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Edited on Sun Aug-21-05 06:05 PM by Violet_Crumble
This is an essay I wrote last year that I thought might be of interest to some. The essay question was: "The Oslo peace process could have delivered a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, provided the Israeli right had agreed to it from the start. Evaluate this critically in relation to the failure of the Oslo process" My apologies for the absense of formatting when it comes to the footnotes :)
The Oslo peace process marked the first time in the Israel Palestine conflict that both parties recognised each other’s right to exist and agreed to negotiate in an attempt to end the decades old conflict. The failure of the peace process was inevitable considering the lack of trust on both sides and the opposition from Israeli and Palestinian hardliners who were determined to scuttle the peace process, and with it any chance of compromise being made.
Opposition in Israel to the peace process came from hardliners such as the mainstream Israeli conservative political party – Likud; other nationalist Israeli political parties, and settler groups..<1> While this opposition ensured the eventual demise of the peace process, it is doubtful that the peace process would have succeeded even with the full and genuine support of the Israeli right.
This essay will examine the part the Israeli right played in the failure of the peace process, and examine other factors that destined the peace process to fail, including the opposition of hardline Palestinian groups to any form of negotiation with Israel; the inability of the United States to take the initiative and not favour Israel when mediating between the Israelis and Palestinians; and the inability and unwillingness of Israeli and Palestinian leaders to inform their populations about the concessions that would be required to be made to reach a final settlement; and finally the vagueness of the Oslo Accords, which resulted in both the Israelis and the Palestinians having vastly differing views of what the results of the peace process would be.
There was strong opposition to the peace process by settler groups who believe, for religious reasons, that all of historic Palestine belongs to Israel.<2> These groups are represented in the Knesset, and Likud are aligned to them. The settlers are only a small minority of the Israeli population, and their opposition to the peace process was in stark contrast to the majority of Israelis who did support the peace process.<3>
The settlers intentionally tried to destroy the peace process, attacking Palestinians in attempts to provoke violence.<4> In 1994, Baruch Goldstein opened fire in a mosque in Hebron, murdering 29 Palestinians. Onlookers disarmed Goldstein and beat him to death.<5> Rather than removing the Hebron settlers, a move supported by the majority of Israeli government ministers, the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin refused to do so because he believed that the general principles of the Oslo Accords did not specify that Israel had to dismantle any settlements in the West Bank or Gaza during the interim period.<6>
Binyamin Netanyahu, leader of the Israeli opposition, led a campaign of incitement aimed at derailing the peace process, and promised to cancel it when Likud was elected.<7> Netanyahu compared Rabin’s agreement to negotiate with Arafat to that of a Jew trying to talk to Hitler. This vitriolic campaign of incitement in which Rabin was cast as the enemy of Israel, culminated on 4 November 1995 when a Jewish religious extremist assassinated Rabin in an attempt to end any hope of the peace process continuing.<8> The peace process continued, but mistrust was growing on both sides. When Netanyahu was elected in May 1996, he did not cancel the peace process, though he slowed it to a crawl, and only continued to meet a few of Israel’s obligations due to pressure from the US. He was defeated in the next election by Ehud Barak, because most Israelis wanted the peace process to continue and they saw Netanyahu as opposing it.
In 1991 Ariel Sharon, the then Likud candidate in the upcoming Israeli election, announced his plans to visit the Temple Mount, one of the holy sites of great importance to Muslims. Accompanied by over a thousand troops, this was a deliberate attempt to provoke the Palestinians into violence. His plan worked, and the Al-Aqsa Intifada started. Sharon’s final action that made the hope of the peace process continuing impossible was when he was elected Prime Minister and refused to continue negotiations with the Palestinians, even though the negotiations at the Taba talks were looking promising.
Even if the Israeli right had accepted the peace process from the start, it still would not have succeeded due to the opposition of Palestinian groups such as Hamas. Hamas opposed the peace process from the start as they did not view Israel as a legitimate state and opposed any negotiations or compromise with Israel. Hamas supported a Palestinian state encompassing Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
While Palestinian intellectuals such as Edward Said opposed Olso<9>, which they saw as the Israeli occupation being continued in a less direct way, the opposition from Hamas excluded any support of a negotiated two-state solution, and manifested itself in the form of suicide bombings on civilian targets in Israel.
Arafat was not able to control the militant Palestinian groups, and more importantly was in a position where he could not make serious attempts to force Hamas to stop their attacks. Arafat feared civil war breaking out if the Palestinian Authority (PA) attempted to curb the activities of Hamas. The mainly secular Palestinian population was suffering from Israeli attacks, expansion of settlements and the associated expropriation of land, house demolitions, curfews and closures<10>. Those actions by Israel led to the possibility that if civil war broke out, secular Palestinians would support the militants over the PA.
Arafat used the power of his leadership to quash threats to his power and to feather the nests of those who gave him their unquestioning loyalty. He excluded those who opposed him from the peace process, including moderates whose contributions could have been valuable within the framework of the peace process.
The negotiations that led to the Oslo Accords were arranged in semi-secrecy between Palestinian and Israeli negotiators. In August 1993, the US Secretary of State was informed that an agreement had been reached between the Palestinians and Israelis. US State Department officials were surprised that there had been no US role required in the negotiations. After the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the US role in the peace process was one of encouraging the two parties to continue to negotiate, and also encouraging the international community to support the peace process.
The US became directly involved in the negotiations as the expectations of both parties emerged as being very different. The US took Israel’s side in the negotiations, at times relaying Israeli demands to the Palestinians and pretending they were actually US proposals<11>. Instead of being even-handed in its mediation, the US was viewed by the Palestinians as supporting Israel, no matter how unreasonable Israel’s position was.<12> While the US role in the peace process should have been that of a mediator not favouring either party, due to the US/Israeli relationship and the expectations of the US domestic audience which viewed even the slightest criticism of Israel with disapproval, the US steered clear of putting much pressure on Israel during negotiations. Both US and Israeli analysises of the causes of the failure of Oslo are exactly the same, and both place all the blame on the Palestinians. The Palestinian version of events, while much closer to reality than that of the US or Israel, was ignored until non-Palestinians supported the Palestinian view<13>.
The Palestinians were seen by the US as the weakest party in the negotiations, and the US supported Israels demands as the US assumed that the Palestinians would have no choice but to negotiate under terms favourable to Israel, and that it should be the Palestinians who should make the vast bulk of concessions in negotiations<14>.
The majority of Palestinians and Israelis polled during the 1990s supported the peace process. Even during Netanyahu’s government, support for the peace process never dropped to less than half of either population<15>. Both Israelis and Palestinians appear to have genuinely desired peace, but only as a general concept, and not with any thought as to specifics that people may not have supported but were essential to attaining a final settlement.
The Palestinian population was unprepared by the PA for concessions that were needed in order for the peace process to proceed. While a large majority of Palestinians supported the peace process, they did not have a concrete concept of the details of what would be required for a settlement to be reached, nor that Israeli expectations and what the PA had agreed to was in direct contrast to well established Palestinian national mythology, especially regarding the refugees<16>. Arafat did not attempt to educate Palestinians, especially the refugees on what would be required to have a peaceful resolution to the conflict. A full implementation of the Right of Return and a two-state solution were mutually exclusive, but there were no attempts made to bring the refugees on board and make them feel as though they were part of the peace process and that their concerns were being addressed<17>. Instead the refugees felt that they were being overlooked and their claims being sacrificed in order for the PA to reach a less than fair final settlement with Israel.Both the Israeli and Palestinian leadership focused on telling their own populations what they thought they wanted to hear, not taking into account that those messages critical of the other party were being listened to by the other population, who heard nothing reassuring<18>. This behaviour contributed to the increase in mutual distrust between the parties and the belief that they had no desire for peace.
The fatal flaw of the peace process was that the Oslo Accords was the same element of the peace process that enabled it to be embraced by both the Palestinians and Israelis. Oslo was couched in general terms and in such a way that the expectations of both parties as to what it would bring were markedly different. For the Palestinians, Oslo would bring them an end of the Israeli occupation, dismantling of Israeli settlements, and a viable and independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For the Israelis Oslo would bring about a Palestinian mini-state with no power and still controlled by Israel, no settlements being removed apart from a few isolated outposts, and legitimisation of the annexation of Jerusalem<19>.
The core issues of the conflict, which happened to be the most contentious issues, were all pushed back to the final settlement to be discussed. The Palestinians were put in the position of making concessions to Israel with no promise of a state, solution of the refugee problem, or the dismantling of settlements on the table. In the final settlement negotiations at Camp David in July 2000, Israel never put an offer in writing, but told the Palestinian negotiators of Barak’s take it or leave it final offer<20>. While the US and Israel refer to the offer as a ‘generous offer’<21>, what Barak was offering fell way short of even the most moderate of Palestinian expectations.
The failure of the peace process was assured even without the acceptance of the Israeli right. The vagueness of the Accord, the contrasting expectations of both Palestinians and Israelis, the opposition of Palestinian militant groups, the breaches of agreements on both sides, the failure of the US as mediator to provide any guidance and to be an impartial mediatior, and the mutual distrust that grew, all contributed to the demise of the peace process.
While the peace process failed, it did set the groundwork for any future negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians. Oslo was a trust building exercise, and at a future time when both Palestinians and Israelis are led by leaders who wish to resolve the conflict, and any US input is carried out in an evenhanded manner, the precedent for negotiations has been set already. The mistakes of the peace process should be considered and examined so that they are not made again, while the Taba talks shows that contentious issues such as the right of return are open for negotiation.
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<1> Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab world (London: Penguin Books, 2001) 521. <2> T. G. Fraser, The Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) 141. <3> Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab world (London: Penguin Books, 2001) 521. <4> Ibid, 525 <5> Ibid., 524. <6> Ibid, 525. <7> Ibid,. 521 <8> Ibid., 546. <9> Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, The Palestinian People: A History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003) 337. <10> Danny Rubenstein, “Five Ways to Kill a Peace Agreement”, Ha’aretz, 3 April 2001. <11> Jeremy Pressman, “Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?”, International Security 28:2 (Fall 2003), 41. <12> William Qandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Washington, D.C : University of California Press, 1993) 388. <13> Jeremy Pressman, “Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?”, International Security 28:2 (Fall 2003), 33. <14> William Qandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Washington, D.C : University of California Press, 1993) 326. <15> Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, The Palestinian People: A History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003) 336. <16> Robert Bowker, Palestinian Refugees: Mythology, Identity, and the Search for Peace (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) 170. <17> Ibid,. 155. <18> Jeremy Pressman, “Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?”, International Security 28:2 (Fall 2003), 40. <19> Ilan Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 225. <20> Jeff Halper, “The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control: in The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent, eds Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin (New York: The New Press) 28. <21> Robert Malley, “Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors”, New York Review of Books, 9 August 2001.
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