Baruch Kimmerling: From Barak To The Road Map

[wellst0nev0ter]

About a year ago, the New York Review of Books devoted its pages to an interesting exchange on the question of who was to blame for the collapse of the Camp David peace talks between Barak and Arafat, presided over by Clinton. This was—and still is—not a purely historical issue: what happened at Camp David has a direct bearing on the present and future of Israeli–Palestinian relations. The exchange in the nyrb, however—on one side, an interview with Barak by the Israeli historian, Benny Morris; on the other, a ‘Reply to Ehud Barak’ by Robert Malley and Hussein Agha—was principally concerned, above all on the Barak–Morris side, with clearing one or other of the participants in the aborted talks of responsibility for their failure. In doing so, the debate became decontextualized, avoiding wider discussion of what really went wrong and why, and concentrating instead on the interpersonal dynamics that developed at Camp David and the psychologies of the major players. The tragic outcome of the June 2000 negotiations was the widespread Western and Israeli acceptance of Barak’s declaration that his ‘most generous offer’ was rejected due to mysterious reasons of Arafat’s—the ultimate proof that Israel has ‘no partners’ among the Palestinians for peace-making. This fateful ‘conclusion’ helped trigger the Palestinian uprising of September 2000; and the combination of Barak’s assertion with the intensification of Palestinian attacks against Israeli civilians within the Green Line resulted in the collapse of the Israeli peace camp and Ariel Sharon’s two landslide electoral victories.

In the course of that dreadful aftermath, and especially following Deborah Sontag’s ‘revisionist’ descriptions of the Camp David summit, set out in the New York Times in July 2001, and Malley and Agha’s initial nyrb piece in August 2001, ‘A Tragedy of Errors’, Barak—a politician aspiring to a comeback: if Sharon could, it seems anything is possible—clearly felt that he owed something to the Israeli people and the world at large. To that end, he recruited a noted historian and chose, with the New York Review, the most respectable of American forums in which to construct his face-saving version of the story. That scholars of such calibre can so easily be employed to further the public-relations aims of politicians is deeply regrettable; but the Barak–Morris piece was certainly effective. Prior to the Camp David talks, Barak and Clinton had agreed that every move would be coordinated in advance between the United States and Israel; and that if the summit failed, Israel would not take the blame. Clinton stood by this, as did most of his subordinates. The exception was Malley, the President’s Special Assistant for Arab–Israeli Affairs during the negotiations, who came out with his own, fairly devastating account of Barak’s strategy, and apportioned blame for the failure between all three sides. Nevertheless, with the support of both Morris and Dennis Ross, Clinton’s point-man for dealing with the Palestinians (employed today as director of a hawkish, pro-Israeli research institute), and through numerous personal articles and appearances, Barak has succeeded in convincing most of the American public of the validity of his ‘no partner’ claim.

Still more important for Barak, however, was to explain

MORE. . .

[bemildred]

1. Nice read, thanks.

[papau]

2. Well spun - but an interesting read - I liked the quote below:

http://www.palestinecampaign.org/news.asp

http://www.palestinecampaign.org/features.asp?d=y&id=327

http://www.newleftreview.net/NLR25708.shtml

http://www.mepc.org/public_asp/whats/timelypalis.asp

"These were the reasons that most of the Palestinian delegation decided in advance to adopt a futile ‘bunker strategy’ of automatically refusing any proposal….. until everything had been agreed upon, nothing was agreed..."

And by the way - discussing Camp David - which most folks felt was unfair with its non-connected PA areas - is a non-starter. Arafat's rejection of the Barak proposal at Camp David was reasonable.

Arafats rejection of the Taba Clinton suggestion is the act that ended the peace process - Arafat's rejection of Taba was not reasonable - a counter offer perhaps was out of the question as long as the end of Israel as a Jewish state was not agreed to via the right of return - but right of returnt is the myth referred to in the book that Arafat could not surrender so as to get peace.

It was Arafat's decision then - and he will never make a different decision in the future - so the road map with Arafat is pointless.

[wellst0nev0ter]

3. Um, Arafat Did Not Reject The Taba Offers

He just didn't accept the offers fast enough to satisfy Barak - who was really a lame duck who was losing an election to a man who would have nullified the agreement anyways if he were elected.

Clinton was out of office during the time of the Taba talks, and our boy George decided he didn't want to get involved in that sticky situation.

In any case, the American proposals had come too late to be anything more than a symbolic gesture. It would have benefitted them more to present them during Camp David than to side with Israel and their series of unacceptable proposals.

[Gimel]

4. Timetables

He just didn't accept the offers fast enough to satisfy Barak

So Barak is at fault, according to you. The old American rational. Pass the Buck, shuffle the blame. It's all a lame duck anyway, the second Intifada had already begun.

[wellst0nev0ter]

5. It's The Fault Of All Sides

It's the fault of the Israelis for not giving a fair proposal.

It's the fault of the U.S. for not being an honest and fair broker.

It's the fault of the previous two for imposing a summit on the Palestinians too quickly in order to suit their political needs.

And it's the fault of the Palestinians for not expediting a resolution.

But yeah, it was Barak's fault. Did you know that during the Camp David summit, Barak's contempt for Arafat was so complete he didn't even meet face to face with him, and when Arafat wanted to shake his hand, Barak rebuffed him? That quiet create a picture of a man who is committed to a just peace.