Reprocessing in China: Separating fact from fiction

[bananas]

http://www.fissilematerials.org/blog/2011/01/reprocessing_in_china_sep.html

Reprocessing in China: Separating fact from fiction
By Mycle Schneider on January 12, 2011

On 11 January 2010, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) published a brief analysis of last week's announcements in several media (incl. Reuters, The Guardian, AP/NYT) of a major "breakthrough in spent fuel reprocessing technology" in China. The international media coverage was triggered by a short report on Chinese state television network (CCTV) on 3 January 2011 announcing the start-up of a pilot scale commercial reprocessing plant in Gansu Province, which took place on December 21, 2010. The media stories suggested that "a new technology" was involved to separate plutonium and uranium from spent fuel. However, the "breakthrough", UCS clarifies, refers to "something that was a first for China, not a breakthrough in reprocessing technology." The attention given to the announcement is all the more surprising considering that the facility is believed to have been completed as early as 2004 and a six-year long start-up phase seems excessive. There is no publicly available explanation for the delay. In a detailed comment on the story, Carnegie Endowment senior associate Mark Hibbs suggests that Chinese safety authorities might have been holding back from granting the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) permission to activate the plant. The facility is believed to have an annual capacity of 50-100 tons.

Mark Hibbs: "And what happened at the plant last month certainly was not a breakthrough for China in any technical sense: This is a Purex plant, using the same technology that China, beginning in the 1950s on an R&D level, employed to separate plutonium for its weapons program."

http://hibbs.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/88/china-peeps-about-plutonium

China Peeps about Plutonium
By mark | 11 January 2011

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The Gansu reprocessing plant project got underway during the early 1990s, and construction began in 1997. And it was delayed long before Chinese regulators had anything to say about the commissioning schedule beginning in 2004.

About 15 years ago, some foreign intelligence information attributed to Chinese sources suggested that some of the early delays had to do with problems raised by the Russians, in consideration of the potential military application of the technology involved—a point I’ll return to below because it has re-emerged more recently.

<snip>

And what happened at the plant last month certainly was not a breakthrough for China in any technical sense: This is a Purex plant, using the same technology that China, beginning in the 1950s on an R&D level, employed to separate plutonium for its weapons program.

<snip>

France wants to be assured that China won’t put Areva technology to use in making nuclear weapon material, and Chinese officials in fact have told me quite recently that there has been a discussion about a future verification regime for an Areva-supplied reprocessing plant in China which might involve the IAEA. That’s a potential show-stopper, China hands say, because in general Beijing doesn’t like IAEA inspectors rubbernecking around Chinese nuclear facilities. There’s also the cost of verification—an issue which Japanese executives say has deterred China from doing some serious nuclear business with Japan (which under a bilateral cooperation agreement with China requires IAEA safeguards under certain conditions).

<snip>

Unsurprisingly, pro-nukes fell for the fake news of a "breakthrough": http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=115x269591
edit to add another DU thread where pro-nukes fell for the fake news: http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=102x4681041