just arguing semantics

First of all, by simulation, I don't necessarily imply that the simulation is a copy of something that already exists in some reality. It could very well be an original entity. Secondly, even if the simulation were a duplicate of something else, if it is a perfect simulation it is completely arbitrary which one is the "real" one - either one could be said to be a simulation of the other. Any amount of knowledge that leads you to decide that one is a simulation could just as easily be the result of a lack of knowledge about the nature of existence of the other. One cannot use the lack of knowledge as evidence of non-existence.

To your second objection, by completely control, I meant this to be an extension of the immediately preceeding statement - completely control to the extent that something is possible to be controlled, and therefore completely determine its possible states of existence. If the universe is finite it would be impossible and therefore illogical to model all the impossible states of existence of a thing because those would be infinite.

In my original argument I am using knowledge not in the anthropic sense but in the pure disembodied information theory sense, which I doubt Plato, Socrates, Descartes, etc. were considering. "Thought" is then irrelevant. The linkage I am pondering would be directly between epistemology and existence.

[markses]

9. Well, semantics (i.e., meaning) tends to be important when making rigorous

arguments, yeah? And I did extend each note on terminology to a discussion of the conceptual problems.

By use of the term "simulation" you most certainly *imply* at least two "entities," by definition. I made no claims about the "reality" of either with respect to the other (paging Dr. Turing!) - in fact, I implied that both maintain the minimum of ontological "reality" necessary to attain a singular status. There is no doubt that *both* are original entities in the sense that they are both singular entities, whether or not you know about the other, and regardless of which *you* take to be "real": there is difference in the repetition. But you continue to confuse epistemology and ontology, which is the problem all along (you are, of course, trying to prove the "equivalence" between the two, so it is no surprise).

Unless, of course, you mean by simulation the creation of something without a model, in which case you may just as well use "creation" as "simulation," but this would also force you to abandon the second clause of your conclusion (i.e., "because a perfect simulation of a thing is equivalent to that thing") which clearly posits two "things" - you need at least two to set up a relation of equivalence.

You repeat the same problem (and this is not semantic, but categorical): "completely control to the extent that something is possible to be controlled, and therefore completely determine its possible states of existence." There is no therefore here: You cannot move from "to the extent it is possible to be controlled" to "completely determine its possible states of existence." If you posit a limit to the ability to control X (and you must do so!), you also posit states of existence (and I prefer "movements" or becomings to this "states of existence" bit) that exceed that limit. The capacity to be controlled does not map onto the possible states of existence without remainder, even according to your own argument. You certainly extend the first sentence, but you do so without warrant.

As for the "pure knowledge of information theory," you'd have to explain more about that, but from what I know of information theory, it is one of the most profound re-eruptions of Platonism (did somebody say "disembodied"?!?). And of course "thought" is irrelevant, since it is an action and a force, and not a reification, like "pure knowledge" - ah, the music of the spheres...

[nuxvomica]

6. Perfect knowledge of a thing requires near infinite information about it

Your average thing, like an apple, embodies in its very existence the most efficient storage of all information about that apple. To have perfect knowledge of that apple requires some level of abstraction of that information, for which there is probably not adequate storage in a finite universe outside of the apple itself. Or so I figure.

[Philosophy]

8. Depends upon what "knowledge" is

How abstract does the model need to be?

I suppose that depends upon what one intends to do with that knowledge. So perhaps it is a "goal" that determines the validity of the knowledge, and therefore the reality of the apple is determined by such that "goal".

This actually fits into a paper I am working on. :-)