Hezbollah's Tactics and Capabilities in Southern Lebanon

[Lithos]

Wanted to post a few articles together about the recent engagement in S. Lebanon.

With its attack on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, Israel is fighting on terrain that has been prepared by the Shiite movement for six years since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldiers have described finding a network of concrete bunkers with modern communications equipment as deep as 40 meters along the border (Ynet News, July 23). The terrain is already well-suited for ambushes and hidden troop movements, consisting of mountains and woods in the east and scrub-covered hills to the west, all intersected by deep wadis (dry river beds). Broken rocks and numerous caves provide ample cover. Motorized infantry and armor can only cross the region with difficulty. Use of the few winding and unpaved roads invites mines and ambushes by Hezbollah's adaptable force of several thousand guerrillas (The Times , July 21).

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The guerrillas rigorously examine the success or failure of each operation after completion. Tactics change constantly and new uses are sought for existing weapons. The use of mortars (81mm and 120mm) has been honed to near perfection. Hezbollah fighters have developed efficient assault tactics for use against armor, with their main anti-tank weapons being AT-3 Saggers and AT-4 Spigot missiles. Four tanks were destroyed in two weeks in 1997 using U.S.-made TOW anti-tank missiles (these missiles traveled from Israel to Iran as part of the Iran-Contra affair before being supplied to Hezbollah).

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Israel has never been able to get the upper hand in the intelligence war with Hezbollah. Hezbollah's military wing is not easily penetrated by outsiders, but has had great success in intelligence operations against Israel. Nearly the entire Shiite population of south Lebanon acts as eyes and ears for the fighters, so it is little surprise that Israel initially concentrated on eliminating regional communications systems and forcing the local population from their homes in the border region.

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Rockets are not new weapons, nor are they strangers to Middle East warfare. Size, range and destructive power are all factors in the development of rocket-based strategies, the ultimate of which was the "Mutually Assured Destruction" of the Cold War. The rockets used by Hezbollah in the ongoing conflict with Israel are much smaller and are usually integrated elsewhere within the tactics of the battlefield. Hezbollah is known for innovation, however, and has developed new strategic uses for their unguided rockets, employing them as political, economic and psychological weapons. As stated by Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres on August 6, "Nobody understands why they started to attack, what the purpose of the attack was and why they are using so many rockets and missiles."

"Little Kate" (The Katyusha)

The chairman of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee described why Hezbollah has been able to keep the rockets flying despite extreme military pressure from Israel: "Hezbollah separated its leadership command-and-control system from its field organization. It created a network of tiny cells in each village that had no operational mission except to wait for the moment when they should activate the Katyusha rocket launchers hidden in local houses, using coordinates programmed long ago" (San Francisco Chronicle, July 21).

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The size of Israel's proposed security barrier keeps changing with the realization that even an occupation up to the Litani River (a zone 28-35 kilometers deep) will keep only Hezbollah's short-range Katyushas from reaching Israel. A measure of this reality (and the importance of the "scorecard") was reflected in the August 1 televised remarks of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert: "I believe one can say today…that there is no way to measure this war according to the number or range of the rockets being fired at us. From the very first day, neither I, nor the defense minister, nor the Israeli government, nor the military leadership-and this is to its credit-ever promised for even one moment that when the fighting ended, there would be absolutely no rockets within firing range of the State of Israel. No one can make such a promise" (Israel TV Channel 1, August 6).

The resistance of Hezbollah fighters, the severity of the Israeli bombing campaign and the inability of Israel to halt the rockets has resulted in unusually broad popular support for Hezbollah both in Lebanon and a politically frustrated Arab world. When ceasefire negotiations begin, it will now be difficult for the Arab regimes that opposed Hezbollah at the beginning of the conflict (particularly Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) to ignore Hezbollah's calls for at least diplomatic support from the Arab states. In the meantime, Hezbollah's rocket campaign continues to destroy little militarily while it accomplishes much politically, economically and psychologically.

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In a recent statement, Hezbollah's armed wing, al-Moqawama al-Islamia (Islamic Resistance), described Israel's main battle-tank as "a toy for the rockets of the resistance" (al-Manar TV, August 11). Hezbollah's anti-tank weapons consist of a variety of wire-guided missiles (usually of Russian design and manufactured and/or supplied by Iran and Syria) and rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs). The missiles include the European-made Milan, the Russian-designed Metis-M, Sagger AT-3, Spigot AT-4 and the Russian-made Kornet AT-14. The latter is a Syrian supplied missile capable of targeting low-flying helicopters. Iraqi Fedayeen irregulars used the Kornet against U.S. forces in 2003. The most portable versions of these weapons are carried in a fiberglass case with a launching rail attached to the lid.

On July 30, the Israeli army published photos of various anti-tank missiles they claim to have found in a Hezbollah bunker (see: http://www.hnn.co.il/index.php?modul...sk=view;id=967). The weapons include Saggers and TOW missiles. The TOW (Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided) missile is a formidable weapon first produced by the United States in the 1970s. These missiles were of interest as their packing crates were marked 2001, suggesting that these were relatively new additions to Hezbollah's arsenal and not part of the shipment of TOW missiles from Israel to Iran that was part of the Iran-Contra scandal of 1986 (the shelf-life of the TOW is roughly 20 years). On August 6, Israeli Major-General Benny Gantz showed film of BGM-71 TOW and Sagger AT-3 missiles he reported were captured at one of Hezbollah's field headquarters (Haaretz, August 6).

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The Merkava tank has assumed an important role as a symbol of Israeli military might. Their destruction in combat has an important symbolic value for Hezbollah. Hezbollah's tactical innovations and reliance on anti-tank missiles over more traditional infantry weapons will undoubtedly prompt serious introspection on the part of the IDF in anticipation of renewed conflict along the border.

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The following was cited earlier, but the link has expired on Haaretz.

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What happened in Bint Jbail recurred in Ayta al-Shab. Although it seemed that the town had been conquered, it transpired again and again that there were still Hezbollah men in it. Once again, clashes and battles took place, and again, the IDF suffered dead and wounded.

Although the army had conquered the town, Hezbollah men were hiding in underground bunkers well camouflaged from the outside. The bunkers had been stocked with large quantities of food, enough to last for weeks, and ammunition, including antitank missiles and, in several cases, short-range rockets.

The bunkers are connected to electricity and, according to one report, are air conditioned. When the fighting dies down, Hezbollah fighters emerge from the bunkers and set up ambushes for IDF soldiers and armored vehicles.

That is why soldiers are hit repeatedly in the same places.

On several occasions, there have been difficulties evacuating wounded soldiers under fire. At times, Hezbollah fighters have fired rockets at Israel from areas close to the border that the IDF had supposedly conquered already. The means available to flush the guerrillas out of their underground shelters are not always employed.

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/748441.html&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1">more

[mike_c]

1. hiz'bollah is the de facto primary defense force in southern Lebanon...

...and they acquitted themselves well against a technologically superior force, demonstrating that tactics and planning still count in military campaigns, especially defensive actions, no matter how much armour and technology the enemy can deploy.

Thanks for the informative OP.

[Lithos]

2. Classic military planning

Minimize your weaknesses and your enemies advantages while maximizing your own. They could not compete with the Israeli Air Force nor could they compete with the armor so they did picked a scenario which minimized both Israeli advantages. Passive defense in depth is an old and effective strategy.

On Edit:

Didn't help Israel in that they came to fight the last war. I'm sure that what carried the day was more the skill of the individual soldier than any effective battle planning. You can do this once or twice, but after awhile it tears an army apart.

L-

[pelsar]

9. its always the individual soldier that "carriers the day"

battleplans are good up until the first shot if fired and then the plan loses its validity......Israel relies heavily upon its reservists for motiviation and experience to get through the muddle of combat.

[madrchsod]

3. the hezollah studied the war in Vietnam

adapted the principals to southern lebanon and the mossad and the idf had no clue to what awaited them. the enemy was underneath them

[bemildred]

4. First link is broke.

Thanks for the post, good stuff.

[Lithos]

5. Thanks

First link should be working.

[Lithos]

6. Forgot to add - what I highlighted in bold.

TOW ordnance marked 2001 is interesting. This means some sort of shipment leaving US hands after Bush's inauguration going probably to Iran. I can't imagine any supply route coming via Pakistan or Gulf country. Shades of the Iran Contra affair, especially given the return of several of the principals. If so, I wonder what they got in exchange? (Or what they were white-washing).

[msmcghee]

7. I worked on the development of the TOW missile . .

. . in 1968 and 1969 at Hughes in Culver City, CA. Once it is fired there is no way to jam the guidance. If the operator can keep the target in the cross hairs during the few seconds of flight the target, even a heavily armored tank, is destroyed.

The acquisition of this technology with a 2001 mfg. date by Hizbullah is indeed an interesting development. It will be very interesting to see where this leads. What did you mean by " . . especially given the return of several of the principals."

[bemildred]

8. From Iraq maybe?

Perhaps midnight auto supply? Spoils of war?

I do remember some stories about us cutting deals with Iran a couple years back WRT the Iraq situation, dismissed them at the time, still do I think.

There are the stories about spook stuff going on over on the Balochi side of Iran too, and in Khuzestan.

It is the same old crew, isn't it? But why?

[Lithos]

10. That is a good question

If it came via Iran, that adds an extra wrinkle in that they received enough to warrant passing it along. I'd thought about Iraq being the source, but it would have had to come from stolen US supplies which were then routed back to Iran. Same with weapons stolen/provided from one of the Gulf countries - the route to Iran and back is tenuous. Even harder given the animosity between the various Gulf country governments and Iran. Could it have gone thru one of the former Soviet republics? Still sounds circuitous to me.

Your bit about Iranian help against Iraq sounds plausible.

L-

[bemildred]

11. Maybe we will find out one of these days.

On the other topic, I remember in the early reporting from Bint Jbeil that they were landing the helicopters far in the rear to protect them, making the troops walk in a mile or more, so I think among that and the other things we have a reasonable explanation for my "mystery" about the SAMs.