Yom Kippur is approaching and it's a good
opportunity for some soul-searching and
reexamination of the situation compared to the
past. There's not too much effort required to
reach the conclusion that the Israeli leadership
has fallen victim in 2003 to a strategic "concept"
as it did in 1973. Like then, the leadership has
overestimated Israel's military strength. Then as
now, Israel blames the mistakes of its American
friends. In both cases, the state was led by an
elderly, conservative leader, who did not believe
anything the Arabs said, and rejected any change
or concessions. The main difference is the result.
Instead of a successful crossing of the canal in
broad daylight, Israel is bleeding in an unending
war of attrition with the Palestinians.
The concept of 2003 is based on
a profound conviction that the
U.S. intends to use force to
change the status quo in the
region and topple or shock the
anti-Israel regimes in Iraq,
the Palestinian Authority,
Syria and Iran. The state's
leaders and the heads of the
defense and intelligence
establishments made far-reaching statements
about 2003 being "the year of decision" in the
conflict with the Palestinians. They expected
the occupation of Iraq to create a domino
effect throughout the region as the beaten
Arabs, lacking any military option, would
accept an Israeli dictate to hold onto the
territories for many years to come (a
"long-term interim agreement," as Ariel Sharon
calls it). They spoke of the integration of the
big bang in Baghdad and the internal power
struggles in Ramallah leading to the departure
of Yasser Arafat from the world stage and
resumption of the political process on terms
much more convenient to Israel.
Haaretz