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Farmer says that despite the problems, the 9/11 Commission got to the truth.
Despite what Farmer said, the 9/11 Commission did not get to the truth, not even close.
The 9/11 Commission had all of the information from the DOJ IG investigation. In spite of this, the 9/11 Commission carefully and deliberately hid the fact that the CIA in a massive criminal conspiracy had withheld the information on the al Qaeda planning meeting at Kuala Lumpur from the FBI Cole bombing investigators. The 9/11 Commission then either minimized or covered over the fact that groups at the FBI that had been subjugated by the CIA intentionally and knowing also not only hid this same information from the FBI Cole investigators but then ultimately shut down all FBI criminal investigations of al Qaeda terrorists found to be inside of the US including the investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, who had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting planning the Cole bombing with Khallad Bin Attash.
The CIA had been desperately hiding the fact that Khallad Bin Attash, mastermind of the Cole bombing, had been at the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting with Mihdhar and Hazmi planning the Cole bombing, from the FBI criminal investigators who were investigating this al Qaeda attack.
The CIA apparently did not want anyone to know that they, the CIA, had all of the people at the Kuala Lumpur meeting photographed and even identified and then just let them walk away to carry out the attack on the USS Cole. The attacks on 9/11 were also planned at the Kuala Lumpur meeting so by hiding their culpability in the attack on the USS Cole they hid the information that the FBI needed to have been able to prevent the attacks on 9/11.
To hide this information from the FBI Cole bombing investigators the CIA had taken over the ITOS unit at FBI HQ and the office of the Director of the FBI, at the time headed by Louis Freeh
On August 22, 2001 FBI Agent Margaret Gillespie at the CIA Bin Laden unit found out that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US and took this information to both FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi and CIA officer Tom Wilshire, who at this time was liaison to Michael Rolince head of the FBI ITOS unit.
When Wilshire and Corsi were informed that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US, it is clear that Wilshire, and Corsi knew immediately that these long time al Qaeda terrorists were inside of the US only in order to take part in the horrific al Qaeda attack that both the CIA and FBI HQ had been warned about. See DE #939 entered into the defense exhibits for the Moussaoui trial. Wilshire had clearly indicated this in his email on July 23, 2001, detailed in DE 939.
In spite of knowing that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US in order to take part in a massive al Qaeda attack, Corsi shuts down FBI Agent Steve Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar by telling him in a phone conversation with her boss Rod Middleton, on August 28, 2001 that he and his team cannot start any investigation or be part of any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi because the information they would need came from the NSA and the NSA would not allow, without written permission, this information to go to FBI criminal investigators. See DE 449 the release the NSA gave Dina Corsi on August 27, 2001.
But Corsi had been hiding the fact that she already had been given permission to give the NSA information to Bongardt and his team on August 27, 2001, the day before she and Middleton told him that he had to shut down his investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi.
When Bongardt protested and asks Corsi to get a ruling from the NSLU at the FBI HQ, the FBI legal unit, to see if he and his team could investigate Mihdhar and Hazmi, since he was clearly aware these al Qaeda terrorists were inside of the US for no other reason than to carry out an al Qaeda terrorists attack, she fabricates the attorneys ruling and says the attorney had ruled he could not take part in any investigation of Mihdhar when the attorney had ruled just the opposite and said Bongardt and his team could take part in any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, see p 538 footnote 81, 9/11 Commission report. Note this information was buried at the very back of the 9/11 Commission report in a footnote in point 8 type, intentionally obscuring the massive significance of this information.
On August 29, Bongardt is told to destroy all of the information he has on Mihdhar and “to stand down” and have nothing to do with any investigation of Mihdhar by Corsi and a CIA officer at the CTC unit of the CIA, that must have been Tom Wilshire, according to Lawrence Wright who had interviewed FBI Agent Steve Bongardt for his book Looming Tower.
At the time she tells Bongardt this, she, Wilshire, and the CIA and many other people at FBI HQ all know that the CIA had been deliberately hiding the photograph of Khallad Bin Attash taken at the Kuala Lumpur meeting planning the Cole bombing with Mihdhar and Hazmi from Bongardt and his team of Cole investigators, to insure that Bongardt would not have enough information to be able start an investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi. This photograph of Bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur directly connected the mastermind of the Cole bombing to Mihdhar and Hazmi and their planning of the Cole bombing at that meeting.
But on August 30, 2001, one day after Wilshire and Corsi had shut down Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, the photograph of Khallad Bin Attash is sent by Wilshire, and the CIA to Rod Middleton, Corsi’s boss. While Middleton along with Corsi had told Bongardt on August 28, 2001 that he could not take part in any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, on August 30, 2001 Middleton now had the photographic proof that Mihdhar and Hazmi had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing at the Kuala Lumpur meeting with Khallad Bin Attash, information that meant there was no longer any possible justification to prevent Bongardt from immediately investigating and searching for both Mihdhar and Hazmi
Wilshire had been forbidden twice in July from turning the information on the Kuala Lumpur meeting over to the FBI by his managers at the CTC unit at the CIA, managers that included Richard Blee, Cofer Black and George Tenet.
Since both Wilshire and Corsi were acting under orders from higher level CIA and FBI managers, it is impossible to believe that when these people at the CIA and FBI HQ shut down Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi that they all did not know that as a direct result of their actions that thousands of Americans were now going to perish in the massive al Qaeda attacks that they had all been warned about since April 2001.
Withholding this information and shutting down FBI Agents Bongardt's investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi directly lead to the deaths of almost 3000 people on 9/11.
Since the 9/11 Commission had access of all of this information that came from the DOJ IG interviews of FBI agents and CIA officers, there is no possible excuse why this information on the deliberate and intentionally actions at the CIA and FBI to allow the al Qaeda terrorists to carry out the attacks on 9/11 was not exposed by their investigation and report.
Time after time as you go through the 9/11 Commission report you can actually see where it had been deliberately obfuscated, obscured or where they had intentionally left out critical information to hide the CIA and FBI HQ culpability in allowing the attacks on 9/11 to take place.
Framer not only got in wrong, he got it dead wrong.
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