By Aluf Benn, Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff
Tags: gaza, hamas, israel news
Three rockets fell Thursday in the area around the Gaza Strip, one in the yard of a Sderot home - just a few reminders that Israel is still far from its declared goal in Operation Cast Lead. Discussion about the military operation's outcome revolves around the term "deterrence."
If Israel can enshrine Cast Lead in a long-term agreement, the war will be remembered as a success. But fears are mounting that the operation's military achievements are dissipating. If so, the operation will go down in history as a less-than-successful round in a long war in the Gaza Strip.
The Israel Defense Forces left Gaza with the feeling that it had proven itself, after its debacle in Lebanon in 2006. But it seems that the bottom line will have to wait. In Lebanon, too, it took several months before it could be concluded that although the IDF made mistakes, enough deterrence against Hezbollah was achieved to prevent renewed fighting.
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Barak, who was quick to criticize what went wrong in Lebanon, followed Olmert and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni's lead in withdrawing from Gaza without a real agreement. But like in Lebanon, faced with only an aerial attack or one followed by a ground operation, Israel chose the middle ground and acted slowly and partially. Because in Gaza the enemy was less determined than in Lebanon, the move first appeared to be a victory. Only when the IDF left could the results of the war be seen as limited, with almost daily attacks near the fence, a continuing "drizzle" of rockets and information on renewed arms smuggling.
The blow Hamas was dealt has only led to increased admiration for the group, according to opinion polls in the territories. Hamas is still waiting for another crowning achievement: if abducted IDF soldier Gilad Shalit is released for more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners.
However, the army is currently reviewing its performance during the war and an encouraging picture is emerging in terms of its professionalism, control over units, aerial assistance to ground forces, quality of intelligence and logistics compared to the Second Lebanon War.
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http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1067318.html