<snip> Our cover story this month examines the self-acknowledged failure by FirstEnergy Corp. to develop an effective safety culture at its Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio. In March 2002, that failure led to the discovery of a large hole in the reactor's pressure vessel head, a carbon steel plate more than 6 inches thick.
As attorney and former NRC inspector Howard Whitcomb told Managing Editor Sandy Smith, "If the head had ruptured at Davis-Besse, the collapse of the containment structure and widespread radioactive contamination could have created a health hazard for thousands of people ..."
While it is troubling that officials at a nuclear power plant failed to fully appreciate the need for a vibrant safety culture, it is equally troubling that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission also failed in its oversight role. In fact, the U.S. General Accounting Office last year found a number of "systemic" problems in NRC's monitoring of nuclear safety. <snip>
http://www.occupationalhazards.com/articles/13015Davis-Besse: A Plan for Change or a Worst-Case Scenario?
by Sandy Smith
On Feb. 16, 2002, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. shut down the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) in Oak Harbor, Ohio, for a fairly routine refueling and inspection operation that included checking for cracks in the reactor head nozzles. What workers found was anything but routine.
Cracks were found in several reactor head nozzles, but the worst was yet to come. On March 6, 2002, workers discovered a cavity with a surface area of 20 to 30 square inches in the reactor pressure vessel head. The cavity extended down through the 6.63-inch thick carbon steel reactor pressure vessel head to a thin, internal liner of stainless steel cladding. That cladding was the only thing standing between the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and catastrophe.
"The fact that the reactor head did not rupture...all I can say is that it was divine intervention," says Toledo, Ohio, attorney Howard Whitcomb, a former NRC inspector who worked at the Davis-Besse facility from 1985-88. "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the folks at Davis-Besse are trying to minimize the incident, but the truth is, it was probably the worst accident to occur since Chernobyl and at least as bad as what happened at Three Mile Island. If the head had ruptured at Davis-Besse, the collapse of the containment structure and widespread radioactive contamination could have created a health hazard for thousands of people and been a real threat to Lake Erie, which provides drinking water for 20 percent of the country." <snip>
The task force concluded that the nozzle leakage and the vessel head degradation were preventable. According to the task force, the event at Davis-Besse was not prevented because: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DBNPS and the nuclear industry failed to adequately review, assess and follow-up on relevant operating experience; DBNPS failed to assure that plant safety issues would receive appropriate attention; and The NRC failed to integrate known or available information into its assessments of Davis-Besse's safety performance. <snip>
http://www.occupationalhazards.com/articles/13010