Let’s go back to the beginning of this sub-thread, which is my post 8 (to Douglas Carpenter, not to you), titled, “You have to take the movement as a package,” and in which I said, “Re-read the "debate," and see what Barghouti says are the goals of the movement. They are: 1. withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza; 2. full equality within Israel; 3. right of return.” You then objected to my statement that the BDS movement included a demand for unlimited RoR. In that context, I pointed out in post 34, that if Omar Barghouti says that the BDS movement is about RoR, then that’s what it is about. However, since we’ve already agreed from the start that BDS is about other things, I didn’t burden the post with reiterating what was already an understood point.
The focus here is on what the BDS movement means by RoR. Whether larger Palestinian society has a different meaning may suggest what the BDS movement means (or not, depending on how radical BDS really is), but it seems to me that the best source for what the BDS movement thinks of RoR is the leadership of the BDS movement, i.e. Barghouti. If you think that there are Palestinian leaders of BDS who think differently, go ahead and post them. If Barghouti’s opinion is any indication, the meaning of RoR that the BDS movement has in mind is full RoR.
As for the Crisis Group Report; the “experts” as you put it. When I first looked at what you posted, I thought it was just the executive summary (instead of the full 39 page report), and the summary doesn’t contain any reference to a poll. Now that I have read the full report, I’m certain that it not only doesn’t support your position, it actually supports mine.
To start with, there are several rules of interpreting what a statement means, or what people mean by it. The first of these is the “plain meaning rule”. Just looking at the words, “right of return of refugees,” what do they mean? A right is a person’s moral claim to action. I have a right to speak or be silent, and the government isn’t supposed to be able to do anything about it. That’s my choice. So if a refugee has a right to return, it means that the refugee has the choice to return or not; Israel has to take them back. The meaning of “refugee” in this case has been that supplied by the UNRWA and cited in the Crisis Group Report as “persons whose ‘normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict’ and their descendants.” (ICG Rep. Page 1). The plain meaning of the RoR is therefore that the refugees and their descendants have the right to return to where they came from.
A further way to interpret RoR is by looking at what people have said about it in the past. As the ICG Report states:
“Nor should one forget that the right of return – not statehood – formed the original raison d’etre of the contemporary Palestinian national movement, notably of the dominant Fatah movement and the PLO.” (ICG Rep. Page 7). Since statehood wasn’t the issue, when the Palestinians spoke of RoR in the early days, they meant to Israel, and they meant all of them. Likewise, in 1977 when the PLO (the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people) issued its Six-Point Program, it said, among other things:
THIRD: We reaffirm our rejection of Security Council resolutions242 and 338.
FIFTH: To strive for the realization of the Palestinian people's rights to return and self-determination within the context of an independent Palestinian national state on any part of Palestinian land, without reconciliation, recognition or negotiations, as an interim aim of the Palestinian Revolution. Laquer, “The Israel-Arab Reader”, p. 602 (1984). Textually and historically the only meaning of RoR up until recently has been what you call the “extreme” version. In light of that, the issue isn’t what the meaning of RoR is; it’s whether the meaning has changed.
To the extent that it has, you point to a poll mentioned in the ICG report (but not the executive summary). What the ICG actually said is:
In July 2003, the results of a public opinion poll indicating that if Palestinian refugees obtained explicit Israeli recognition of the right of return in the context of an Israeli-Palestinian permanent political settlement, only 10 per cent would seek to exercise this right if it entailed living under Israeli sovereignty, were strenuously contested. (ICG Rep, Page 8). The poll appears in the context of showing how different Palestinian groups (and others) manipulate and use the refugee issue for their own purposes. The ICG neither affirmed, nor refuted the poll. We don’t know anything about it; not the number of people questioned, nor the questions asked, nor the circumstances of the polling. We do know that at least one Palestinian group vehemently disputed it. Especially given the strong evidence for the “extreme” version of the RoR, this seems pretty thin evidence that its meaning has changed, even if it evidenced a change at all.
Except that even if the poll is dead on accurate, it doesn’t change the meaning of the RoR one iota. It doesn’t say that Palestinians have changed their understanding of what the RoR is. It says only that about 10% of Palestinians would exercise the right if they got it. That doesn’t change the meaning of RoR; at most it changes what the Palestinians would do with the right.
Get real, you say. As a practical matter, if the effect of RoR is that only 10% of refugees would actually want to return, then people can’t argue that RoR means the destruction of Israel. An interesting thought. Or as the ICG put it.:
Paradoxically, as has been noted, Israelis oppose any acknowledgement of a right of return, even in the context of an agreement that would significantly constrain its implementation, while Palestinians insist on it, even in the context of an agreement that would give it little practical meaning. (ICG fn. 74, Page 11). In fact, there really is no paradox; merely the ICG’s failure to appreciate the implications of its own research. First, the ICG is assuming that polling in 2003, and other indicators of Palestinian moderation on this issue, even if accurate, will hold true after Israel actually agrees to a RoR. There are a few reasons to think that it won’t.
First, there is the continuing misery of the Palestinian diaspora to consider. The ICG report spends quite some time explaining that. Do more than 10% of refugees live outside Israel proper, the West Bank, and Gaza? Yes, they do. Many of them live in the Arab world at large. An Arab world that pretty much doesn’t want them, and where they don’t feel welcome. Given the chance, most of them will leave, or be pushed out. Will they all go to the Palestinian state? Or if they were given the opportunity would they go to Israel where the economy is better? The point is that the poll at best tells us what Palestinians think now, when they don’t have the RoR, but are trying to convince the world that they should have it. It doesn’t tell us what they would do if Israel actually agreed to a RoR.
Second, according to the ICG Report:
According to the PSR poll, more than 95 per cent of respondents ‘insists on maintaining the ‘right of return’as a sacred right that can never be given up.” (ICG fn. 68, p. 11). We are expected, then, to accept that even though the Palestinians can never give up the RoR, that they can, now and forever, give up the right to exercise the RoR. That’s just splitting the hair too thin to be believed.
The deeper problem is that RoR has not only huge symbolism for Palestinians, it’s a foundation of Palestinian national existence.
There are obvious historical reasons why the refugee question was and remains the most emotive permanent status issue for Palestinians – refugees and nonrefugees alike. It must be understood in its multiple dimensions: as a practical, material issue for refugees, who endure harsh living conditions in refugee camps or as second class citizens in third countries; as a political issue for those refugees who genuinely want to return to their homes or seek compensation for their losses; but also as an existential issue for the Palestinian people as a whole, the most compelling embodiment and expression of the Palestinians’ experience of dispossession and injustice. (ICG, p. 6). Yes, there are lot’s of reasons why Palestinians want a RoR, but it’s the symbolism of it that is at the essence of the problem. ICG catches a bit of that with this statement:
Behind such sentiments expressed by refugees and non-refugees alike lies a powerful need for recognition that the Palestinians have suffered an historic injustice. It also reflects a continued reluctance to accept Israel’s legitimacy and its right to exist as a Jewish state – seen as tantamount to a retroactive legitimisation of their own dispossession – that is unlikely to be overcome in the foreseeable future. (ICG, p.11 ). Yes the Palestinians believe (falsely) that they were all intentionally expelled by the Jews to create the Jewish state. However, the above relationship involves more than that false belief. In the Palestinian conception, RoR is intimately linked with the denial of Israel’s legitimacy. They demand the right of return as recognition of an historic injustice. As Efraim Karsh puts it:
Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of the Palestinians’ legal case, their foremost argument for a “right of return” has always rested on a claim of unprovoked victimhood. In the Palestinians’ account, they were and remain the hapless targets of a Zionist grand design to dispossess them from their land, a historical wrong for which they are entitled to redress. In the words of Mahmoud Abbas (a/k/a Abu Mazen), Yasir Arafat’s second-in-command and a chief architect of the 1993 Oslo accords: “When we talk about the right of return, we talk about the return of refugees to Israel, because Israel was the one who deported them.” (Commentary Magazine, May 2001;
http://www.hagshama.org.il/en/resources/view.asp?id=252).
The problem is that the Palestinians aren’t innocent victims, and they know it. They know that they rejected compromise prior to the Partition Resolution. They know that they rejected any compromise that even hinted at allowing a Jewish state in any part of Palestine. They know that they rejected the Partition Resolution. They know that they were the ones who initiated the rioting that started after the Resolution was passed in November, 1947. They know that they were the ones who initiated attacks on buses and truck convoys in December of that year. They know that they were the ones who initiated large scale organized military attacks in January of 1948. They know that the war raging in Palestine between Jews and Arabs gave the surrounding Arab states the excuse to come in and destroy the Palestinian state before it could get started. They know that it was the Palestinians who started the war that made them refugees. The only way that they get out of responsibility for their own situation is because they believe that they were justified in starting the war because the Jews didn’t have the legitimate right to create a state in Palestine. That’s why accepting Israel’s legitmacy is , “seen as tantamount to a retroactive legitimisation of their own dispossession.” If the Jews had a legitimate right to create their state, then the Palestinian attacks on them were unjustified aggression, the Palestinians aren’t victims, and they aren’t entitled to a right of return, which is a huge foundation block of Palestinian national myth. Conversely, the demand for RoR is now seen as the physical expression of Israel’s mea culpa for being the reason that the Palestinians started the war that caused them to be refugees.
The Palestinians hesitate to accept Israel’s legitimacy; precisely because doing so would undercut their own. The Palestinian political ethos grew up around demanding the right of return which is itself based on, and intertwined with, delegitimizing the Jewish state. Today, the demand for RoR has become a surrogate for continuing the fight. The flip side of this for Israel is that accepting a RoR is tantamount to admitting to the world, and especially the Arab world, that Israel has no legitimacy. That’s why no sane Israeli government could ever agree to the RoR, even if the Palestinians solemnly agreed that not one of them would return. Unfortunately, as the ICG report indicates, the Palestinians have turned RoR into a zero sum game.
Given the above, the idea that RoR has changed based on Palestinian proposals to not actually return goes way beyond wishful thinking motivated by an, “It’s Israel’s fault” meme.