Cracks found in critical reactor parts at Davis-Besse nuclear power plant

[Kolesar]

Corrosion-susceptible nozzles have been a problem with the Three-Mile-Island-vintage reactors.

We don't know how close we came to the pressure vessel rupturing and spraying radioactive pollution into Lake Erie on the last occasion when the Davis Besse reactor head corroded. There was a football sized hole in the reactor head. The chrome coating was all that was serving to keep the pressure inside.

I hope we close this beast permanently. First Energy's nuclear reactors have made our electricity rates in Ohio ridiculously high--about twice as high as AEP.

Recall that the liars at First Energy wrote fake evaluation reports for the NRC that claimed they did inspections that they never performed. The company did not want to "idle" Davis Besse to do the required inspections because it would cost them revenue. It almost cost us Lake Erie.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=102x4307373

OAK HARBOR, Ohio -- Inspectors working at FirstEnergy Corp.'s Davis-Besse power plant near Toledo have uncovered the same kind of cracking in critical reactor lid parts that were the cause of massive corrosion found at the plant eight years ago.

In a routine report filed early today with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the company said inspectors using sophisticated ultrasonic instruments had found indications of cracking in 12 of the 69 metal tubes that carry control rods through the reactor lid.

Davis-Besse has been down since Feb. 28 for regular refueling and plant-wide inspections and maintenance. Workers late last week began instrument-assisted inspections of all 69 of the corrosion-resistant tubes, known as "nozzles" in the industry because they protrude from the reactor lid several feet and resemble nozzles.

Reactor operators electrically move control rods through the nozzles in and out of the radioactive reactor core at the bottom of the reactor to speed up or slow down the nuclear reaction. The Davis-Besse reactor is about 40 feet tall and 14 feet across, and holds about 87,000 gallons of boric acid-laced reactor coolant...

Source: http://www.cleveland.com/plaindealer /

[eleny]

1. Peter Werbe's interview portion of his radio show covered this last night

I think it was the second interview. So frightening.

[Journeyman]

2. Not much leaked, surely no more than a mickle. . .

and wasn't it Ben Franklin himself who averred it would take "many a mickle to make a muckle."

So we're okay. Just so long as we don't do the math. . .


If I should remark that in the Pacific depths
bubbles trickle ominously through concrete boxes,
what would you answer?

~Evan S. Connell
Points for a Compass Rose, 1973

[Statistical]

3. "We don't know how close we came to the pressure vessel rupturing and spraying radioactive pollution

I know: 0.0000000%.

Unlike Russia designs US reactors have both a pressure vessel and containment structure (18" of steel surrounded by 7 feet of steel reinforced concrete).
If a reactor vessel were to fail (has never happened yet) any radioactive material released would be inside the containment structure. This is the reason we spend about half a billion dollars (in 2010 dollars) building both the concrete pad and containment structure. We have never needed one but it is the last line of defense in case a reactor pressure vessel breaks.

[Kolesar]

5. Lid blows, control rods jam, reactor goes critical, steam explosion blows the fuck out of the

..."Containment structure". You don't know how lucky we were that did not happen. The investigation noted that Davis Besse was within a few weeks of the lid rupturing.

Real estate from Toledo to Toronto would have been worthless with a radioactive water supply.

[Statistical]

8. Containment structure designed to handle overpressure of steam explosion.

If steam explosion could destroy containment structure THEN WHY THE FLYING FUCK WOULD WE BUILD THEM?

They exist for one reason and one reason only. That is is to contain the energy released for steam or hydrogen explosion for melted core.
They do nothing else.

Also Western reactors are required to have fission halt devices. Control rods and nuclear poisons. Temp rises in core past max operating temperature (and this hundreds of degrees below vessel breach point and temperature specific seals burst flooding core with boron solution kept under extreme static pressure. Boron absorbs neutrons and kills fission chain (even with control rods completely out).

Defense in depth, defense by redundancy, and passive safety

Your frantic doomsday hyperbole notwithstanding.

[kristopher]

9. Actually that isn't it at all...

A containment building, in its most common usage, is a steel or reinforced concrete structure enclosing a nuclear reactor. It is designed, in any emergency, to contain the escape of radiation to a maximum pressure in the range of 60 to 200 psi ( 410 to 1400 kPa). The containment is the final barrier to radioactive release (part of a nuclear reactor's defence in depth strategy), the first being the fuel ceramic itself, the second being the metal fuel cladding tubes, the third being the reactor vessel and coolant system.<1>

The containment building itself is typically an airtight steel structure enclosing the reactor normally sealed off from the outside atmosphere. The steel is either free-standing or attached to the concrete missile shield. In the United States, the design and thickness of the containment and the missile shield are governed by federal regulations (10 CFR 50.55a) <2>.

While the containment plays a critical role in the most severe nuclear reactor accidents, it is only designed to contain or condense steam in the short term (for large break accidents) and long term heat removal still must be provided by other systems. In the Three Mile Island accident the containment pressure boundary was maintained, but due to insufficient cooling, some time after the accident, radioactive gas was intentionally let from containment by operators to prevent over pressurization. This, combined with further failures caused the release of radioactive gas to atmosphere during the accident.<3>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Containment_building

200 psi is the operating pressure of a large home workshop air compressor...

In a full-fledged nuclear meltdown, the most severe outcomes would be those leading to early containment failure. Two possibilities are the ejection at high pressure of molten fuel into the containment, causing rapid heating; or an in-vessel steam explosion causing ejection of a missile (eg. the upper head) into, and through, the containment. Less onerous but still significant would be that the molten mass of fuel and reactor core melts through the floor of the reactor building and reaches ground water; a steam explosion might occur, but the debris would probably be contained, and would in fact, being dispersed, probably be more easily coolable.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steam_explosion

[Statistical]

13. you are aware how big containment is right.

Slightly larger than size of an air compressor.
Energy required to raise pressure increases as volume increases.
P = V/T. Sound familiar.

The volume inside containment is a couple thousand times larger than an air compressor. Thus energy required to raise pressure is ALSO couple thousand times larger.
EDIT: my ballpark figure was too low. For a contaiment that is a 50 foot tall cylinder with 25 foot radius the volume is roughly 400,000 cu ft. So hundreds of thousands time larger.

Do the math on how much energy it would require to increase atmospheric pressure inside a containment structure 50 meters by 20 meters in size to 200 psi.
Saying compressor is 200psi is stupid. A soda can is 55 psi. I guess opening a 6 pack of coke inside containment will rip the building apart. Who knew a can of coke is that powerful.
No need for smart bombs just drop 6 packs of coke on the enemy.

Pressure inside a handgun chamber can reach 25,000 psi. So by your logic someone firing a pistol at containment building will blow a giant chunk out of it.
No wait, a paintball gun achieves pressures of 3,000 psi. Don't let a terrorist get within a mile of a nuclear plant with a single paintball gun. They could BLOWZZZZ UP DA REACDOORZ!


The more you type the more it becomes obvious you just grab stats and figures and don't have the slightest clue what they mean, do you?

[kristopher]

15. Nukophiles like to point to the thickness of the dome...

to paint the picture that it is a totally impervious to the effects of an explosion. It isn't. It is no stronger than the fucking air compressor in my garage.

[Statistical]

17. I need to bookmark that.

Did you fail science in school? Maybe you got a GED instead or was it one of those "social promotion" things?

You honestly think a containment structure is "no stronger than the fucking air compressor in my garage". Really?
Lets put the pro-nuke, anti-nuke arguments aside. You honestly believe that? Even worse you have no clue as to why that is incorrect.

200 psi in a 500,000 cubic feet = 200 psi in 1.5 cubic feet? I really feel sorry for you man. I really do. Somewhere the public education system failed you.

[kristopher]

19. Another effing strawman!!!

I understand the difference in aggregate energy contained. That doesn't change the fact that the max *pressure* the dome can contain (*if* it is 200) is the same as the compressor. I would feel sorry for *you* that you have to rely on attempts to deceive people if the act of prevarication itself weren't so repugnant.

[Statistical]

20. You words "no stronger than the fucking air compressor in my garage"

Sad. You know realize how stupid what you said was and are trying to pretend you didn't say it.

What you said: "containment is no stronger than the fucking air compressor in my garage"
Reality: containment is roughly 400,000 times stronger than your air compressor (if 1 cu ft).

1:1 or 400,000:1. Who care rights? When all your arguments are faith based they mean the same thing.

[Kolesar]

22. My Strength of Materials prof would have flunked you if this was your answer

to an essay question
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=115&topic_id=236498&mesg_id=236517
200psi is the strength of the vessel wall, no matter the size of the vessel.

[Statistical]

25. Not likely.

Apply energy to both an air compressor (1 cu ft) and containment building (400,000 cu ft). Which can absorb more energy before rupturing?

Given that the danger from nuclear meltdown is decay heat (fission will halt in negative void coefficient design as water boils), and decay heat is transferring energy into water, converting it to steam and thus increasing pressure the SIZE OF THE STRUCTURE is very important in determine how much energy can be safely contained. Pressure will build inside containment building at 1/400,000th the rate it will in the air compressor given equal amounts of energy.

Ever notice the inside of a PWR containment is mostly empty? Containments in PWR are roughly 10x as big as BWR. Why do they build them so big? They like extra material cost? Planning to hold a rave inside there? No. Could it possibly be to absorb the massive amount of energy released in a vessel breach? Something an air compressor can't do. Right?

[kristopher]

24. Ok, lay it out completely.

You are talking about the total energy contained, not the pressure exerted on a per unit basis of the interior surface area.

If that is wrong, then I will retract my statement.

[joshcryer]

29. "It is no stronger than the fucking air compressor in my garage."

LOL!

:rofl:

[AtheistCrusader]

35. Your air compressor can withstand the impact of an F-4 Phantom on a rocket sled?

Neat. I want one.

[kristopher]

37. The containment dome can't either...

http://www.nci.org/02NCI/01/back-27.htm

Background

Some TV news documentaries and newspaper articles and editorials have featured a crash test, provided by nuclear industry representatives, showing an F-4 Phantom jet being rocket-propelled on a sled into a massive concrete wall. The plane disintegrates in a fireball; the wall is barely scratched. The conclusion offered by industry is that reactor containment domes can resist air crashes, even by jumbo jets.

Not so fast.

The U.S. Sandia National Laboratories, which conducted and filmed the test in 1988, has put the following disclaimer on its website: "The test was not intended to demonstrate the performance (survivability) of any particular type of concrete structure to aircraft impact."

And for good reason.

As a letter to the editor of the New York Times by NCI Scientific Director Edwin Lyman, points out, the crash test "proves nothing, since the wall was not attached to the ground and was displaced nearly six feet."

Lyman goes on to quote directly from the Sandia test report: "The major portion of the impact energy went into movement of the target and not in producing structural damage."

In fact, the wall was not anchored in the ground (as containment domes are) but suspended on a cushion of compressed air so that it would be pushed back and would not suffer structural damage. The reason: the test was not intended to test the strength of the wall, but rather to measure the impact forces of the jet crashing into it. That is why Sandia devised a "frictionless" way for the wall to move, upon impact.

Of course, the dramatic footage of the crash suggested just the opposite: a containment-type wall resisting the full impact of a 500 mph jet crash!

The nuclear power industry, which closely follows research results of the Sandia National Laboratories, has made no effort to clear up the misimpression left by the film of the test. Indeed, the test is a phony when it is used to demonstrate reactor containment survivability.

The Nuclear Control Institute now calls on the Nuclear Energy Institute and other representatives of the nuclear power industry, to disavow the Sandia test, to acknowledge its misleading results, and to apologize for recklessly misleading the public.

Here are some other details that dramatically illustrate just how misleading the film of the Sandia test is:

-- The fuel tanks of the Phantom jet were filled with water, not jet fuel (this to permit Sandia to measure the dispersal of the water upon impact and thus project how jet fuel would be dispersed in a crash);

-- The total weight of the Phantom fighter is only about 5% of a 767 jumbo jet;

-- The Phantom's engine weight is only about 1/3d that of a 767 jumbo jet engine (the Nuclear Control Institute has calculated a jumbo jet engine could penetrate six feet of reinforced concrete);

-- The concrete test wall was 12 feet thick, compared with the 3.5-foot-thick concrete containment domes of nuclear power plants.

What is needed is a peer-reviewed design analysis to demonstrate whether containment domes could resist a full-speed crash of a jumbo jet. Until such a design analysis is completed by U.S. government scientists and regulators, the industry's claims that containments could resist such a crash should be rejected.

Paul Leventhal
President
Nuclear Control Institute

[AtheistCrusader]

38. I apologize.

I was apparently willingly misled.

[kristopher]

39. I just found it out myself.

[Statistical]

40. No you are being mislead now.

That test wasn't designed to SIMULATE a containment building. Rather that test was designed to determine the level of force a future containment building would suffer. It was designed to gather precise measurements on force of impact. Before you can set standards for safety you need to know how much energy will need to be absorbed.

Think about it for a second. Would it makes sense to build a bunch of containment buildings at random with different material strength and crash planes into all of them and then pick the one which survives? Of course not.

The first thing any scientist or engineer needs is percise measurements. How much force will a containment building need to absorb to safely protect the reactor? That is the question answered by the study. By putting the slab on a cushion of air and striking it and then observing its movement you can calculate the force of the impact.

USING THAT INFORMATION. The NRC developed NUREG-1150 which sets the safety conditions for nuclear plant operation including the physical properties for containment structure.

After 9/11 new simulations were done to reconfirm the survivability of containment structure from modern jetliner impact.

http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/aircraftcrashbreach

Structures that house reactor fuel at U.S. nuclear power plants would protect against a release of radiation even if struck by a large commercial jetliner, according to analyses conducted over the past several months by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).

...

The study was performed for EPRI by ABS Consulting’s Irvine, Calif., office and by San Diego-based ANATECH. It was peer reviewed and critiqued as the computer modeling was being done by internationally recognized experts with decades of experience in structural analysis.

The analysis used several criteria that increased the severity of the crash scenario. Most notable was the assumption that a large aircraft traveling low to the ground at speeds similar to the estimated speed of the jetliner that struck the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, precisely executes a hit that transfers the full impact of the crash to the structure being struck. Separate analyses assumed direct hits by both the aircraft’s fuselage and a 9,500-pound engine. This size engine is typical of the majority of aircraft currently in service; it would envelop engines on 767-400s, 757-300s, 747-400s, 737-800s, DC 10-30s, MD11s, A320-200s, A330-200s and L1011-500s.

The analysis also increased severity by assuming that a Boeing 767-400 would strike at its maximum takeoff weight (450,000 pounds) even though fuel would be consumed both in takeoff and en route to any power plant site.

Here is a copy of declassified results
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/reports/epriplantstructuralstudy/

Sandia National Labs also did extensive testing of containment building (one build specially for testing)
http://www.sandia.gov/media/NewsRel/NR2000/pccvtest.htm

Results of the test (updated Oct. 1, 2000): Sandia National Laboratories test engineers began pumping nitrogen gas into the 1/4-scale model of a pre-stressed concrete containment vessel (PCCV) at 10 am Tuesday, Sept. 26, increasing the internal gas pressure gradually. At about noon on Wednesday, Sept. 27, as the internal pressure inside the model was approaching 2.5 times the model's design pressure, test engineers detected and verified a leak in the vessel. They increased the gas pressure at a faster rate until about 5 pm, at which time the model was losing pressure faster than the researchers could pump gas in. The maximum internal pressure at that time was about 3.1 times the model’s design pressure. The test was terminated at about 6 pm, Wednesday, Sept. 27. Engineers have not yet determined exactly where the structure failed. Results of the test will be made available to the international nuclear safety community after they have been reviewed by Sandia, NUPEC, and the US NRC.

Notice the structure didn't leak until pressure was 2.5x the design requirement, the building exceeded their ability to overpressure at 3.1x design spec (200 psi per NUREG-1150). Which means containment buildings are actually substantially over-engineered. Even at a massive overpressure (which far exceeds requirements to contain damage from LOCA) containment structure wouldn't completely collapse. At what point would containment be "blown apart". Well we don't know simply because they couldn't get pressure high enough but we know it is 3.1x design spec for containment buildings.

[kristopher]

41. It is unfortunate the data isn't avaiable for review by independent experts.

While I have high level of regard for EPRI, that confidence is based largely on the transparency of their products. Given the secrecy involved and the national security implications of a report that would say the containment structures were NOT able to withstand an impact, I can't say this report is persuasive. It may be accurate, but since the alternative answer would paint a bulls-eye on 500 targets around the globe, and since the data can't be reviewed, and since the nuclear industry is known to lie...



BTW your assertion that the test was used as a basis of design specs to proof the containment structures against aircraft impacts is refuted by the reference you provided:

"Nonetheless, the nuclear power industry is confident that nuclear plant structures that house reactor fuel can withstand aircraft impacts, even though they were not specifically designed for such impacts. This confidence is predicated on the fact that nuclear plant structures have thick concrete walls with heavy reinforcing steel and are designed to withstand large earthquakes, extreme overpressures and hurricane force winds. The purpose of this study is to validate that confidence."


However, I do thank you for the paper.

[Statistical]

42. Design requirements are available as part of NUREG-1150

You could always commission your own study to simulate the effect of airliner crashing into building built to specifications of NUREG-1150. I will be waiting for your results.

Then again you and I know if the anti-nukers could prove (or even create suspicion) containment wasn't safe they would have published peer-reviewed studies a long time ago. What better way to shutdown (or bankrupt) nuclear energy than to take a page from the Bush playbook. "When in doubt play the TERRAA card".

[kristopher]

44. If the design specs are available why is the report classified?

[Statistical]

46. I don't know but my guess would be so we don't make it easier for terrorists?

NUREG-1150 is pretty dense stuff. You need a lot of engineering knowledge to do anything useful with it.

A simulation showing the exact amount of damage each type of impact causes might be more useful for terrorists?

I guess you could always sue under Freedom of Information act claiming no need for secrecy exists because NUREG-1150 is available.

[AtheistCrusader]

43. Thanks, but I still misused the example

but thank you for the clarification. I knew it was related, and also knew the block moved, but didn't have all the pieces.

[Statistical]

45. It is commonly misquoted. I don't think Sandia National Labs likes that very much.

It is misquoted by pro-nuclear sources because the reality is more complicated and less sexy. It is also misquoted by anti-nuclear sources to infer that containment can't survive a aircraft strike.

Also the reason a fighter was chosen is Kinetic Energy. KE = (1/2) m*v^2.

Notice velocity is squared while mass is linear. So a lighter faster object (like a high performance jet) is actually more of a threat than a larger slower (relatively speaking) object like a passenger jet. This is why a bullet does more damage than a baseball.

At the time of the study nobody was thinking about terrorism (terrorism wasn't even on the radar) or accidents involving passenger airliners (nuclear reactors are in secured airspace). They were more thinking about two different high velocity threats:

A) Accident involving friendly military fighter which is out of control and strikes a reactor.
B) Strike from enemy missile. Coldwar? Damage caused by soviets hitting 100+ nuclear reactors simultaneously.

Hence the reason for using the F-4 to find out maximum force in an high speed impact. Even today NUREG-1150 calls the outer layer of containment structure the "missile shield".

Of course all this plus my prior post doesn't make a very good 30 second soundbite which is why the F-4 test will continue to be misquoted by both sides for decades.

[Nihil]

31. Thank you for shining a massive spotlight on that!

First, the explanation of the issue (in terms simple enough for anyone
to follow):

> Do the math on how much energy it would require to increase atmospheric
> pressure inside a containment structure 50 meters by 20 meters in size
> to 200 psi. Saying compressor is 200psi is stupid. A soda can is 55 psi.
> I guess opening a 6 pack of coke inside containment will rip the building
> apart. Who knew a can of coke is that powerful. No need for smart bombs
> just drop 6 packs of coke on the enemy.

Then the inevitable conclusion:
> The more you type the more it becomes obvious you just grab stats and
> figures and don't have the slightest clue what they mean, do you?

:applause:

The one failing of your post was that, as you are so polite, you failed
to mention the other aspect that is involved: When proven wrong, there will
be no acknowledgement of the fact - and certainly no apology - but a strident
denial of the evidence followed by a repeated spamming of (usually irrelevant)
cut & pasted text in a desperate attempt to get the thread shut down so it
can be brushed under the carpet and forgotten.

:toast:

[kristopher]

36. .

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=115&topic_id=236498&mesg_id=236527

[Kolesar]

10. Radioactive steam escape was too likely

At that time, inspections revealed corrosion of the reactor's lid, created by leaks that had been ignored for up to six years. The NRC ordered the reactor shut down until further notice and created a special oversight panel for the plant. Federal authorities later estimated the reactor lid would have ruptured in as little as 60 days had the corrosion hole not been discovered.

Other investigations revealed that critical safety systems designed to prevent a meltdown of the reactor's core in the event of a rupture had been severely limited by years of poor maintenance and might not have kept radioactive steam and debris from escaping the containment building.


2006 url is dead: http://www.cleveland.com/ohio/plaindealer/index.ssf?/base/news/113774992055330.xml&coll=2

This is an old story.
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=115&topic_id=39228

[Throckmorton]

18. Maybe

Water boils away, no more thermalized neutrons, reactor shuts down. Fuel melts due to decay heat. Plant is toast, but the containment is designed to withstand the Large Break LOCA, radiation leakage is anybodies guess.

[Canuckistanian]

4. There you go. Nuclear is "unsafe at any speed".

To say nothing of the (as yet completely unsolved) nuclear waste issue.

Wind power Now.

[NNadir]

6. Only if you're as scientifically illiterate as, say, Ralph Nader.

I am very pleased to know however that you and Ralph have completely solved the dangerous fossil fuel waste issue.

It would also be interesting if you and Ralph could produce a single person who has been injured by a nuclear accident in this country, or if either of you gave a rat's ass about the many people who have died in dangerous fossil fuel accidents.

But that won't happen. You'll just scare monger.

Wind power sucks.

[Kolesar]

7. All you can come up with is deflections

whiney malcontent

[Name removed]

32. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[NNadir]

11. One reason you don't know how close the reactor vessel came to rupturing is that, um,

you don't know much about reactors.

[Kolesar]

12. You are happy to make stuff up if it serves your purpose

see http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=115&topic_id=236498&mesg_id=236514

[Throckmorton]

23. Sorry NNadir, but it was a closer run thing than that

Yes, I do know a great deal about nuclear reactors, and I respectfully disagree. The head on Davis-Besse came as close to failure as I ever want to see again. The inner and outer liners and the omega seal welds were all that remained between the RCS and the environment, the liners are 3/4 inch (average) 601 stainless steel applied to in outside and inside of the head. The seal welds held the CEDM housing in place, and welded the upper pressure housing to the liners. The CEDM extension housing was 2 inches out of alignment at the top of the extension housing, showing that nozzle had already started to move as the liners yielded under the stress.

As a result of this incident, we replaced our reactor head. As we had been finding cracks, similar to the ones noted here, in our seal welds for years, and grinding them out and re welding the J-seal. The expense of radiographing all of the nozzle welds, every outage was such that it made better sense to replace the head, and the current head uses 690 Stainless Steel, which doesn't suffer from pure water stress crevice corrosion.

[NNadir]

27. You are referring to a different event than being discussed here.

We all know about the head corrosion event.

It was, um, prehaps close, but it was not a failure.

In 1983, the sluice gates on the awful Glen Canyon dam came close to failure. The fact that they didn't fail was related to the fact that Bureau of Reclamation Engineers went to a hardware store and got some plywood to help keep Lake Powell from breaking through the dam, taking out the Grand Canyon and then destroying the Hoover Dam below it and Lake Mead above Hoover.

http://www.lakepowellrealty.net/2009/12/18/glen-canyon-1983-floods/

It is estimated that the death toll would have dwarfed Banqiao.

People still claim, despite this event - and Banqiao which killed more than 200,000 people within a week or so - that hydropower is safe and we don't have lightweight airheads coming here every day making sweeping statements about how wind should replace dams. (The fact is that wind cannot replace dams or anything else, since it's a nearly useless form of energy, totally unreliable.)

The point is that the reactor head was discovered - in 2002 - the head replaced, and the reactor restarted.

There was no loss of life. There were in fact, no injuries.

I respect that people in the nuclear industry are diligent and concerned, and that they don't even want to come any closer than Beese Davis or even half way as close to Beese Davis. Neither do I. (Left to my own devices, I would avoid soluble boron poisons, which is surely technically feasible.)

But let's be clear on something, OK? The agenda of people discussing this topic is not to improve reactor operations. It is to ban reactor operations.

Nuclear power need not be risk free to be better than every single form of energy in the world. It merely needs to be better than every single form of energy in the world, which it is.

My claim is that the person writing the OP doesn't understand reactors. I stand by it.

[Kolesar]

28. 9:45

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=115&topic_id=236498&mesg_id=236514

And it's spelled Davis Besse, Mr. Smug.

[Throckmorton]

48. No, the 2002 event, and the current event report both deal with CEDM nozzle seal welds

The new reactor head uses a J-Seal Weld, not an Omega Seal Weld. The 2002 event started as a weld failure, but the external indications (boric acid build-up and Hematite plate-out) were ignored for at least 1 fuel cycle. Now, again, the UT exams of the seal welds are showing indications of failure. This is particularly troubling for me, as my new reactor head, now in it's fourth cycle, uses similar materials and seal weld designs.

BWR's don't use boric acid, nor do the navy's PWR's, however, our rod drive system doesn't allow fine enough power changes to allow us to run without it. Either we would be slightly over our thermal power limit, or slightly under our rated output much of the time.

[Kolesar]

26. Flee, cowering agitator

Go clip some pictures of broken photovoltaics. I expect you will bring your profane presence back to this forum come April.

[Kolesar]

14. 3 accused of lying about reactor(indicted)-Ohio, First Energy, Davis-Besse

This is what turned me against the nuclear industry. They take big risks with our health and safety. There are many threads about Davis Besse in the DU archives. And there are only two "e"s in Besse, for the smug agitator in our midst.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=115&topic_id=39228

According to the indictment, Geisen, Siemaszko and Cook omitted key records and created false documents while claiming that the Davis-Besse reactor lid had been completely cleaned and every part of it inspected in 1996, 1998 and 2000. Geisen also is accused of lying to NRC staff about the inspection results during a meeting.

The three men and other FirstEnergy officials, including higher managers, repeatedly visited NRC headquarters to argue for delaying a shutdown until a regularly scheduled refueling in April 2002, the document says.

When NRC engineers, certain the reactor was leaking, demanded inspections by Dec. 31, Geisen and Cook are alleged to have offered a "risk assessment" based in part on false documents.
...snip...
At that time, inspections revealed corrosion of the reactor's lid, created by leaks that had been ignored for up to six years. The NRC ordered the reactor shut down until further notice and created a special oversight panel for the plant. Federal authorities later estimated the reactor lid would have ruptured in as little as 60 days had the corrosion hole not been discovered.

Other investigations revealed that critical safety systems designed to prevent a meltdown of the reactor's core in the event of a rupture had been severely limited by years of poor maintenance and might not have kept radioactive steam and debris from escaping the containment building.
...snip...
U.S. Rep. Dennis Kucinich, a Lakewood Democrat and FirstEnergy's harshest critic, commended White's work but said FirstEnergy itself should be held accountable.

http://www.cleveland.com/ohio/plaindealer/index.ssf?/ba...

[kristopher]

16. That is the same thing that recently turned me against the nuclear industry.

I've seldom seen so much deceit and lying; and I've NEVER seen such ethics in as area as critical to public safety.

[Kolesar]

21. Rockwell International paid huge fines for Rocky Flats, Colorado

Piketon, Ohio and Hanford, Washington were left as a horrible, polluted mess. The nuclear weapons industry is different than the nuclear generation industry, but both have problems. The power companies are more careful because of public relations, but not careful enough. They both sprung from the same militarist culture in Cold War America.

[Nothing Without Hope]

30. Human greed and incompetence make this technology too dangerous

Even without considerations of true accidents, let alone the preparation, distribution and disposal of radioactive materials. To me, the fact that many of the same powerful people who support nukes also oppose serious efforts toward safer and greener sources of energy reveals what their true priorities are. Like I said, greed and incompetence.

[Kolesar]

33. reactor had operated hotter than any other commercial reactor & 20 degrees > the industry average

When FirstEnergy peeled back the insulation off its old reactor head in April of 2002, it discovered a problem never before seen in the nuclear industry. Enough acid from the reactor had escaped through nozzle cracks to pool up on the steel reactor head and burn a pineapple-shaped cavity through six inches of metal. The NRC knew at the time that acid occasionally leaked through nozzles, but the assumption had always been that it vaporized upon contact with the steel reactor heads. Davis-Besse's reactor had been operating at 605 degrees prior to the 2002 shutdown, hotter than any other commercial reactor and 20 degrees hotter than the industry average.

http://toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100315/NEWS16/100319751

[Kolesar]

34. Davis-Besse could face long outage

From those anti-nuclear conspirators at the Toledo Blade :sarcasm:
March 16, 2010 http://toledoblade.com/article/20100316/NEWS16/3160338
By TOM HENRY
BLADE STAFF WRITER

OAK HARBOR, Ohio - Deja vu for Davis-Besse?

After six years of rock-solid performance, the Ottawa County nuclear plant faces the prospect of staying offline for another extended period because multiple control-rod drive mechanism nozzles that jut out of its reactor head - one of the plant's largest and most important parts - again are aging faster than expected.
...
The situation is eerily close to what happened when the nuclear plant was forced to shut down for two years in 2002. But Viktoria Mitlyng, Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman, said there is no evidence of acid escaping from the reactor, pooling up on the head's surface, and compromising the integrity of the structure this time. She said only about a teaspoon of dried boron - leakage evidence - was found on welds near the base of two nozzles, a sign the problem was caught in its early stages.
...
No danger exists to the public unless Davis-Besse is put back into operation in substandard condition, a violation of federal NRC rules. That's what happened in 2000 and possibly earlier restarts, according to a joint investigation by the NRC and the U.S. Department of Justice that resulted in a record $33.5 million in fines being assessed against the utility and sanctions being taken against two former workers, as well as an in-house investigation that resulted in numerous firings.

The 2002 event has been described by federal officials as one of the greatest cover-ups in nuclear history. It led to changes in how plants are regulated nationally.

FirstEnergy, charged multiple times by the NRC for withholding information from the government in that case, has vowed to never have a repeat of that incident. The utility said it made good on that promise by reporting the latest problem at the first sign of trouble.
...more...

[troubledamerican]

47. De-regulate! Stop the tyranny of nanny safety inspections! Let God decide!

Eat your strontium!