The BP report listed the main causes of the accident as:
- The cement and shoe track barriers - and in particular the cement slurry that
was used - at the bottom of the Macondo well failed to contain hydrocarbons
within the reservoir, as they were designed to do, and allowed gas and liquids
to flow up the production casing
- The results of the negative pressure test were incorrectly accepted by BP
and Transocean, although well integrity had not been established;
- Over a 40-minute period, the Transocean rig crew failed to recognise and act
on the influx of hydrocarbons into the well until the hydrocarbons were in the
riser and rapidly flowing to the surface;
- After the well-flow reached the rig it was routed to a mud-gas separator,
causing gas to be vented directly on to the rig rather than being diverted
overboard
- The flow of gas into the engine rooms through the ventilation system created
a potential for ignition which the rig’s fire and gas system did not prevent
- Even after explosion and fire had disabled its crew-operated controls, the
rig’s blow-out preventer on the sea-bed should have activated automatically to
seal the well. But it failed to operate, probably because critical components
were not working.
(
http://www.theengineer.co.uk/bp-links-deepwater-horizon-disaster-to-bad-cement-job/1004786.article)