Fukushima: Consequences of Systemic Problems in Nuclear Plant Design

[kristopher]

This is a bit dated (post Fukushima pre-Italian referendum) but the refutation of the two claims made by nuclear proponents about safety in the afterglow of Fukushima are well worth reading.

François Diaz Maurin (Francois.Diaz@uab. cat) is a former engineer of the French and US nuclear industries who has worked on the development of new nuclear power plant designs. He is now doing a doctorate on energy and society at ICTA, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain.

The paper is Fukushima: Consequences of Systemic Problems in Nuclear Plant Design

Maurin identifies the two primary claims made by nuclear proponents who are attempting to persuade the public that nuclear power is safe.
Argument #1: “The accidents at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant are due to a unique occurrence of two natural disasters – an earthquake and a tsunami”.
Argument #2: “New reactor designs would stand such natural events”.

The rebuttals take a few pages so I'll just post the conclusion:

...the argument of better safety with new design seems to reflect complacency more than objectivity. Indeed, a good illustration of this complacency towards nuclear energy comes from a recent declaration of French President, Nicolas Sarkozy talking about the design of the new AREVA EPR reactor during the Fukushima nuclear crisis: “The idea of the double wall structure is that if a Boeing 747 crashes on the plant, the reactor is not damaged”.<10> That is true. The double wall structure of the EPR reactor building would withstand such an event and it is part of the new safety features of the future nuclear EPR reactor. But we cannot predict all other threats or mistakes, not just from the outside but also internal to the plant operation. In any case, there is no EPR reactor currently operating in the world. Only five are under construction while there are about 440 plants operating worldwide. In that case, this argument is not relevant at the time of the nuclear energy crisis in Japan. Therefore, we should be very critical about this kind of official discourse as the following political lock-in we face in general seems to apply to nuclear technology:
When we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality... we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors...and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do – attributed to Karl Rove, former advisor of Georges W Bush.<11>

To conclude, I cannot do anything but to urge you not to take as “truthful” the over-reassuring and non-scientifically-based discourse that tends to minimise the seriousness of the nuclear disaster in Japan or which intends to avoid facing the current problems of nuclear energy by talking of future prospects. The history of humankind is already full of such examples.

The existing systemic uncertainty affecting nuclear power plant design raises the question of whether society is willing to accept continuing with a never-ending learning process with potentially high adverse consequences, both to humans and to the environment. It has been argued here that developing new designs will not lead to improved nuclear safety but will simply maintain the technological lock-in put in place by the civilian nuclear industry.

http://hectornunez.academia.edu/FrancoisDiazMaurin/Papers/848047/Fukushima_Consequences_of_Systemic_Problems_in_Nuclear_Plant_Design

[RC]

1. I'm getting dizzy from the spin.

"The existing systemic uncertainty affecting nuclear power plant design raises the question of whether society is willing to accept continuing with a never-ending learning process with potentially high adverse consequences, both to humans and to the environment.

It has been argued here that developing new designs will not lead to improved nuclear safety but will simply maintain the technological lock-in put in place by the civilian nuclear industry."


The second sentence is pure BS. Developing new designs has already led to much improved nuclear safety. That is an undeniable fact.

What are they talking about with the "...technological lock-in put in place by the civilian nuclear industry."
What is this "technological lock-in"? Never mind the phrase "...the civilian nuclear industry." As opposed to what? That does not really exist either.
Nuclear power is too heavily regulated by the government and the military to keep the technology and various fuel components from being stolen by undesirables.

[kristopher]

2. Maybe the dizziness is a result of cognitive dissonance.

At having a French nuclear engineer tell you that when looked at from a systems view the complexity of nuclear power means that making them safe is impossible - you are doing nothing but playing a game of whack-a-mole where everything that is redesigned as a result of failures in the field opens up new potential for failures in the untested product.

"The existing systemic uncertainty affecting nuclear power plant design the world over raises the question of whether society
is willing to continue with a never-ending learning process, with potentially high adverse consequences – both to humans and to the environment."

- "François Diaz Maurin is a former engineer of the French and US nuclear industries who has worked on the development of new nuclear power plant designs. He is now doing a doctorate on energy and society at ICTA, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain."