In Palestinian-Israeli politics, Israel remembers that there are certain mutual understandings used to manage the troubled relationship only when Palestinians take actions that anger the Israelis. Only in such circumstances does Israel complain of threats to the roadmap, the Sharm El Sheikh understandings, or even the entire peace process. When the Palestinians do whatever they are asked, however, such understandings and frameworks suddenly cease to exist.
A few days ago, a statement by the Palestinian Authority foreign minister, Nasser Al Kidwa, provided just such an example. Kidwa angered Israel when he said that Palestinian militant groups will not be disarmed as long as the occupation continues. "The disarming of armed organizations is not on the table because weapons are legal as long as the occupation exists."
Israel's Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared that Kidwa's statement was "a cluster bomb in a process that could lead to dialogue and calm". But neither dialogue, nor calm has ever been on offer from Israel, except as a reminder that a Palestinian action -- or in this case a mere statement -- has prevented it.
In spite of all the lying and deception, many people worldwide still either believe or are comfortable with the idea that until Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas has the guts to "rein in the Palestinian terrorists" and to "dismantle their infrastructure", Israel is justified in not moving forward with the peace process. The missing reality in this lopsided equation is that since the 1967 war, Israel has been much more comfortable with Arab extremists. Although the declared claim was always to the contrary, Israel felt all along that moderate Arab politics posed a challenge it was not ready to take, while extremists provided Israel with the needed excuse to oppose any genuine peace efforts, so that it could go forward with its well-planned expansionist programme in the whole of Palestine, as well as in parts of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. This applies fully to current Israeli politics, and it explains most of the difficulties the ultramoderate Abbas is facing today.
Abbas' entire strategy is based on Palestinian renunciation of all forms of anti-Israel violence, even in self-defence, practically stopping the Intifada, and establishing an open-ended truce until the United States or the international community succeeds in convincing Israel to start a meaningful dialogue with the Palestinians. Miraculously, Abbas succeeded in convincing the militants to accept a truce under uneven and severe conditions. In spite of the fact that Israel neither recognized the truce nor respected it, Palestinians have largely stuck to it.
http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article3926.shtml