The work I'm doing right now has a strong message for stories like this, with its implications about the affordability of fertilizer in the underdeveloped world as time goes on.
I’m just completing the number crunching for the next stage of my ongoing attempt to develop a quantitative framework for projections about global civilization and population over the next 40 or 50 years. (Earlier parts of the analysis are at
World Energy to 2050 and
Energy and GDP in 2050.) I haven't finished the write-up of this latest work yet, but the numbers are so compelling that I thought I’d post a précis here.
I’m analyzing the effects of energy depletion (mainly peak oil and gas) on global and national GDP. My previous attempt in the article linked above was somewhat unsatisfactory, so I’ve reworked the analysis to examine the effects of the energy intensity (the amount of energy needed to produce a dollar of GDP) of different countries’ economies. The EIA keeps good energy intensity records, and I’ve used them to develop intensity projections out to 2050 for the economy every country on the planet.
When you combine those intensity projections with the changes in national energy supplies that I developed in my first article, it’s possible to calculate the changes in national GDP in 2050. When those results are combined with UN population projections, a picture emerges of the national average per capita GDP in each country. The story the numbers tell is fascinating (in a deeply disturbing sort of way).
Rich nations tend to have stable or declining populations as well as constantly improving energy intensities. The result of hitting this trifecta is that even in the face of energy shortfalls their per-capita GDP will not fall by much. Their population and energy intensity changes both move in positive directions that help insulate them from the worst effects of energy declines. In a few cases their income levels actually improve.
Poor nations are another story altogether. Rather than a trifecta they face a triple threat: they are poor to begin with, and have few energy options beyond fossil fuels; they have exploding populations because the underdeveloped nations have universally high Total Fertility Rates; finally, their economies tend to show worsening energy intensities over time.
This combination of factors leads to a massive increase in the global disparity of national incomes reflected in per-capita GDP.
The most telling number is what happens to the world’s mean and median income between now and 2050.
Today the world’s mean income is about $10,000 per person, while the median income is about $8,000.
In 2050 the global mean income declines 25% to $7,500. The
median income, however, plummets a full 70%, to a meager
$2,500.
The end result is that the number of “poor” as I have defined them (people living in countries with an average per-capita GDP less than $4,000) more than doubles to over 5 billion, while their average income drops from $2,500 to $1,250.
This analysis has radically changed my understanding of the shape of the coming troubles. My initial intuitive expectation that a global die-off was on its way has been modified by this appearance of a massively bimodal distribution of wealth. We in the overdeveloped nations will do fine with our hybrid cars, windmills, electric trains and military might. However, the world will not be able to bridge the yawning chasm that is now opening beneath the underdeveloped nations.
I have yet to add in the effect of droughts, soil depletion or rising fertilizer prices to my developing model. When you consider the fact that fertilizer in Africa already costs at least twice the world price and that we can expect that price to rise by several multiples as Peak Natural Gas hits over the next two decades, then the projected decline in per-capita GDP in Africa and South Asia amounts to a death sentence for many millions of people over the next few decades.