It's late and I am tired but for anyone who answered the Pristina Question over and over, please put this:
http://www.theclarksphere.com/archives/000347.html#000347in a safe and handy place.
....snip....
So the questions raised by the smear pieces have been answered - Clark believed in allies at the time, and he believed in the chain of command, and he followed that chain of command. He believes in Allies now as well. Clark continued to rely on Sir Mike Jackson, sending him to negotiate face to face with Serbian commanders. Jackson continued on to be KFOR commander. Clearly, the two men, for whatever their differences over the Pristina airfield, did not decide the other was an unreliable colleague, and did not attempt to undercut or undermine the other's authority. It was a difference of tactical decision - Clark supported by his commanders and by Solana, Jackson by his superiors. The working out was not based on a larger decision about later negotiations, but over the working relationship between the US and the UK.
After all, if Clark's plan had been unacceptable, Solana could have simply withdrawn the "ACTORD", or Washington could have. Clearly both wanted the option in play in the negotiations, or one phone call could have stopped everything cold.
He had guidance for me. "I am recommending you move to Pristna airport as soon as possible," he (NATO Secretary General Javier Solana) said.
"Javier, I just want to be certain that you are comfortable that I have the authority to order this," I asked to be clear.
"Yes, of course you do. You have ACTORD," he said emphatically.
---------------
Let's be clear who we are talking about here - Javier Solana was the Socialist former Foreign Minister of Spain, who had opposed his country's entry into NATO, and who, as Secretary General, had the authority to order Clark to do this. It was Jackson, and later the British, who decided against it. The plan eventually adopted, to block airspace and the roads was Clark's, not "Washington's". On the 11th of June Solana ordered air exercises over Kosovo as a way of making it clear to the Russians that NATO was not merely folding its tent and going home. In his statements Solana emphasized that "all military options remain open". So, on the record, Clark had the backing of NATO to implement the ACTORD of 12 June.