AA Flight 11 - unanswered questions

[pberq]

This is a thread for unanswered questions about AA flight 11.

Here is Paul Thompson's page on Flight 11 from the "Complete 9/11 Timeline":

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline&day_of_9/11=aa11


For me, the first unanswered question is why SOP was not followed in terms of intercepting a plane that has shown the signs of being hijacked. A reading of the timeline shows that there was at least a 20 minute gap between the time Flight 11 was suspected of being hijacked and the time that it is claimed that the military was notified.

Here is a short excerpt of a recent article by Prof. Griffin:

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=%20GR20051213&articleId=1478

The 9/11 Commission's Incredible Tales
Flights 11, 175, 77, and 93

by Prof. David Ray Griffin

December 13, 2005

<snip>
Standard operating procedures dictate that if an FAA flight controller notices anything that suggests a possible hijacking--if radio contact is lost, if the plane's transponder goes off, or if the plane deviates from its flight plan--the controller is to contact a superior. If the problem cannot be fixed quickly--within about a minute--the superior is to ask NORAD--the North American Aerospace Defense Command--to scramble jet fighters to find out what is going on. NORAD then issues a scramble order to the nearest Air Force base with fighters on alert. On 9/11, all the hijacked airliners occurred in NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector, which is known as NEADS. So all the scramble orders would have come from NEADS.

The jet fighters at the disposal of NEADS could respond very quickly: According to the US Air Force website, F-15s can go from "scramble order" to 29,000 feet in only 2.5 minutes, after which they can then fly over 1800 miles per hour (140). (All page numbers given parenthetically in the text are to David Ray Griffin, The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions). Therefore--according to General Ralph Eberhart, the head of NORAD--after the FAA senses that something is wrong, "it takes about one minute" for it to contact NORAD, after which, according to a spokesperson, NORAD can scramble fighter jets "within a matter of minutes to anywhere in the United States" (140). These statements were, to be sure, made after 9/11, so we might suspect that they reflect a post-9/11 speed-up in procedures. But an Air Traffic Control document put out in 1998 warned pilots that any airplanes persisting in unusual behavior "will likely find two on their tail within 10 or so minutes" (141).

[Make7]

1. How long should the notification have taken?

And what would that information be based on?

- Make7

[pberq]

2. About one minute

"If the problem cannot be fixed quickly--within about a minute--the superior is to ask NORAD . . . to scramble jet fighters to find out what is going on.”

David Ray Griffin cites the FAA manual for ATCs at www.faa.gov

Here is another footnote on this subject:

The 9/11 Commission Report (Ch. 1, note 103) cites "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," which was issued June 1, 2001. This document in turn cites Directive 3025.15, issued in 1997, which contains the statement quoted in the text. The idea that no standard procedures should prevent immediate responses in emergency situations is also stated in other places in the document of June 1, 2001. Section 4.4, after saying that the secretary of defense retains approval authority for various types of support, concludes by saying: "Nothing in this Directive prevents a commander from exercising his or her immediate emergency response authority as outlined in DoD Directive 3025.1." And Section 4.5 begins with these words: "With the exception of immediate responses under imminently serious conditions, as provided in paragraph 4.7.1., below. . . . " I have discussed this issue at greater length in the Afterword to the second edition of David Ray Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions about the Bush Administration and 9/11 (Northampton: Interlink Books, 2004)---henceforth cited as NPH.

[Make7]

5. All the times cited are for post-9/11 response times, except...

... this from the original post:

an Air Traffic Control document put out in 1998 warned pilots that any airplanes persisting in unusual behavior "will likely find two [jet fighters] on their tail within 10 or so minutes"

Which of course has absolutely no indication of what the ATC response time to notify the military should be.

"About one minute" is based on General Eberhart's responses to questions during his Senate Armed Services Committee on October 25, 2001.

During his 9/11 Commission appearance General Eberhart specifically stated that the procedures for military interception had been improved, greatly reducing the response times compared to what had occurred on September 11, 2001.

Yet, this is the time being used to judge what the proper response time should have been following SOP on 9/11 - that is looking at a pre-9/11 world with post-9/11 vision.

Posted by pberq:

"If the problem cannot be fixed quickly--within about a minute--the superior is to ask NORAD . . . to scramble jet fighters to find out what is going on."

David Ray Griffin cites the FAA manual for ATCs at www.faa.gov

I imagine Dr. Griffin conducted this search and retrieval of information on the FAA website post-9/11. Had the information that he is citing been updated at all regarding new procedures based on lessons learned in 9/11? I suspect that it had. I looked for anything resembling the quoted passage, but could only find the following:

When you observe a Mode 3/A Code 7500, an unexplained loss of beacon code, change in direction of flight or altitude, and/or a loss of communications, notify supervisory personnel immediately.

http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATC/Chp10/atc1002.html

Perhaps you could search their entire website to find this particular piece of information that Dr. Griffin is referring to. Let me know if you are able to come up with anything.

Posted by pberq:

Here is another footnote on this subject:

The 9/11 Commission Report (Ch. 1, note 103) cites "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," which was issued June 1, 2001. This document in turn cites Directive 3025.15, issued in 1997, which contains the statement quoted in the text. The idea that no standard procedures should prevent immediate responses in emergency situations is also stated in other places in the document of June 1, 2001. Section 4.4, after saying that the secretary of defense retains approval authority for various types of support, concludes by saying: "Nothing in this Directive prevents a commander from exercising his or her immediate emergency response authority as outlined in DoD Directive 3025.1." And Section 4.5 begins with these words: "With the exception of immediate responses under imminently serious conditions, as provided in paragraph 4.7.1., below. . . . " I have discussed this issue at greater length in the Afterword to the second edition of David Ray Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions about the Bush Administration and 9/11 (Northampton: Interlink Books, 2004)---henceforth cited as NPH.

Well, I agree with that much. Even though it has been claimed by some that the Secretary of Defense needed to be notified to scramble aircraft because of this DoD Directive, it clearly is not the case. Although, I don't really see the relevance of this to my question about how long the ATC notification to the military should have taken.

However, I do find it odd that you included the footnote without ever having posted the text related to it.

The Commission, to be sure, would have us believe that Marr had to get approval from superiors. But the very document from the Department of Defense cited by the Commission indicates that anyone in the military chain of command, upon receiving "verbal requests from civil authorities for support in an ... emergency may ... immediately respond" Colonel Marr, therefore, could have responded on his own.

Colonel Marr could have responded on his own. Okay... but that still has nothing to do with the question that I posed.

All I would like to know is this: what is the basis for Dr. Griffin concluding what the response times should have been by following Standard Operating Procedures on September 11, 2001? Using post-9/11 response times cannot possibly be construed as an accurate measure of this.

- Make7

[pberq]

6. FAA rules

http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/AirDefStdDwn.html

<snip>
9-11 Timeline: minute-by-minute
Stand Down from Incompetence or Complicity?

From the morning of September 11th, official explanations for how three planes managed to fly into their respective targets without being shadowed by United States Air Force jets engaged in standard, aerial reconnaissance as per all the rules in the book, is simply not credible.

What is most revealing about the four hijacked flight timelines of September 11th is that Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules and regulations of standard intercept procedures for dealing with these kinds of situations have been in force and on-line for decades in the United States, 365 days a year, 7 days a week, 24 hours a day. Air Traffic Controller (ATC) procedures are explicit and unambiguous: if a plane goes two miles off course, that is an emergency situation. Since 9-11 we have not needed new laws; we needed for the existing laws to be adhered to. Last December, R. Anderson posted a summary of rules governing Instrument flight rules (IFR) requirements on the net with links to specific FAA and other U.S. government agencies' documentation.<80>


http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/AirDefStdDwn.html

There is now irrefutable evidence which proves massive complicity on the part of the highest levels of government -- along with numerous accomplices and co-conspirators in the military, intelligence and administrative sectors -- in the September 11 atrocities perpetrated against the American people.

Here's the deal.

1. Dozens of Air Force and Air National Guard bases are located within ten to thirty minutes intercept time of both 9.11 target locations. (List of bases provided below.)

2. Most of these installations have, at the ready, fighter jets such as F-16s to be scrambled on a moment's notice, for intercepting troubled or problem aircraft.

3. Air defense units did receive alerts from Air Traffic Controller (ATC) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) officials on a number of aircraft across the East Coast which had broken communications and deviated radically from established flight paths on the morning of September 11.

4. Standard intercept procedures for dealing with these kinds of situations are totally established, in force and on-line in the United States 365 days a year, 7 days a week, 24 hours a day.

5. Air National Guard and Air Force air defense units of the United States were prohibited from carrying out their standard intercept procedures (detailed in the following list of FAA documentation) on the morning of 9.11; after they had received the alerts from ATC and FAA.

Regarding rules governing Instrument flight rules (IFR) requirements, see:

* FAA Order 7400.2E, Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters Effective Date: December 7, 2000, (Includes Change 1, effective July 7, 2001), Part 4. Terminal and En Route Airspace, "Chapter 14 Designation of Airspace Classes" Section "14-1-2. Definitions". (Full text at: http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/AIR/air1401.html#14-1-2)

* Aeronautical Information Manual, Guide to Basic Flight Information and ATC Procedures (Includes Change 3, Effective: July 12, 2001), "Chapter 5 Air Traffic Procedures", "Section 6. National Security and Interception Procedures", "Section 5-6-4. Interception Signals" (http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/AIM/Chap5/aim0506.html#5-6-4)

* FAA Order 7110.65M, Air Traffic Control, (Includes Change 3, Effective: July 12, 2001), "Chapter 10. Emergencies,"
o "Section 1. General," "10-2-1. Emergency Determinations" (http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATC/Chp10/atc1001.html#10-1-1)
o "Section 2. Emergency Assistance," "10-2-5. Emergency Situations" (http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATC/Chp10/atc1002.html#10-2-5)

* FAA Order 7610.4J Special Military Operations, (Effective Date: November 3, 1998; Includes: Change 1, effective July 3, 2000; Change 2, effective July 12, 2001)
o "Chapter 4 FAA/NORAD/PACAF PROCEDURES FOR CONTROL OF AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT," "Section 5. AIR DEFENSE LIAISON OFFICERS (ADLO'S)," "Air Defense Liaison Officers (ADLO's)" (http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/MIL/Ch4/mil0405.html)
o "Chapter 7 ESCORT OF HIJACKED AIRCRAFT," "Section 1. GENERAL," "7-1-2. Requests for Service" (http://faa.gov/ATpubs/MIL/Ch7/mil0701.html#7-1-2)

* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3610.01A, 1 June 2001, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," "4. Policy (page 1). PDF at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01a.pdf. Backup at: http://emperors-clothes.com/9-11backups/3610_01a.pdf

* For a clear and detailed description of flight plans, fixes, and Air Traffic Control, see: `Direct-To Requirements' by Gregory Dennis and Emina Torlak at: http://sdg.lcs.mit.edu/atc/D2/D2Requirements.htm

Absolutely no executive-level input of any kind is required for standard intercepts to be scrambled.

There was no indication in any alerts received by air defense units that "shoot-downs" may be required as opposed to intercepts -- i.e. that the planes were definitely under control of "hostile" forces -- because ATC/FAA could not have known that.

When the first alerts were received from Air Traffic Control, all that air defense units were required to do was scramble standard interceptors to make contact with the incommunicado and off-course jets. F-16s and other fighter planes would have overtaken every single hijacked plane on September 11, before they had reached their targets! (See below for locations of air bases.)

(more at link. . .)

[Make7]

9. Where is "about one minute" in there?

You answered my original question concerning how long the notification should have taken by saying, "About one minute".

Which one of those FAA regulations stipulates that the notification time will occur in approximately one minute?

If it's in there somewhere, please quote the relevant passage directly and also provide a link to it. And if it's not, would you please tell me what the "about one minute" answer is based on?

Perhaps I should not have written so much in my last post. My main point was that basing a notification time on the procedure in place after September 11th is not truly representative of what the notification time should have been on September 11th before any such procedures were changed. (Which may possibly also apply to any FAA regulation that has some notification time frame included.)

- Make7

[pberq]

10. Make7 - thank you for calling me on my sloppy research

I was taking all this from Ch. 11 of "The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions" by David Ray Griffin.

Yes, "about one minute" was taken from General Eberhart's testimony.

I have a question though. Where is the documentation that supports his statement that ". . . the procedures for military interception had been improved, greatly reducing the response times compared to what had occurred on September 11, 2001."? Do we have the procedures from before and after 9/11 that prove this to be true? Or was Gen. Eberhart just trying to cover up?

Here is what David Ray Griffin says on this:

(p.140-141)

Interception also occurs quickly. As General Ralph Eberhart, the head of NORAD, reported in October 2002: From the time the FAA senses that something is wrong, "it takes about one minute" for it to contact NORAD, after which NORAD can scramble fighter jets "within a matter of minutes to anywhere in the United States."6 (Congressional testimony by NORAD's commander. General Ralph E. Eberhart, made in October 2002, and Slate magazine, January 16, 2002). Part of the reason they can get anywhere within a matter of minutes is that, according to the US Air Force website, an F-15 routinely "goes from 'scramble order' to 29,000 feet in only 2.5 minutes," after which it can fly 1,850 miles per hour.7

For the sake of accuracy, however, I need to point out that Eberhart's statement was preceded by the word "now," so he was saying that it now takes the FAA only about a minute to contact NORAD and that now NORAD can scramble jets to anywhere in the USA within a matter of minutes. Eberhart was thereby implying that procedures had been speeded up after 9/11. But if this is true, it could be easily supported by comparing NORAD's response times for interceptions prior to 9/11 with those afterward.

I know of no such comparison. The 9/11 Commission Report does not mention any comparison and reflects no probing about any such speed-up of procedures. My own assumption is that no such change was made. One piece of support for this belief is a 1998 document warning pilots that any airplanes persisting in unusual behavior "will likely find two on their tail within 10 or so minutes."(http://www.xavius.com/080198.htm)

On 9/11, however, this did not happen. The first hijacked airliner, Flight 11, showed clear signs of a possible hijacking at 8:14 that morning, and yet when it crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center 32 minutes later, no Air Force jets had even been scrambled. The other three hijacked flights also provided signs of their hijacking in plenty of time to have been intercepted. Standard procedures had clearly been violated.

Here is the source of the "10 minutes or so" quote:

http://www.xavius.com/080198.htm

ATCC Controllers' Read Binder...

NOTAMS, FAQs and other info for users of ATCC

August, 1998
. . .

Intercept Missions

The U.S. military has their own network of radars looking over the U.S. borders, and out over the ocean (NORAD). They are tied into the FAA computer to be able to get information on incoming flights from overseas, but if they see a target over international waters headed toward the U.S., without flight plan information, they will call on the "shout" line to the appropriate Center sector for an ID. Sector 66 might get a call to ID a radar target, and if 66 has no datablock or other information on it, the military will usually scramble an intercept flight. Essentially always they turn out to be private pilots ("VFR") not talking to anybody, who stray too far outside the boundary, then get picked up on their way back in. But, procedures are procedures, and they will likely find two F-18's on their tail within 10 or so minutes.

For the controller, the scrambles are treated like most other flights, with normal handoffs and altitude assignments, though they are given direct routes to the target. Center controllers handle the intercept, except in unusual situations, after being shown the target (or general area) by the NORAD controller. The Center controller just gives them a heading toward the area, and usually whatever altitude the intercept flight requests. When the flight leader acquires the target on radar or visually, they just take over the remainder of the intercept, and call you back when they're done and need a clearance back to their base.

"Done" doesn't mean they shoot them down, but rather they have identified the aircraft as a frightened private pilot, or possible drug smuggler, and NORAD has decided to let the Coast Guard take over the tracking and/or following. Or, they just record the tail number and send a letter to the plane owner telling them to be careful!

Granted, the above refers to flights coming in over the ocean. However, here is some more background from earlier in the chapter quoted above:

According to standard operating procedures, the FAA is supposed to contact the NMCC whenever it suspects that an airplane has been hijacked. There are three major signs that a plane may have been hijacked: (1) if it deviates seriously from its flight plan; (2) if radio contact is lost; or (3) if its transponder goes off. (The transponder is an electronic device that identifies the plane on the controller's screen and gives its exact location and altitude. It also can be used to send a four-digit emergency hijack code.) If any of these things happen, the flight controller is to try to contact the pilot to get the problem fixed. If the pilot does not respond appropriately, or if radio contact cannot be quickly restored, the FAA is to contact the NMCC to request assistance.

Note that it is not the FAA's task to determine whether a hijacking has actually occurred. Rather, FAA traffic controllers are given the following instruction: "If . . . you are in doubt that a situation constitutes an emergency or potential emergency, handle it as though it were an emergency."1 (The FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual: Official Guide to Basic Flight Information and Air Traffic Control (ATC) Procedures (www.faa.gov).) In other words, treat a possible hijacking as an actual hijacking.
Military regulations say: "In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA."2 http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01a.pdf

The NMCC then tells NORAD to have jets sent up—"scrambled"—from the nearest Air Force base with jets on alert. Typically one or two jet fighters will be sent to intercept the suspect airplane.

To me this calls in to question the long gap on 9/11 before NORAD was notified. Griffin’s documentation is a little too general here, I admit. I will put up better links in a future post. Also, I just noticed that Nafeez Ahmed has a better-documented chapter on this subject in “The War on Freedom”.

[Make7]

13. More later....

I'm kinda running short on time, so I won't be able to get to everything I would like to discuss, but I will post again in the next few days.

I was definitely questioning you on your answer of "about one minute", but it was more to point out that that particular point being raised by Dr. Griffin was not based on very reasonable information. I don't think any of us here has the time or energy to research all of this information to the degree we would like to... so we rely on the research of others that we believe has made the time and effort to go into these matters in greater depth. The problem that sometimes will arise from using the information presented by others is that they may not have done an adequate amount of research themselves. It never hurts to double check ones sources. I have failed to do that myself plenty of times, and even after saying all that I'm sure I'll do it again at some point in the future.

I feel there is a difference between you or me doing that on some internet message board and Dr. Griffin doing it. He is a very prominent figure in the '9/11 Truth' movement. His work is cited by many people to support their case, but not everything that Dr. Griffin says is backed up by solid information. With a subject this important, thorough research would seem to me to be essential for someone writing books and giving lectures concerning it.

I will attempt to limit myself more to the discussion concerning intercept and notification times in my next post. :) And also address your questions and the points raised in your post.

- Make7

[Make7]

15. More

Posted by pberq:

I have a question though. Where is the documentation that supports his statement that ". . . the procedures for military interception had been improved, greatly reducing the response times compared to what had occurred on September 11, 2001."? Do we have the procedures from before and after 9/11 that prove this to be true? Or was Gen. Eberhart just trying to cover up?

I haven't found pre and post procedures myself. That is based on General Eberhart's testimony to the 911 Commission.

MR. THOMPSON: This is a question for everyone on the panel to the extent you can answer it. If everything had gone perfectly on the morning of September 11th, if all the information from the controllers -- and I assume you now accept the Staff Statement the timeline of all of these things is correct -- let's start from that premise -- if everything had gone perfectly, if all the information that the controllers had had gone smoothly to FAA command centers, if all the information at the FAA command centers had gone smoothly to the military, the vice president's authorization to shoot down intruding aircraft had been communicated to the pilots, would it have been physically possible for the pilots, the military pilots, to have shot down the airplane that hit the first tower, the airplane that hit the second tower, and the airplane that hit the Pentagon? Assuming everything had gone perfectly, everybody was perfectly prepared, focused inward, scrambled, armed -- all the authorization there, all the information there -- would it have been physically possible for the military to have intercepted those three aircraft before they concluded their terrible mission?

GEN. EBERHART: Sir, our modeling, which we have shared with the staff, reflects that given the situation that you've outlined, which we think is the situation that exists today, because of the fixes, the remedies put in place, we would be to shoot down all three of them -- all four aircraft.

http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-17.pdf  (p. 55-56)

I'm not sure why General Eberhart's testimony is valid enough for Dr. Griffin to determine "within about a minute" for notification, but Dr. Griffin still states that his "own assumption is that no such change was made" regarding the speed-up of these procedures - neglecting the testimony of General Eberhart before the commission whose very report he is writing about.

For now I'll just add this post-9/11 response time example:

After 9/11, NORAD said it adjusted to the new realities. In October, Gen. Eberhart told Congress that "now it takes about one minute" from the time that the FAA senses something is amiss before it notifies NORAD. And around the same time, a NORAD spokesofficer told the Associated Press that the military can now scramble fighters "within a matter of minutes to anywhere in the United States."

But lo and behold, earlier this month (January 2002) when 15-year-old student pilot Charles Bishop absconded with a Cessna and flew it into a Tampa skyscraper, NORAD didn't learn of it until it overheard FAA radio calls about the situation, and it wasn't able to launch its fighter jets until 15 minutes after Bishop had already crashed into the building. Those fighters didn't arrive on the scene until 45 minutes after Bishop took off.


http://www.slate.com/?id=2060825

- Make7

[pberq]

16. Why didn't the 9/11 Commission check this out?

As Prof. Griffin says:

Eberhart was thereby implying that procedures had been speeded up after 9/11. But if this is true, it could be easily supported by comparing NORAD's response times for interceptions prior to 9/11 with those afterward.

I know of no such comparison. The 9/11 Commission Report does not mention any comparison and reflects no probing about any such speed-up of procedures.

In my post below about Paine Stewart’s flight, which is cited so often, it is clear that the official NTSB report conflicts with the ABC news report (which claims to be based on an Air Force briefing). Also, many people have reported that the intercept time was relatively quickly (everything from 10 - 18 minutes to “immediately”.)


Here's another point about Eberhart:

http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/071204_final_fraud.shtml

July 9, 2004 1430 PDT (FTW) - When asked who was responsible for coordinating the multiple war games running on the morning of September 11, 2001, General Ralph E Eberhart, the man in charge of NORAD on the morning in question replied,

"No Comment."

It is extremely suspect that Eberhart was unable to comment when we look at his sworn testimony just moments before this question was posed to him on June 17, 2004, in response to Commissioner Roemer's line of questioning.

Tim Roemer was the only Commissioner to pose a question about military exercises running on the morning of 9/11. He opened by making reference to an 8:38 FAA communication to NEADS regarding a hijacked aircraft headed to New York. The response from NEADS was, "Is this real world or an exercise?" FAA response was, "No, this is not an exercise, not a test."

Roemer then asked General Eberhart:

My question is, you were postured for an exercise against the former Soviet Union. Did that help or hurt? Did that help in terms of were more people prepared? Did you have more people ready? Were more fighters fueled with more fuel? Or did this hurt in terms of people thinking, "No, there's no possibility that this is real world; we're engaged in an exercise," and delay things?

Eberhart's response:

Sir, my belief is that it helped because of the manning, because of the focus, because the crews - they have to be airborne in 15 minutes and that morning, because of the exercise, they were airborne in six or eight minutes. And so I believe that focus helped.


If the war games helped "because of the focus," why would General Eberhart be reluctant to go on record regarding the issue of just who was the central person coordinating that focus? Was the General himself, the man who headed NORAD that very morning, in charge of coordinating the multiple war games on 9/11?

There is much more about the multiple war games on 9/11 at the link.

[Make7]

17. It doesn't appear that they compared pre and post intercept time data...

...but according to the staff statement and General Eberhart's testimony on June 17, 2004, the staff researched the procedures that were in place on 9/11 and were also given models outlining the updated procedures. Perhaps they felt that comparing that information adequately covered the subject.

I've seen many conflicting press accounts of the Payne Stewart accident. I think one source of confusion is the change in Time Zones in the NTSB report. It is often cited with the times as if they were all using the same time reference, which reduces the time of intercept by one hour.

Here are a couple more snippets from press reports:

10:08 a.m. (eastern) "FAA requested emergency escort." F-16 from Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., was airborne on routine mission when diverted to provide the initial escort.

http://www.usatoday.com/sports/golf/stewart/stewfs13.htm

Pentagon officials said the military began its pursuit of the ghostly civilian aircraft at 10:08 a.m., when two Air Force F-16 fighters from Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida that were on a routine training mission were asked by the FAA to intercept it. The F-16s did not reach the Learjet, but an Air Force F-15 fighter from Eglin Air Force Base in Florida that also was asked to locate it got within sight of the aircraft and stayed with it from 11:09 a.m. to 11:44 a.m., when the military fighter was diverted to St. Louis for fuel.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/daily/oct99/crash26.htm

I'd just like to add that according to the NTSB report, radio contact was lost at 09:33 a.m. eastern. Also notice how the intercept time in the Post article differs from other reports.

- Make7

[laruemtt]

11. does anyone know or remember

how long it took them to get up there when payne stewart's plane went off course / didn't respond?

[hack89]

12. It took one hour and 24 minutes

per the NTSB:

At 0933:38 EDT (6 minutes and 20 seconds after N47BA acknowledged the previous clearance), the controller instructed N47BA to change radio frequencies and contact another Jacksonville ARTCC controller. The controller received no response from N47BA. The controller called the flight five more times over the next 4 1/2 minutes but received no response.

About 0952 CDT,7 a USAF F-16 test pilot from the 40th Flight Test Squadron at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida, was vectored to within 8 nm of N47BA.8 About 0954 CDT, at a range of 2,000 feet from the accident airplane and an altitude of about 46,400 feet,9 the test pilot made two radio calls to N47BA but did not receive a response. About 1000 CDT, the test pilot began a visual inspection of N47BA

http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2000/AAB0001.htm

[pberq]

14. Questions on the NTSB report

I do not have documentation (such as military logs) to dispute what is reported by the NTSB. However, a number of questions arise from reading the report and doing a couple of quick Google searches.

First, are we to believe that absolutely nothing happened for an hour and twenty minutes that was worth including in the report? What about the call to the military? What time did that occur?

Second, this report conflicts with the ABC news report posted below, which states that two F-15s first intercepted the aircraft.

Third, in the citations below, there seems to have been a common belief that Paine Stewart's plane was intercepted much more quickly than an hour and twenty-four minutes. This does not make it true, but where did these various people get that idea if it is false? Unfortunately, these statements are not supported by original documentation, but then neither is the NTSB report.

One would suspect that the military has some logs from that day, which would shed light on this. Also, the military pilots could be interviewed.

So here are the articles, starting with a recap of the section of the NTSB report:

http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2000/AAB0001.htm

At 0933:38 EDT (6 minutes and 20 seconds after N47BA acknowledged the previous clearance), the controller instructed N47BA to change radio frequencies and contact another Jacksonville ARTCC controller. The controller received no response from N47BA. The controller called the flight five more times over the next 4 1/2 minutes but received no response.

About 0952 CDT,7 a USAF F-16 test pilot from the 40th Flight Test Squadron at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida, was vectored to within 8 nm of N47BA.8 About 0954 CDT, at a range of 2,000 feet from the accident airplane and an altitude of about 46,400 feet,9 the test pilot made two radio calls to N47BA but did not receive a response. About 1000 CDT, the test pilot began a visual inspection of N47BA

About 0954 CDT, at a range of 2,000 feet from the accident airplane and an altitude of about 46,400 feet,9 the test pilot made two radio calls to N47BA but did not receive a response. About 1000 CDT, the test pilot began a visual inspection of N47BA. There was no visible damage to the airplane, and he did not see ice accumulation on the exterior of the airplane. Both engines were running, and the rotating beacon was on. He stated that he could not see inside the passenger section of the airplane because the windows seemed to be dark. Further, he stated that the entire right cockpit windshield was opaque, as if condensation or ice covered the inside. He also indicated that the left cockpit windshield was opaque, although several sections of the center of the windshield seemed to be only thinly covered by condensation or ice; a small rectangular section of the windshield was clear, with only a small section of the glare shield visible through this area. He did not see any flight control movement. About 1012 CDT, he concluded his inspection of N47BA and proceeded to Scott AFB, Illinois.
About 1113 CDT, two Oklahoma ANG F-16s with the identification "TULSA 13 flight" were vectored to intercept the accident airplane by the Minneapolis ARTCC. The TULSA 13 lead pilot reported to the Minneapolis ARTCC controller that he could not see any movement in the cockpit. About 1125 CDT, the TULSA 13 lead pilot reported that the windshield was dark and that he could not tell if the windshield was iced.


http://emperors-clothes.com/9-11backups/abclearjet.htm

Golfer Payne Stewart Dies
Runaway Plane Crashes in S.D.; Golfer, at Least Four Others Killed

By Geraldine Sealey
ABCNEWS.com

Oct. 25 — A runaway Learjet carrying professional golfer Payne Stewart and possibly five other people crashed today after drifting across the country for hours with no one controlling the aircraft. There were no survivors
. . .

Military Aircraft Tracked Jet
According to an Air Force summary, after contact was initially lost, two F-15s from Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., were sent to track the Learjet. The F-15s pulled back and two F-16s in the air from Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., moved in to track the aircraft.
After the Learjet reached the Midwest, the Eglin F-16s pulled off and four F-16s and a midair refueling tanker from the Tulsa National Guard followed it.

http://www.space4peace.org/reports/trip_report_ca_ma_04.htm

. . .She, like many others, still do not get an answer to their basic question as to why military planes were not scrambled when the four airliners were clearly hijacked. Federal Aviation Authority guidelines require that this be done and the case of Paine Stewart, the golfer, whose plane lost contact with the control tower years ago was much cited as one example of standard operating procedure. In that case Stewart's private plane lost contact with the control tower and two military jets were immediately sent up to investigate the situation. I personally watched real-time coverage of the story on CNN from my office.


http://my.highschooljournalism.org/oh/akron/hoban/article.cfm?eid=842&aid=9530

Procedures in place Sept. 11 might have averted disaster
Special Analysis: WHAT WENT WRONG?

By Mike DalSanto and Derek Allen

While Sept. 11, 2001, is forever etched in the memory of virtually every American, far fewer remember Oct. 25, 1999. On that day, professional golfer Paine Stewart's Learjet crashed into a South Dakota field, killing all on board.

After taking off from Orlando, Fla., Stewart's plane missed a scheduled turn above Gainesville. Soon after, according to a CNN.com article, the air traffic controllers (ATC) tried to reestablish communications with the plane, but to no avail. Apparently, the plane had lost cabin pressure, incapacitating all on board.

From the official National Transportation Safety Board crash report, after a 9:19 a.m. takeoff, the pilot failed to respond to a command at 9:33. For about five minutes, the ATC tried to regain contact with the plane, and, having failed to do so, the controller immediately called the military.

http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:UT1yUSM-U9cJ:www.septembereleventh.org/forum/showflat.php%3FCat%3D%26Number%3D64%26Main%3D64+%22Paine+Stewart%22+9-11&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=10&lr=lang_en&client=firefox-a

Edited transcript of the video "Truth and Lies of 9/11", based on an address by publisher Michael C. Ruppert ("From the Wilderness") at Portland State University, Oregon, on November 28, 2001.

. . .Remember Paine Stewart. Remember his airplane? Remember it went off course. It was off course for no more than ten minutes and fighter jets had been scrambled to fly along beside it.


http://www.bushstole04.com/9-11-01_new_6a.htm

8. Several years ago professional golfer Paine Stewart was flying with friends out of Florida in a small private jet towards Dallas . Within a short period of time after take off there was a malfunction in the plane, and the pilot and passengers passed out and lost contact with the FAA. Within 18 minutes NORAD had scrambled an F16 to fly next to this plane. Within 22 minutes, there were four F16's flying in tandem with this disabled plane. This is all Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2006/01/08/there-may-be-more-leaks-_n_13455.html

As you all may recall, especially if you follow golf, Paine Stewart was on a private flight out of Florida a couple of years before 9/11, and the plane was off course and out of contact with controllers. A fighter jet was immediately scrambled, and confirmed that all crew and passengers were dead, probably due to a loss of cabin pressure. The jet was ordered to follow the plane, and to shoot it down if it looked like it would crash in a populated area. As it turns out, it flew for thousands of miles before crashing in an unpopulated area.

[Woody Box]

3. Which departure gate? 26 or 32?

A simple question first raised in a DU thread two years ago

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=125&topic_id=6265&mesg_id=6265

and a bit later in an article

http://911wideopen.com/mirror/twin11-1/twin-11-mod.htm

and still not answered.

[pberq]

8. Thank you. Very important story.

http://911wideopen.com/mirror/twin11-1/twin-11-mod.htm

<snip>
The issue in question is the identity of the doomed plane. Plane-32 is the jet that crashed into the WTC North Tower. Its flight path is well documented by the transponder data, the radar data and the radio talk with the controllers, at least up to a few minutes before the crash. But there is no evidence of any people embarking, or intending to embark, on a plane starting at 7:45 from Gate 32, not one report, not one witness. Whereas it's possible that the passengers boarded partly plane-26, partly plane-32, it seems to be far more likely that the irregularity of the two gates is part of a hitherto unknown plan to get control of plane-32 without disturbing passengers or crew members. So in all probability, the plane was "stolen" from the airport by the so-called hijackers, - with no passengers aboard.

The people most concerned by this are the relatives of the victims of flight 11. They must learn that their husbands, wives, fathers, mothers etc. perhaps did not die in the North Tower. Sadly, there is virtually no hope that they are still alive because we've never heard of them anymore. But as every human being wants to know the place where his loved ones left this earthly world, it's just a matter of time until questions for their real fate will arise.

The FBI and the 9/11 Commission, apparently unaware of the problem, should seriously scrutinize the hypothesis of the "hijacked" planes. If there were no passengers on plane-32, there was no need to hijack it. The pilot's behavior - deviation from course, no reaction to controllers, suspicious cockpit talks - was supposed to PRETEND a hijacking. The resulting question - why did he do that, why did he attract attention so early instead of calmly following his deadly route as long as necessary - lacks an answer yet but constitutes a big challenge to every investigator.

[MrSammo1]

4. I think it's pretty safe to assume......

that 911 was nothing more than a modern day version of Operation Northwoods.

[savemefromdumbya]

7. Flight 11X and flight11

there were 2 planes flight 11 and flight 11X