US terror suspect in Yemen worked at 5 nuke sites

[bergie321]

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iQ2HxePTzHc1UC28Twn_MTWP8YmQD9ED788O3

BUENA, N.J. — Federal regulators say a U.S. citizen in custody in Yemen as a suspected al-Qaida member worked at five nuclear plant complexes in Maryland, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

<snip>

Funny, I don't see Al Qaeda operatives scrambling to infiltrate wind farms...

[cliffordu]

1. Great point....them wind farms seem immune to terra.

[Statistical]

2. TERRA TERRA TERRA.

That TERRA bomber in NYC was a cab driver. We should ban cabs to crack down on TERRA!

[kristopher]

3. Nuclear power plants are identified by terrorists as desirable targets.

Here is why: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/harvey-wasserman/who-will-pay-for-americas_b_191455.html

...Chernobyl's lethal cloud began pouring into the atmosphere 23 years ago this week. Dr. Alexey Yablokov, former environmental advisor to the late President Boris Yeltsin, and president of the Center for Russian Environmental Policy, estimates the death toll at 300,000.

It also gutted the regional economy, and accelerated the Soviet collapse. By conservative accounts Chernobyl's explosion has so far cost a half-trillion dollars, with its financial toll continuing to accrue.

...Chernobyl exploded in a remote rural region in an impoverished country. Eighty kilometers away, Kiev was heavily dusted with radiation. Its people have since suffered a marked increase in cancers, leukemia, birth defects and more.

Most American reactors are in what were also considered remote regions. But Indian Point is about half as far from Manhattan as is Chernobyl from Kiev. Likewise San Onofre from Los Angeles, Turkey Point from Miami, Byron from Chicago, Grand Gulf from Baton Rouge, Seabrook and Pilgrim from Boston, Limerick and Peach Bottom from Philadelphia, Calvert Cliffs from Baltimore, Perry from Cleveland, Prairie Island and Monticello from Minneapolis...

[Dogmudgeon]

4. As usual, key information was snipped

"But the commission says laborers like him would not usually be given security-related or sensitive information. Authorities say he passed federal background checks."

So the guy was in construction.

Maybe he was planning to fly a backhoe into a containment building. Maybe he was trained as a suicide pipefitter.

You never know when it comes to ... NUKE TERRAH!

--d!

[kristopher]

5. Or maybe just sabotage critical construction for a payoff at a later date?

[bergie321]

6. You think

That a trained construction worker couldn't deliberately weaken the structural integrity of a containment tower?

[Statistical]

7. For what purpose?

Never not once in history of US commercial power has containment structure been needed. Even in the TMI accident the fuel assemblies melted but they were contained within the the reactor pressure vessel.

I mean that has got to be the longest terra plot ever.

"Let me weaken this structure on the hope that maybe in next hundred years this reactor might have a meltdown (which has only happened once in 50 million reactor hours) in hopes that all other emergency coolant systems will fail (which has never happened) and the reactor vessel will breach (which has never happened) and radiation floods the containment structure and a steam explosion occurs (which may not happen even in reactor breach) and the containment structure is weakened enough that it can't contain the steam explosion (despite containment being over-engineered to withstand failure) and release radiation.

Really? I mean that some dedication.

TERRA! TERRA! TERRA! Maybe 70 years ago a terrorist weakened the Golden Gate bridge during construction so that eventually after 70.1 years it would fail and kill thousands of people.

OH NOES! OH NOES!

[bergie321]

8. Simply pointing out

Another of the dangers of nuclear power. But hey, I think I saw another wobbly blade on a windmill...

[kristopher]

10. So not only have nuclear plants been perfected against major accidental failures

but against deliberate sabotage at the construction phase also?

Wow. I'm impressed.

[Statistical]

11. No you aren't and that wasn't my claim.

My claim is it is stupid to think a terrorist would conduct sabotage that would only have an effect IF AND ONLY IF there is a meltdown that breaches the core (which has never happened in 50 million operating hours and counting).

[kristopher]

13. It is stupid to posit that a terrorist would use such an approach.

This isn't a fucking game.

[bananas]

26. That's flat-out wrong.

Your statement "Never not once in history of US commercial power has containment structure been needed" is wrong:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Containment_building

In the Three Mile Island accident the containment pressure boundary was maintained, but due to insufficient cooling, some time after the accident, radioactive gas was intentionally let from containment by operators to prevent over pressurization. This, combined with further failures caused the release of radioactive gas to atmosphere during the accident.<3>

Without containment, there would have been much more radiation released.

[kristopher]

31. Come on now...

You know that the nuclear power industry has ascended to a technological nirvana...

It isn't possible that any harm could result for deploying more the than 10,000 nuclear reactors that would be required to meet about 50% of our expected energy needs.

[Merchant Marine]

19. How exactly do you sabotage 10 feet of concrete and steel?

Short of a controlled demolition, that is...

[kristopher]

20. Why would that be the strategy?

IIRC containment domes generally range from 3-6 ft in thickness; it's interesting how they've lately morphed to 10 ft.

Here is their basic function:

As to

A containment building, in its most common usage, is a steel or reinforced concrete structure enclosing a nuclear reactor. It is designed, in any emergency, to contain the escape of radiation to a maximum pressure in the range of 60 to 200 psi ( 410 to 1400 kPa). The containment is the final barrier to radioactive release (part of a nuclear reactor's defence in depth strategy), the first being the fuel ceramic itself, the second being the metal fuel cladding tubes, the third being the reactor vessel and coolant system.<1>

The containment building itself is typically an airtight steel structure enclosing the reactor normally sealed off from the outside atmosphere. The steel is either free-standing or attached to the concrete missile shield. In the United States, the design and thickness of the containment and the missile shield are governed by federal regulations (10 CFR 50.55a) <2>.

While the containment plays a critical role in the most severe nuclear reactor accidents, it is only designed to contain or condense steam in the short term (for large break accidents) and long term heat removal still must be provided by other systems. In the Three Mile Island accident the containment pressure boundary was maintained, but due to insufficient cooling, some time after the accident, radioactive gas was intentionally let from containment by operators to prevent over pressurization. This, combined with further failures caused the release of radioactive gas to atmosphere during the accident.<3>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Containment_building

Could a failure through sabotage be *designed* to exceed those parameters?

It certainly seems prudent to assume that is possible until it is shown to not be possible.

[OKIsItJustMe]

25. TMI was brought down by a defective valve

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html

...

The accident began about 4:00 a.m. on March 28, 1979, when the plant experienced a failure in the secondary, non‑nuclear section of the plant. The main feedwater pumps stopped running, caused by either a mechanical or electrical failure, which prevented the steam generators from removing heat. First the turbine, then the reactor automatically shut down. Immediately, the pressure in the primary system (the nuclear portion of the plant) began to increase. In order to prevent that pressure from becoming excessive, the pilot-operated relief valve (a valve located at the top of the pressurizer) opened. The valve should have closed when the pressure decreased by a certain amount, but it did not. Signals available to the operator failed to show that the valve was still open. As a result, cooling water poured out of the stuck-open valve and caused the core of the reactor to overheat.

As coolant flowed from the core through the pressurizer, the instruments available to reactor operators provided confusing information. There was no instrument that showed the level of coolant in the core. Instead, the operators judged the level of water in the core by the level in the pressurizer, and since it was high, they assumed that the core was properly covered with coolant. In addition, there was no clear signal that the pilot-operated relief valve was open. As a result, as alarms rang and warning lights flashed, the operators did not realize that the plant was experiencing a loss-of-coolant accident. They took a series of actions that made conditions worse by simply reducing the flow of coolant through the core.

...

I don't believe it was installed by a foreign terrorist...

[NNadir]

9. On the other hand, you don't see nuclear terrorism either. As for the wind farms

they are a fig leaf for the dangerous fossil fuel industry - on which they depend entirely and, I don't know if you've heard of this - there have been several dangerous fossil fuel terrorist events, one involving a small town called "New York" and a slightly smaller town called "Oklahoma City."

Have a nice fear mongering day, Dick Cheney.

[kristopher]

12. what security measures protect against sabotage of critical subsystems built offsite?

Once you start down the road of considering sabotage of new nuclear plant construction, where do the opportunities for malicious action end?
All the risk assessments directed at terrorism seem to focus on the vulnerability of the containment dome or the pools storing spent waste to an aircraft strike like the WTC.

That shows a distinct lack of imagination on the part of planners. How many welds could be compromised by using welding rods that are designed to ensure the weld fails after 1 year of use?

What would be the results of perhaps thousands of welds all ready to fail at approximately the same time? Could a cascade of failures be planned where one critical failure overloaded hundreds of other welds?

This isn't a fucking game.

[Name removed]

14. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[kristopher]

15. So that addresses the possibility of thousands of sabotaged welds?

[Name removed]

16. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[kristopher]

17. I used to plan against terrorist attacks at a military installation with nuke storage.

It is amazing how many vulnerabilities you can find when you are looking for them. For example, simply replacing welding rods with specified performance standards with ones that have lower standards would be relatively easy to do and would have potentially catastrophic consequences if planned properly.

Are you denying that is true?

[The Croquist]

33. What about inspections?

Would they discover this?

[bananas]

34. These guys are clueless about security

A couple of stories you might not have heard about - first, the attack on Pelindaba, and second, some surprising security problems with the control systems. If you read the threads below, you'll see that the knee-jerk reaction from pro-nukes is to "call bullshit", they've been conned into believing that these things are impossible.


First, the attack on Pelindaba.

This wasn't a power plant, but it was the facility used by South Africa to build it's atomic bomb, the government tried to cover it up - if the off-duty security guard hadn't been interviewed at the hospital, we never would have heard about it.

"Gun battle in reactor control room - Nuclear industry tries to censor the story"
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=115x120921

"South Africa nuclear research facility admits to second break-in"
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=102x3064484

"Pelindaba suspects are still at large"
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=115x163728

60 Minutes eventually did a story on it:
"Assault On Pelindaba Nuclear Facility - tonight on 60 minutes"
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=385x243866

"xpost - Assault On Pelindaba nuclear site - full 60 Minutes video and transcript"
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=115x176681

This is one of South Africa's most secure facilities, they got in and out scott-free, nobody knows who the attackers were or who was working with them on the inside, and the only reason they failed their mission is because an off-duty security guard happened to be keeping his fiance company.


Next, some security problems with the control systems.

"New York nuclear plant shutdown triggered by digital camera"
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=115x154025

"Entergy and the NRC said information about the camera incident would be passed to other nuclear plants, which have experienced similar woes, such as when camera flashes caused the release of Halon gas at the Haddam Neck Plant in Connecticut in 1997."
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=115&topic_id=154025&mesg_id=154243

"The first time Scott Lunsford offered to hack into a nuclear power station, he was told it would be impossible. There was no way, the plant's owners claimed, that their critical components could be accessed from the Internet. Lunsford, a researcher for IBM's Internet Security Systems, found otherwise."
http://www.forbes.com/2007/08/22/scada-hackers-infrastructure-tech-security-cx_ag_0822hack.html

"Cyber-security experts have long warned of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure like power, transportation and water systems to malicious hackers. Friday, those warnings quietly became a reality: Tom Donahue, a CIA official, revealed at the SANS security trade conference in New Orleans that hackers have penetrated power systems in several regions outside the U.S., and "in at least one case, caused a power outage affecting multiple cities." "
http://www.forbes.com/2008/01/18/cyber-attack-utilities-tech-intel-cx_ag_0118attack.html

Those incidents were accidents but they should make it apparent that the control systems are susceptible to various forms of jamming and hacking.

[hunter]

18. I wonder what jobs he had?

Drywall hanger sabotages remodeling of Nuclear Power Plant's Restroom! Three inches of Dap 9140 drywall tape left exposed! "I noticed it when I was standing at the urinal and I looked up!" says a stunned engineer. "I wondered what sort of tradesman would do such a thing!" Stay tuned for more News at Ten!

I can't wait to see what this is really about...

[kristopher]

21. The significance is the vulnerability it exposes...

Do you have any idea how difficult it would be to provide security against this approach to sabotage if we undertake to build hundreds (in the US) or over 10,000 (globally) new reactors to meet climate change goals? It isn't just the direct jobs, but all the employees in the supply chain.

[kristopher]

22. "Get away from me you Muslim killer!"

'Mobley is a 26-year-old natural-born U.S. citizen who grew up in Buena, N.J., and later lived in Philadelphia and Newark, Del. A former neighbor said he moved to Yemen about two years ago, supposedly to learn Arabic and study Islam.

He was among 11 al-Qaida suspects detained this month in a security sweep in Yemen's capital of San'a this month. He was taken to the hospital over the weekend after he complained of feeling ill. Yemeni officials said he snatched a gun from a security guard and fatally shot one guard and wounded another before being captured.

His parents have said he is not a terrorist.

A former friend said he believed Mobley was becoming radical before he moved to Yemen about two years ago.

Roman Castro, an Army veteran who did a tour in Iraq after he and Mobley graduated from high school together in 2002, said Mobley had only these words for him in a chance meeting four years ago: "Get the hell away from me, you Muslim killer!"'

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/12/sharif-mobley-alleged-nj_n_496590.html

[Statistical]

23. Yup dangerous to let him carry tools.

Officials at PSEG Nuclear, which runs the complex in New Jersey, say he carried supplies and worked on routine maintenance mostly during periodic refueling outages, when hundreds of contracted employees descend upon the plants.

The NRC says a laborer typically would not have access to security-related or sensitive information.

[kristopher]

24. This isn't an issue of information access, it is an issue of potential sabotage of new plants.

Like I've written, this highlights a substantial weakness (and unaccounted cost) that affects plans for future construction.

How do you assure, other than through the procurement process, that the welding rods used are actually meeting design specifications? How do you protect the supply chain against sabotage at that level?

[hunter]

28. OMG! He had TOOLS!

I'm still not worried yet. This story stinks.

I'll bet guys tangled up with drug gangs have worked in nuclear power plants too. And alcoholics, and stoners, and people who are incompetent fools.

It's still a management problem of the common sort until proven otherwise.

He could've been blowing up a natural gas plant in Middleton maybe...

TERROR!

[kristopher]

30. He shot and killed one guard and wounded another after they initially arrested him as AlQ suspect

http://videos.apnicommunity.com/Video,Item,1000714154.html

[kristopher]

27. Congressional Research Service on containment breach

Government Accountability Office. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Preliminary Observations
on Efforts to Improve Security at Nuclear Power Plants. Statement of Jim Wells, Director,
Natural Resources and Environment, to the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform. September 14,
2004. p. 14.
Nuclear Plant Vulnerability

Operating nuclear reactors contain large amounts of radioactive fission products
which, if dispersed, could pose a direct radiation hazard, contaminate soil and vegetation,
and be ingested by humans and animals. Human exposure at high enough levels can
cause both short-term illness and death, and longer-term deaths by cancer and other
diseases.

To prevent dispersal of radioactive material, nuclear fuel and its fission products are
encased in metal cladding within a steel reactor vessel, which is inside a concrete
“containment” structure. Residual heat from the radioactive fission products could melt
the fuel-rod cladding even if the reactor were shut down. A major concern in operating
a nuclear power plant, in addition to controlling the nuclear reaction, is assuring that the
core does not lose its coolant and “melt down” from the heat produced by the radioactive
fission products within the fuel rods. Therefore, even if plant operators shut down the
reactor as they are supposed to during a terrorist attack, the threat of a radioactive release
would not be eliminated.

Commercial reactor containment structures — made of steel-reinforced concrete
several feet thick (not 10' thick - K) — are designed to prevent dispersal of most of a reactor’s radioactive
material in the event of a loss of coolant and meltdown. Without a breach in the
containment, and without some source of dispersal energy such as a chemical explosion
or fire, the radioactive fission products that escaped from the melting fuel cladding mostly
would remain where they were. The two meltdown accidents that have taken place in
power reactors, at Three Mile Island in 1979 and at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union in
1986, illustrate this phenomenon. Both resulted from a combination of operator error and
design flaws. At Three Mile Island, loss of coolant caused the fuel to melt, but there was
no fire or explosion, and the containment prevented the escape of substantial amounts of
radioactivity. At Chernobyl, which had no containment, a hydrogen explosion and a
fierce graphite fire caused a significant part of the radioactive core to be blown into the
atmosphere, where it contaminated large areas of the surrounding countryside and was
detected in smaller amounts literally around the world.

So the question regarding containment becomes, could a fire or explosion be contrived?

How much pressure is the airtight dome designed to contain?

"A containment building, in its most common usage, is a steel or reinforced concrete structure enclosing a nuclear reactor. It is designed, in any emergency, to contain the escape of radiation to a maximum pressure in the range of 60 to 200 psi ( 410 to 1400 kPa). The containment is the final barrier to radioactive release (part of a nuclear reactor's defence in depth strategy), the first being the fuel ceramic itself, the second being the metal fuel cladding tubes, the third being the reactor vessel and coolant system.<1>
The containment building itself is typically an airtight steel structure enclosing the reactor normally sealed off from the outside atmosphere. The steel is either free-standing or attached to the concrete missile shield. In the United States, the design and thickness of the containment and the missile shield are governed by federal regulations (10 CFR 50.55a) <2>."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Containment_building

200PSI is the working pressure of a large home workshop sized air compressor.

There was a great deal of publicity about a test where a small jet crashed into a containment dome at high speed and did virtually no damage. What does it require to expand steam more than 200psi in the volume of a containment structure?

[kristopher]

29. Rachel did segment on Mobley tonight.

http://videos.apnicommunity.com/Video,Item,1000714154.html

[bananas]

32. That test wall was pushed back six feet

There's a better video around somewhere which clearly shows the wall moving back,
I don't have link to that right now, but here's an article about it:

http://www.nci.org/02NCI/01/back-27.htm

Lyman goes on to quote directly from the Sandia test report: "The major portion of the impact energy went into movement of the target and not in producing structural damage."

In fact, the wall was not anchored in the ground (as containment domes are) but suspended on a cushion of compressed air so that it would be pushed back and would not suffer structural damage. The reason: the test was not intended to test the strength of the wall, but rather to measure the impact forces of the jet crashing into it. That is why Sandia devised a "frictionless" way for the wall to move, upon impact.

[kristopher]

37. That is very different then.

I should have known better than accept nuclear industry propaganda at face value...

[bananas]

35. This article lists six plants

Weird - first it says he worked at 5 plants, then it lists six plants he worked at.

http://www.wgal.com/news/22823463/detail.html

US Terror Suspect In Yemen Worked At TMI
Sharif Mobley Worked At 4 Other Nuclear Power Plants

BUENA, N.J. -- Federal regulators said a U.S. citizen in custody in Yemen as a suspected al-Qaida member worked at five nuclear plant complexes in Maryland, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

<snip>

The 26-year-old Mobley worked at the Salem and Hope Creek plants in New Jersey; the Peach Bottom, Limerick and Three Mile Island facilities in Pennsylvania; and Calvert Cliffs in Maryland between 2002 and 2008.

<snip>

[kristopher]

36. Salem and Hope Creek are co-located - usually considered as one entity.