I just re-read this, and was impressed by it's window into Kerry's thinking. Foremost, the man is an international chessmaster. He understands the short-term, but also plays 10 moves ahead. Secondly, he very much believes in laying the case out to the public
why international policies matter. Thirdly, he is very much conscience of the ways culture informs policy for other nations. Fourthly, he is absolutely committed to the long-term need for both international cooperation and raising international standards of conduct.
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"China will continue to be the most important—and most difficult—bilateral U.S. relationship in the years to come. It is clear that the Bush administration will maintain the policy of engagement with China, but it must engage China more effectively to better serve our national interests and rebuild the consensus in Congress in support of engagement. Bush must do four things to meet that challenge.
First, he must recognize that engagement is
not an objective in and of itself. Engagement is a process through which the United States and China pursue respective interests—some mutual, some not. Given the differences, engagement must be long term and promises to be challenging.
When China takes actions to which we object, whether toward Taiwan or its own citizens, we
cannot let fear of disrupting the process of engagement restrain us from
responding firmly, in public as well as private.
Second, the president must more clearly articulate U.S. national interests with regard to China if we are to do more than simply lurch from one crisis to the next. We need to
give Americans a better understanding of why we must engage China and what is at stake for the United States.
If Americans fail to
understand the linkage of interests with China, then setbacks in one area, such as human rights or trade, can undermine our ability to effectively maintain the overall relationship. By clearly stating our interests and our goals, we can
stay focused on the issues of real importance and avoid unnecessary and harmful distractions.
Third, we must be more realistic about expectations for
short- and long-term progress. Concluding a WTO agreement with China was a short-term goal. Promoting human rights and change in China is a long-term objective, and success or failure is not simply a function of our bilateral relationship.
We must realize that China’s fractious history and desire to maintain power has embedded in its leaders a
deep-rooted fear of too much rapid change and a resistance to anything that might undermine stability and cohesion. Due to this tendency, our ability to influence China varies—a point that policymakers in both the executive branch and the Congress
must understand and convey more clearly to the U.S. public. For this reason, a pragmatic U.S. approach to China must include multilateral efforts.
Finally, we must be prepared to
hold China accountable for its actions. When proliferation agreements or human rights are violated, we must invoke the enforcement mechanisms within international institutions such as the Geneva Human Rights Commission, the International Labor Organization, or soon the WTO, as well as enforce our own domestic laws.
The international community must insist that China be responsible for full compliance with its commitments. The U.S. public will not continue to support engagement unless we are more realistic about China’s transgressions and
oppose them openly. The level of debate has been frustrating and less than visionary."
www.twq.com/01spring/kerry.pdf
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