By A.K. Gupta
... In the case of the media, they have ignored their own reporting. The Bush administration has a strategy that has been in the works for months, even if it is muddled and mad. The secret memo from National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, published by the New York Times in November, reveals that the White House is trying to isolate Muqtada al-Sadr, a pillar of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government. As Hadley explains, the Bush administration wants to reshuffle Maliki’s coalition so he no longer needs the support of 30 assembly members loyal to Sadr. Afraid this might cause Iraqi security forces to fracture and lead “to major Shia disturbances in southern Iraq,” Hadley recommends that the United States “provide Maliki with additional forces of some kind,” the rationale for the surge ...
Joining in the political and military campaigns against the Sadrists would be a Shia party that has an alliance of convenience with the Bush administration, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and its militia, the Badr Brigade. This is where the prospect of a second civil war becomes very real. The Bush strategy is to foment an intra-Shia conflict to try to regain the upper hand. As both the Badr Brigade and Mahdi Army are enmeshed with various Iraqi police forces, the security forces would splinter, leading to Shia-on-Shia warfare throughout southern Iraq ...
Those generals who wouldn’t sign on to a military escalation have been ditched. General John Abizaid, the top U.S. commander for the Middle East and a vocal opponent of the surge option, is being eased into retirement. So is General George Casey, Jr., the top commander in Baghdad. He slapped down administration plans the week before Christmas by noting, “Additional troops have to be for a purpose,” then reversed course and backed the escalation, “eliminating one of the last remaining hurdles to proposals being considered by President Bush for a troop increase” (LA Times, December 23, 2006). But it was too little to save his post. He’s being pushed out of Iraq in February or March, as opposed to next summer as planned, because Bush “sees a chance to bring in a new commander as he announces a new strategy” (NYT, January 2, 2007) ...
This brings us back to the White House’s strategy review. It could be the “80 percent solution” or it could be stoking a Shia-on-Shia conflict. (The 80 percent solution refers to the percentage of Iraqis who are either Shia Arabs or Kurds.) According to the Washington Post, which detailed the White House debate, the policy would entail the United States abandoning “reconciliation efforts with Sunni insurgents and instead give priority to Shiites and Kurds.” Bringing an end to reconciliation efforts would mean “U.S. troops would be fighting the symptoms of Sunni insurgency without any prospect of getting at the causes behind it—notably the marginalization of the once-powerful minority.” ...
http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Feb2007/gupta0207.html