Question: How does someone try to divert a topic when they are wrong?
Since you are trying to change the subject, I'll stay focused. This link provides both pro and con arguments and serves as a starting point.
http://www.citact.org/newsite/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=272This is the CBO estimate predicting greater than a 50% default rate for nuclear power plants.
For this estimate, CBO assumes that the first nuclear plant built using a federal loan guarantee would have a capacity of 1,100 megawatts and have associated project costs of $2.5 billion. We expect that such a plant would be located at the site of an existing nuclear plant and would employ a reactor design certified by the NRC prior to construction. This plant would be the first to be licensed under the NRC’s new licensing procedures, which have been extensively revised over the past decade.
Based on current industry practices, CBO expects that any new nuclear construction project would be financed with 50 percent equity and 50 percent debt. The high equity participation reflects the current practice of purchasing energy assets using high equity stakes, 100 percent in some cases, used by companies likely to undertake a new nuclear construction project. Thus, we assume that the government loan guarantee would cover half the construction cost of a new plant, or $1.25 billion in 2011.
CBO considers the risk of default on such a loan guarantee to be very high—well above 50 percent. The key factor accounting for this risk is that we expect that the plant would be uneconomic to operate because of its high construction costs, relative to other electricity generation sources. In addition, this project would have significant technical risk because it would be the first of a new generation of nuclear plants, as well as project delay and interruption risk due to licensing and regulatory proceedings.
Note the price - $2.5 billion was to be only for the first plants. Future plants were, according to the assumptions provided by the nuclear industry, expected to have
lower costs as economy of scale resulted in savings. In fact, since the report was written (2003), the estimated cost has risen to an average of about $8 billion. Wonder what that does to the “risk is that … the plant would be uneconomic to operate because of its high construction costs, relative to other electricity generation sources”?
Does that risk diminish or increase when the price rises from $2.5 billion to $8 billion? Well, investors think it rose, because the government had to raise the loan guarantees to 80%,
and lend the money from a government development bank. So instead of 50% we as taxpayers are at 80% exposure, and still it isn't enough; which is why they need to put the ratepayers on the hook for the rest with CWIP.
The CBO also goes into what happens after those plants default, saying, "Assuming the nuclear plant is completed, we expect it would financially default soon after beginning operations, however, we expect that the plant would continue to operate and sell power at competitive market rates."
What that means is that the ratepayers are still going to be on the hook for the 20% that they took on as unwilling investors, but they don't have the government to bail them out and depreciate their independently financed portion of the asset.
Those "competitive market rates" BTW will now be set to keep renewable competition from getting established. In case you doubt this 'crowding out effect' on renewables, we can then look at Cooper's paper from last year where the effect is well documented.
Policy Challenges of Nuclear Reactor Construction, Cost Escalation, and Crowding Out Alternatives
Lessons from the US and France for the Effort to Revive the U.S. industry with Loan Guarantees and Tax Subsidieshttp://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/IEE/20100909_cooperStudy.pdf