http://justicefor911.org/iiA1_AirDefense_111904.phpToward New Criminal Investigations into the Events of September 11
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COMPLAINT AND PETITION AS FILED WITH NY AG ELIOT SPITZER 11/19/04
APPENDIX A1
AIR DEFENSE ON 9/11
U.S. domestic air defense forces under the umbrella of the North American Aerospace Defense Command ("NORAD") failed to intercept the errant flights of September 11, 2001, as called for in routine operating procedures for situational reconnaissance and response.
1. Even before it became clear that the September 11 flights had been hijacked, or that the intent was to use these aircraft in kamikaze attacks, their diversions from flight plan should have activated routine responses for dealing with errant planes. Civilian and military regulations and longstanding working procedures for commercial passenger planes and other aircraft under Instrument Flight Rules ("IFR") call upon air traffic controllers under the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") to alert NORAD upon determining that a flight has veered significantly from the route assigned to it by controllers; has ceased responding to ground control; or is an "unknown." NORAD's role in that case is to issue "scramble orders" for interception of the errant flight by jet fighters from U.S. Air Force Bases ("AFBs"). Interception of an errant flight allows for visual reconnaissance of the situation and a graduated menu of possible further actions (these might include attempts at radio contact, looking into the cockpit of the errant aircraft, visual signals such as tipping wings, attempts to force a landing, etc.).
2. These standard procedures were activated on 67 occasions in the period from September 2000 to June 2001 (see, FAA news release, 8/9/02; AP, 8/13/02); and in 129 cases in the year 2000 (see, Calgary Herald, 10/13/01). These figures were released by FAA and NORAD officials to the press in 2002, but go completely unmentioned in The 9/11 Commission Report. The report does not indicate whether the Kean Commission requested comprehensive performance data on these prior interception orders from the military, or whether the military provided any such information. An analysis to determine the typical circumstances and response times for interception orders prior to 9/11 would require, in each case for which orders were issued, data on the times it took for air traffic control to determine that a flight was errant; for the FAA to alert NORAD; for NORAD to issue a scramble order and for the scrambled jet(s) to take to the air; and, subsequently, for the interception itself; as well as the location of the errant flight, and information on whether it was still broadcasting transponder data. (Transponder broadcasts from planes under IFR locate the craft and specify its altitude. When these are interrupted, craft can still be located by "skin paint" on primary radar, albeit without altitude data.) Also necessary would be data on cases of errant planes or unknowns in which no scramble orders were issued. Of special interest would be the prior performance within NORAD's Northeastern Air Defense Sector ("NEADS"), which is headquartered at Rome, New York. Such a cumulative analysis--with special attention to cases when passenger planes deviated from course in the air-traffic control zones within which the 9/11 attacks occurred--would provide indispensable context for serious research into the subject of air defense response on September 11. This data is currently unavailable to the public, and there is no indication such an analysis was undertaken by the Kean Commission.
3. Response by FAA and NORAD on 9/11/01 should have become more rapid as the intent of the plot became clear and forces accordingly went on alert. Instead, according to official timelines, response times became slower as the attacks proceeded. According to all official accounts, none of the four 9/11 flight diversions were intercepted. Would it have made a difference to the outcome of the day's events? Even presuming the determined suicide pilots identified and described by U.S. authorities were at the helm, there is no telling how they may have reacted to the sudden appearance of fighter jets. One thing is certain: the function of visual reconnaissance of potential attack aircraft went unfulfilled.
4. Two days after September 11, speaking under oath at his confirmation hearings as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers (acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 11) told the Senate that no military aircraft were scrambled to intercept the diverted passenger flights until after the Pentagon was hit (at 9:38 a.m., according to official timelines). (Myers testimony to Senate, 9/13/01, see also, Appendix A2, point 3b.) This was reiterated the next day by NORAD spokesman Maj. Mike Snyder (Boston Globe, 9/15/01).
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11. "Staff Statement No. 17" is also the first government document to mention a "phantom aircraft." At an unspecified time after the first WTC crash at 8:46 a.m., the FAA sent out a false report that Flight 11 was still airborne and flying south over New Jersey, according to the Kean Commission staff. They say that the NORAD interceptors taking off from Langley AFB at 9:30 a.m. were not scrambled to intercept Flight 77, as NORAD and the FAA had claimed. Instead, these fighters were actually sent in pursuit of "Phantom 11," the Commission staff said. "Phantom 11" apparently did not correspond to any actual plane in the air. "We have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information," The 9/11 Commission Report concludes (p. 26). The report does not clarify how it came to be that this mistake was still being propagated 44 minutes after the Flight 11 crash (i.e., when the jets were scrambled from Langley AFB). The report does not ask how the misconception could have arisen at all, if no blip was visible on the FAA radar to be falsely identified as Flight 11 in the first place.
12. From the above, we draw a number of inescapable conclusions: Because the NORAD and FAA timelines were still in conflict as of May, 2003, officials of either NORAD or FAA (or both) were still upholding false accounts to the public more than 1½ years after September 11. Because the 9/11 Commission staff statement of June 2004 radically conflicts with both, either it is false, or both the NORAD and the FAA accounts were false. In whatever permutation, some combination of government officials must have been disseminating serious falsehoods over an extended period of months and years.
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15. We must also consider the possibility that at least some of the false statements are not due to incompetence or honest mistakes made after September 11, but instead result from intentional attempts to hide wrongdoing or gross negligence on the day of 9/11 itself. Given that possibility, the need for accountability, investigation and redress is all the more urgent.
16. The following anomalies give rise to suspicion of such wrongdoing, and therefore demand investigation:
(...failure to intercept Flt. 77 ... lack of response from Andrews AFB ... wargames mirroring each aspect of the 9/11 scenario, held that morning and planned long in advance ... evidence these wargames hindered response and were in fact intended to do so, or to serve as cover and means to facilitate attack...)
l. Destruction of evidence relating to Flight 11 and Flight 175: Less than two hours after the attacks, at least six air traffic controllers at the New York Air Route Traffic Control Center in Ronkonkoma made an audio recording describing their immediate recollection of events. But the tape was later destroyed by an FAA supervisor, before anyone made a transcript or even listened to it--despite other, urgent orders to retain all evidence (New York Times, 5/6/04).
m. Gen. Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD on September 11, is the only source cited in the 9/11 Commission Report specifically on the potential for confusion caused by the wargames held on that morning. He is quoted in a footnote (Ch. 1, fn 116) as saying that "it took about 30 seconds" to make the adjustment from the wargames to the real world situation. The report does not, however, specify the time when this adjustment was made. The report adds the opinion that the wargames if anything increased defense readiness on the day. This is a suspect conclusion, given the actual events.
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(Forward to Appendix A2.)
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