'Military leaders who remained in office in the Bush administration saw terrorism moving "further to the back burner," as Hugh Shelton put it. "The squeaky wheel was Dick Clarke, but he wasn't at the top of their priority list, so the lights went out for a few months. Dick did a pretty good job because he's abrasive as hell, but given the level he was at" therewas no breaking through into the new team's field of vision.
Under Shelton, the Joint Chiefs had not come up with more military options. There was still a strong belief that al-Qaeda was first and foremost an intelligence problem, but the Chiefs were frustrated by the lack of CIA "information operations" - actually disinformation operations - to create dissent among teh Taliban. In the last year of the Clinton administration, the Joint Chiefs started developing a project of their own, which they planned to launch in 2001. But when they were briefed, thge Pentagon's new leaders killed the project. "Rumsfeld
Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz were agaisnt the Joint Staff having the lead on this," says Shelton. The two had been pruning away tasks that the armed forces had taken on in recent years, but that they did not consider to be military missions, and the disinformation project was one of those trimmed. In the early months of the administration, Rumsfeld's attention was on military doctrine, inclusing the existing guidelines that US forces needed to be able to fight two major theater wars, for example in the PErsian Gulf and on teh Korean peninsula, almost simultaneously. Missile defense and military restructuring were the key issues. According to Shelton, "this terrorism thing was out there," as far as Rumsfeld was concerned, "but it didn't happen today, so maybe it belongs lower on the list ... so it gets defused over a long period of time."'
p335-6