I know the other party gets really upset when we draw the comparisons between GOP and the less-than-favorably-remembered parties. My answer to that - well maybe you guys shouldn't make it so freakin' easy.
What follows is quite lengthy but I think these points are relevant. Parallels can already be drawn in some regards. Only the future can tell if the same can be said of others. It all makes for an interesting debate, though. Or maybe it's just me. (My minor was in History/Political Science and spent time in England studying Statesmanship between WWI and WWII, so there you go. I can't help BUT to try and draw parallels between present and past no matter how hard I try.)
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From 'Nazi Propoganda' by Proferssor David Welch in which he discusses the Nazi's 1932 campaign (
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/nazi_propaganda_gallery_01.shtml):
"Propaganda for the masses had to be simple, and appeal to the emotions. To maintain its simplicity, it had to put over just a few main points, which then had to be repeated many times. Once in power the Nazis took control of the means of communication by establishing the Reichministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda ('Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda') - or RMVP, under Dr Joseph Goebbels.
From 'Hitler's Leadership Style" by Dr. Geoffrey Megargee (
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/hitler_commander_01.shtml)
"There were several broad sets of problems with Hitler's style of command. These revolved around his personality, the depth of his knowledge, and his military experience, and they exacerbated corresponding problems in the German command system. After the war, the picture emerged of Hitler as a megalomaniac who refused to listen to his military experts and who, as a consequence, lost the war for Germany. That picture emerged due largely to the efforts of his former generals, who had their own reputations to protect. The truth was more complicated, even if Hitler's failings remained at the heart of it.
"Whatever the problems with his generals, however, there is no doubt that Hitler lacked many of the qualities he needed to control military affairs with consistent success. There have been examples - Churchill was one - of political leaders who successfully interceded in the details of military strategy and operations, but Hitler had neither the experience nor the personality for such a role. He shunned serious, comprehensive intellectual effort and was largely ignorant of military affairs and foreign cultures. He tended to reject any information that did not fit with his (often wildly inaccurate) preconceptions. Instead he relied on his 'instinct' and a belief that the will to win would overcome every obstacle in the end.
"By late 1942 Hitler's subordinates had split into cliques that competed for increasingly scarce resources, while he remained the final arbiter of all disputes. His senior commanders felt free to contact him directly; they knew that the last man to brief him often got what he wanted. At other times, though, Hitler would cling to a decision stubbornly, regardless of its merits. His decision to attack in the Ardennes in 1944 is one good example: his commanders tried, both directly and indirectly, to persuade him to adopt a more realistic plan, without success.
"He began by accepting war against the British Empire without any clear conception of how to win it. When his initial attempts to solve that problem failed, he reacted by turning against the Soviet Union - his preferred target in any case, for ideological as well as strategic reasons. There again he assumed an easy victory and had no back-up plan when success eluded him.
"Then, even as the failure of his eastern offensive was becoming obvious, he took on the United States, with whom he considered war to be inevitable in any case. At that point, with Germany fighting simultaneously against the world's three greatest powers, only a miracle could have staved off defeat, and none was forthcoming. From 1942 on, Germany could only hang on and try to exhaust its enemies, but their superior resources and increasingly skilled armies made the outcome first predictable and then inevitable.
"This was a situation that Hitler created. Where the Allies had a clear strategic concept, he had none. Ultimately he believed that war was his only tool, that his armies would win the war simply by winning battles, and that they would win battles in large part because of their racial and ideological superiority. He never balanced ends and means at the national level, and no matter how many battles he won, there always seemed to be another one to fight. In the end, his was the nation that exhausted itself.
"A final judgement on Hitler's role is one that calls for some balance. No commander works in isolation, no matter how absolute his power might appear. Germany's senior military leaders bear a large measure of responsibility for the onset, character and outcome of World War Two.
"The fact remains, however, that Hitler was the driving force behind the war. It was Hitler that provided its ideological basis and its strategic direction; his generals merely went along, however willingly. Hitler also had a hand in nearly all the major operational decisions concerning Germany's running of the war, and his was the leadership that took Germany and Europe into the greatest catastrophe of modern times."