I read a post here about whether a poll like this indicates that Clark made a strategic error in not competing in Iowa, and I still say no. I started a thread on this yesterday before the results came in, and there were some interesting observations others posted there that still hold water.
Here is the link to that now buried thread:
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=132&topic_id=135639&mesg_id=135639But to keep the discussion on a current thread, I will copy my opening statement off that thread below, under these Tuesday afternoon comments. Because of Clark, Kerry became a viable candidate again (see reasons below). Some of Clark's surge over the last 3 weeks came from discouraged Kerry backers. Even before the results came in from Iowa, many of those former Kerry backers were feeling a lot more optimistic, hearing about Kerry's momentum in Iowa over the last several week. Hence this poll already reflects a movement back to Kerry from Clark on the part of some essentially Kerry supporters in NH. It in many ways anticipated the Iowa results in that regard. What it did not anticipate was Dean's very poor showing as a distant third. I think few expected the margin of Dean's defeat last night, I certainly didn't. It could not predict either the current round of negative spin swirling around Dean's concession speech.
So now, for the first time really, there is a chance that some of Dean's previously Hard core support in New Hampshire will move away from him. That is the variable I did not factor into my below reposted comments below. I still hold that Clark does not have to beat Kerry, or come very close to him in New Hampshire. Clark does not have to come in second either. Clark does have to come in above Edwards however. If Clark beats Edwards convincingly, some of Edwards southern leaning support may peal away from Edwards. The fight will leave Kerry's New England backyard. Clark is fully loaded to compete on more neutral terrain. This should be interesting. Here's that thread. See how it holds up in the light of the day after:
"In the excitement and glare of our mutual Iowa moment, there are a few observations that I believe are called for regarding the wisdom, or lack of it, of Clark skipping Iowa, and the consequences for his campaign.
!) Clark did not make a tactical mistake in not competing in Iowa. The correct statement is that Clark was at a tactical disadvantage in not being able to adequately compete in both Iowa and NH due to his very late entry. Clark had a total of four months to assemble a staff, organize his campaign, introduce himself to voters, ramp up fund raising, develop solid position papers on many issues that elected officials already had their political aids help them prepare, and do retail campaigning in at least one of those two states. Clark played his hand extremely well. Obviously it would have been far preferable for him to run solid campaigns in both states. He couldn't. The campaign operation Clark now has could well have done so, but he did not have that capacity 3 months back.
2) Clark has gotten incredible attention for his campaign by moving up from 6% or so to 20% or so in NH. That shows in the National polling numbers also. The entire "Clark is a flavor of the month, he is an armature who will wilt under campaign pressure" line of attack has been rebutted and laid to rest. Now Clark is discussed as a very viable candidate whose positions actions, and prospects are taken seriously. Had he been mired in the middle of the pack in two states likely none of that would have happened, except perhaps for the prediction that he was a "flavor of the month".
3) By showing strong movement up in NH, Clark established that Dean was not the only Democrat capable of exciting voters. During that period all of the other campaigns were either stagnant or collapsing. With Gore's endorsement, Dean's bandwagon might have become unstoppable had no other candidate shown promise of being able to compete with Dean during those critical weeks. Clark's strategy enabled him to slow Dean's bandwagon when no one else was doing so. Clark helped both himself and the other candidates by doing so. He would rather have helped himself only, but you can't always get what you want. At least now there is still a race going on for Clark to potentially win.
4) The earlier projections and assessments about what Clark needed to accomplish in NH have changed with changing circumstances. Previously the question was, what must Clark achieve in NH that will position him to continue the fight against a relentlessly effective Howard Dean campaign that was wearing the aura of virtually preordained nominee? Either Kerry, Edwards, and/or Gephardt will "bloody" Dean in Iowa, or they won't. If they don't, they will lose luster for having failed to do so, and Clark will regain momentum because, not having competed in Iowa, Clark can not fail in that regard. If one or more of those men do hobble Dean, then the race we will subsequently be looking at is far different than the one everyone anticipated only a few weeks back. It would be unlikely to end in a quick knockout for anyone. Clark has the resources and national organization needed for a prolonged competition.
5) Assuming for the moment that Dean's momentum is slowed by Iowa's results, where does that leave Clark? What will he need to accomplish in NH, and how likely is it that he can? The most important thing to keep in mind is that Iowa for the most part becomes a foot note to history as soon as NH's results are in. Iowa is important because it helps set the stage for the contests that follow, but Iowa is small and somewhat quirky, and everyone knows it. A very small group of Democrats actually participate in Iowa's caucus. Momentum anyone achieves coming out of Iowa instantly dissipates, if that momentum is lost in New Hampshire. So lets say Edwards or Kerry has a strong showing in Iowa, the question then becomes, can they follow it up?
For Edwards it will be very hard for him to explain away coming in behind Clark in New Hampshire should that in fact happen. Even if Edwards moves up in New Hampshire, building off a good showing in Iowa, the fact is Edwards did not have to face Clark in Iowa, and everyone knows it. Should Clark beat Edwards in New Hampshire people will revisit the Iowa results and conclude that Edwards was pulling votes there that otherwise would have gone to Clark had Clark contested the state. Edwards needs to finish ahead of Clark in NH, if Clark prevents that Clark prevails in their contest. Should Kerry win in Iowa, that likely sets Kerry up to come in first or second in New Hampshire, pumping new energy into his campaign, but not inevitability. Kerry campaigned long and hard in his neighboring state. Unlike Edwards, Clark is not required to beat Kerry in order to remain highly viable. Clark however NEEDS to beat everyone other than Dean and Edwards to retain some, most, or all of his momentum heading into the following week's contests.
That in many ways brings us back to square one for Clark. He has to finish third or higher in New Hampshire. Second or higher would be great, but not necessary. Contests held during the following couple of weeks will include many that Clark is well positioned in, with Clark having ample resources available there to ratchet up his efforts. In closing, the last point that many are missing is:
6) Clark did NOT compete in Iowa, get it? That means some, certainly not all but some, of the surging support other candidates in Iowa are receiving at Dean's expense comes from voters who otherwise would have chosen Clark had Clark competed there also. That means those same men will now have to fight to keep those votes from reverting back to Clark in all the subsequent contests where Clark is in fact competing. The perceived popularity of all the candidates in Iowa to some extent is inflated, because they are not facing one of their leading opponents, Clark, in that contest.
We have not yet begun to fight."