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Edited on Wed Feb-11-09 08:04 AM by HamdenRice
It's pretty disappointing. I haven't analyzed the whole thing yet, but overall, it's worse on principle than Paulson's.
<On edit: I should call it Barney Frank's plan, not Paulson's. It was Frank who completely revised the one page plan that Paulson presented to Congress, and turned it into a much better, if flawed, 100 page legislative plan. That said, Paulson worked on it, and it is generally called "Paulson's plan."-HR>
At least in Paulson's TARP 1, the Treasury took an equity position in the banks. That was in the form of preferred shares and warrants to buy common stock. Although a lot of the liberal blogosphere seems to believe that there were "no strings attached," in fact, the preferred had a face value, paid mandatory dividends, and had to be redeemed at face value. Paulson's plan was a partial stealth nationalization. Hence, if the banks were saved, most homeowners stayed in their homes and paid their mortgages, and the bad assets regained value, then the taxpayers would regain almost everything they put into the banks in preferred redemption, dividends and the warrants ability to deliver the rise in price of the banks' common stock. In other words, to paraphrase the phrase of the day, Paulson's plan socialized the risk, but also socialized the profits.
Geithner's plan entirely socializes the risk and privatizes the profits -- the risk being socialized through guarantees, while as far as I can tell (and I stand to be corrected), all the profits will go to hedge funds and other large institutional investors. He's trying to lure hedge funds and institutional investors into a win-win situation in which if the assets recover value, they make trillions, and if the assets lose value, these hedge fund investors lose nothing because the taxpayers pony up on the guarantees. In other words, Geithner's plan will completely socialize the risk and privatize the profits.
One thing we all have to keep in mind -- something that's hard to keep in mind because of the rhetoric of the media -- is that the underlying assets, the mortgage backed securities, are still extremely valuable. Many of them are not in default, but because the market has died, can't be sold. Many of them are performing normally, but their credit ratings have been downgraded, so many, many financial institutions, that are only allowed to buy "investment grade securities" are legally not allowed to buy them. That means that there are billions (if not trillions) of dollors worth of $10,000 face value mortgage backed securities that are paying interest and principal normally, that are by any measure actually worth $10,000, but are worth almost nothing on the bond market.
<On edit: The $10,000 face value is an example, and is not exclusive.-HR>
Of course, there's also a lot of really, truly worthless stuff out there -- especially collateralized debt obligations -- but that stuff is making everyone afraid of the still good stuff.
Because the media, including the liberal blogosphere, has latched onto calling all of them "toxic," "worthless," "troubled" and so on, most of the public doesn't realize that they still have inherent value and that a lot of actors are planning a massive giveaway of "garbage" that will magically be transformed into gold.
Who gets these securities -- and who is holding them when and if they return to their face value -- is the big question. In Paulson's plan, it's basically the banks, with us taxpayers as owners, through preferred shares and warrants. In Geithner's plan, it's hedge funds.
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