The continuing war

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Some interesting stuff from Mr. Schiff. A mix
of fact and interpretation, but more meat than we
usually get on how things are going.


The most disturbing news last week, to which
for some reason there was no reaction from the
Israel Defense Forces spokesman, was the
report of the attempt to blow up one of the
military positions along the Egyptian-Israeli
border in the Rafah area. While the IDF is
fighting the tunnels through which the
Palestinians smuggle mostly materiel, they
have also managed to dig right under the nose
of the IDF an approximately 200-meter-long
tunnel through which they smuggled hundreds
of kilograms of explosives.

This was the second attempt to use a tunnel to
blow up an IDF position in the area (first the
Termit army outpost and now the Hardon army
outpost). In oral explanations it was stressed
that no one was hurt and that the damage was
not serious. This is a superfluous trumpeting of
victory. Despite the dozens of military outposts
against the Palestinians in the area, their desire
to fight and their courage are stronger than
ever.

The IDF has entered and exited the area many
times. In order to prevent losses and dangerous
smuggling, the best thing to do would be to
occupy a land belt there until the conflict ends.
The Egyptians would certainly complain, but
they also bear indirect responsibility for
smuggling from their territory.

The Gaza Strip is stormy again. Further north
two IDF officers were killed in a battle and
Qassam rockets and mortar shells have again
been fired at Sderot and other locales.

Haaretz

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1. Kick.

Hezbollah infiltrating Tanzim?
Hamas telling Egypt to buzz off?
Undiscovered tunnels under guard posts, filled with hundreds
of Kg of HE? Twice? Political chaos?

[The Magistrate]

2. It Is An Interesting Commentary, My Friend

The fractionation of the Arab Palestinian irregulars is one of the salient characteristics, and difficulties, of the situation. For all Arafat's claim he is the one to deal with for a cease-fire, he probably could not deliver one either, even if he wanted to.

The Egyptian relation with Hamas is particularly tangled. Hamas is a sort of off-shoot of the Moslem Brothers, and that is an organization strictly policed by the Egyptian government. At the same time, the Egyptian "special services" have effective control of the smuggling operations into Gaza, and a serious apparat of long standing there. They could put a serious crimp in Hamas operations there, though at the cost of a good deal of shooting. Again, the use of hostility to Israel as a safety-valve to bleed off discontent that could produce explosions against the reigning secular autocrats is an important part of the puzzle in this hole and corner business.

Hezbollah is well situated for attempts at infiltrating various armed Arab Palestinian factions, for two reasons. It enjoys a reputation for success among them, derived from the struggle in Lebanon, and it has a state sponsor, Iran of the clerics, which gives it a reliable budget and source of armaments. Both these things, in a situation of competing warlord factions, are tremendous advantages. Armed forces ruled by personal loyalties are delicate things, that can turn on a dime: "silver bullets" was the phrase for it in China during the twenties, and subversion of an opponent's armed forces was a leading tool of conflict there in those days, sometimes with decisive results.

All of this points once again to an old trope here, namely the need for real leadership and consolidation of authority within the polity of Arab Palestine. Sooner or later Arafat is going to have to put his place to the test of violence, and curb or break the various armed factions: if he does not, someone else will, sooner or later. It will probably not be possible to emerge from the current impasse without a genuine civil war within Arab Palestine, and that will not be a pretty thing.

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3. It seemed a bit more to the point than most of what we get.

Thank you for your comments.

I think Arafat is rapidly becoming a side issue. Barring a massive
effort by the Israeli government to rehabilitate him as a "partner
for peace" and all that, it's hard to see what relevance he can have
other than as a symbol. He's not going to win the "terrorist of the
year" competition with Hamas et. al. He seems mainly to function as
an obstacle to the faction that wants to negotiate, and I think that
negotiation will be rather pointless unless the more violent factions
are brought into the process too, an unlikely prospect at this point.

Of course his age and physical condition is part of that, the struggle
over the leavings from his departure has no doubt already begun.

I inferred that Egypt rides herd on what gets through the tunnels by
the absence of greater violence than there already is; as you say
they must manage them rather than either shut them down or leave them
unattended. That Hamas feels strong enough to tweak their nose is not
a good sign.

Hezbollah is cause for concern, should they fill the leadership vacuum
(using the words loosely) left by Arafat and his minions, they are a
much more competent organization with better resources to bring to
bear. I would not view it as a policy success to bring that about.

The continuing descent into chaos, as I put it, or warlordism, as you use,
is the larger concern. Living next to Somalia or a little Afghanistan
is unlikely to be much fun, and once achieved it will be an ugly
and long-winded business to try to change it back.