Does Israeli Intelligence Lie?

[bemildred]

All of the suffering in Gaza — indeed, all of the suffering endured by Palestinians under Israeli occupation for the last eight years — could have been avoided if Israel negotiated a peace agreement with Yasser Arafat when it had the chance, in 2001.

What chance? The official Israeli position is that there was no chance, "no partner for peace." That’s what Israeli leaders heard from their Military Intelligence (MI) service in 2000 after the failure of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David. Arafat scuttled those talks, MI told the leaders, because he was planning to set off a new round of violence, a second intifada.

Now former top officials of MI say the whole story, painting Arafat as a terrorist out to destroy Israel, was an intentional fiction. That’s the most explosive finding in an investigative report just published in Israel’s top newspaper, Ha’aretz, by one of its finest journalists, Akiva Eldar.

http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5783

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1. Military Intelligence: Never expected Hamas victory in 2006

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Lavie had a rich career in the intelligence unit 8200, as Arab affairs adviser to the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories and in MI's research unit. In 1997 he graduated cum laude from the National Security College. After leaving the IDF he entered academia and recently completed a doctoral thesis on Palestinian society. In an April 2004 letter to Ze'evi-Farkash, Lavie wrote: "The conception underneath the 'no partner' approach became a model with grave national implications. Its consequences are manifested in the unilateral disengagement plan for Gaza and in the construction of the separation fence in Judea and Samaria." Lavie added that he had discovered, from conversations with former Shin Bet and Mossad espionage agency personnel, that their organizations had also seen the same disparity between oral and written doctrine, which had helped deepen the mistaken conception.

In response to a previous letter on the same subject, Ze'evi-Farkash wrote to Lavie that he felt "a sense of missed opportunity on your part for not having expressed these views when you felt the disparities were coming into being." He added: "There is no need for us to examine the validity of your viewpoint. We believe you wrote from a subjective viewpoint, it is true, but with sincerity and clarity, and this is indeed your perception of the developments." Ze'evi-Farkash suggested to Lavie that he approach the "relevant parties," namely his predecessor as DMI, Amos Malka, and the former head of the MI research unit, Amos Gilad.

It was not until 2008 that the internal investigation was conducted, under the tutelage of the current DMI, Major General Amos Yadlin. Its findings, which are being publicized here for the first time, are that MI suffers from knowledge gaps, a dearth of resources and a lack of group thinking, and that it speaks in two voices. The written voice is intended for internal control and potential commissions of inquiry; the oral voice, which is not documented, is for the senior political level. The report found that as long as the political echelon rejected the idea of a unilateral disengagement because it would be "withdrawal under fire," MI's research unit produced papers in a similar vein. However, when the political level decided to go ahead with the disengagement, the research unit wrote: "A unilateral disengagement will pose a challenge to Hamas and place a wall in front of Arafat."

Lavie described the "two voices" syndrome in a November 2003 letter to the DMI, headlined "Failures in the Work of Intelligence Regarding the Palestinian Issue." The "oral doctrine" is documented in the minutes of General Staff and cabinet meetings where senior MI officers gave briefings. In these closed forums (though much of the content finds its way into the media) MI officers provide assessments that are close to the leaders' views but often deviate from internal written assessments.

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1053882.html

[Nicholas D Wolfwood]

6. That's either bullshit or evidence of their idiocy.

Everyone with one iota of knowledge knew Hamas would win. Why wouldn't they? They're the only ones who actually provide social services to people. It's just like here if either the Evangelists or Unions were the only ones doing anything for people. That group would win every time.

[bemildred]

8. The headline is "inaccurate".

The body says:

The internal investigation found that, regardless of its position on the implications of the disengagement, all the papers produced by the MI research unit predicted a tie between Hamas and Fatah in the January 2006 Palestinian Authority election, or at most a tiny advantage for Hamas. In November 2005, two months before the election, the research unit wrote that the opening of the Rafah crossing and the Fatah primary had improved that faction's situation. A month later, the unit was a bit more cautious, taking note of "an atmosphere of uncertainty and high volatility." It warned that the feeling of despair was causing Mahmoud Abbas to contemplate retiring from politics.

[Idealism]

2. Imagine that, an intelligence agency caving into government pressure...

Where have I seen this before

[bemildred]

7. Delete. Misposted. nt

[Howardx]

3. thanks

good article

[Nicholas D Wolfwood]

4. If anyone needs a reminder...

It was Arafat that received a Nobel Peace Prize for his ability to negotiate faithfully with Yitzhak Rabin, who also received a Nobel Peace Prize for his role. It was also Rabin whom Israelis killed for being a "partner for peace".

What's outlined in this article depicts quite nicely what has been the cycle: Declare Palestinians as incapable to reach peace with, instigate an attack, use said attack to justify claims about Palestinians and achieve military objectives. This is exactly what happened with the Golan Heights.

It's a very well done piece - thank you for posting it.

[TahitiNut]

5. Arafat was given one of those "offers he can't refuse" -- it was atrocious.

The "fine print" was, in essence, a demand for a total capitulation, surrendering lands, "right of return," access to water, defensible boundaries, free transit between Gaza and West Bank, any significant part of Jerusalem, and other critical issues of sovereignty.

[Ian David]

9. The idea that an intelligence agency might engage in subterfuge is unheard of!

I'm shocked!

Shocked, I tell you!

Why can't they be more like our own CIA and NSA that tells the world the absolute truth about absolutely everything, always!

[LeftishBrit]

10. Probably. Is there an intelligence agency anywhere in the world that doesn't?

[bemildred]

11. The issue is telling the political echelon what it wants to hear.

Not lying to the world at large, which is to be expected.

[Chulanowa]

12. Of course it does. A better question is...

Does any intelligence agency on the face of the earth tell the truth?

[madrchsod]

13. of course they do...

[HeraldSquare212]

14. There's a book review of three books by former Clinton diplomats who say the same thing

in the current New York Review of Books. The Clinton administration reluctantly went along with painting Arafat as the roadblock, according to the article.

[azurnoir]

15. I would think that most "intelligence" agencies

have a vested interest in not biting the hand that feeds.