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Now that we have the benefit of hindsight, anyone who looks at Clark's testimony to the Armed Services Committee can see that he was completely right about Iraq in the fall of 2002. Here are the quotes that back up this statement:
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But the problem of Iraq is only one element of the broader security challenges facing our country. We have an unfinished worldwide war gainst Al Qaida, a war that has to be won in conjunction with friends and allies and that ultimately will be won as much by persuasion as by the use of force. We've got to turn off the Al Qaida recruiting machine. Now some 3,000 deaths on September 11th testify to the real danger from Al Qaida, and I think everyone acknowledges that Al Qaida has not yet been defeated.
As far as I know, I haven't seen any substantial evidence linking Saddam's regime to the Al Qaida network, though such evidence may emerge. But nevertheless, winning the war against Al Qaida and taking actions against the weapons programs in Iraq, that's two different problems that may require two different sets of solutions. In other words, to put it back into military parlance, Iraq they're an operational level problem. We've got other operational level problems in the Middle East, like the ongoing conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Al Qaida and the foundation of radical extremist fundamentalist Islam, that's the strategic problem.
We've got to make sure that in addressing the operational problem we're effective in going after the larger strategic problem. And so, the critical issue facing the United States right now is how to force action against Saddam Hussein and his weapons programs without detracting from our focus on Al Qaida or our efforts to deal with other immediate mid and long-term security problems.
I'd like to offer the following observations by way of how we could proceed. First of all, I do believe that the United States diplomacy in the United Nations will be strengthened if the Congress can adopt a resolution expressing U.S. determination to act if the United Nations can not act. The use of force must remain a U.S. option
under active consideration.
Such congressional resolution need not, at this point, authorize the use of force. The more focused the resolution on Iraq, the more focused it is on the problems of weapons of mass destruction. The greater its utility in the United Nations, the more nearly unanimous the resolution, the greater its utility is, the greater its impact is on the diplomatic efforts under way.
---snip---
We have to work this problem in a way to gain worldwide legitimacy and
understanding for the concerns that we rightly feel and for our leadership. This is what U.S. leadership in the world must be. We must bring others to share our views not be too quick to rush to try to impose them even if we have the power to do so. I
agree that there's a risk that the inspections would fail to provide evidence of the weapons program. They might fail, but I think we can deal with this problem as we move along, and I think the difficulties of dealing with this outcome are more than offset by the opportunities to gain allies, support, and legitimacy in the campaign
against Saddam Hussein.
If the efforts to resolve the problem by using the United Nations fail, either initially or ultimately, then we need to form the broadest possible coalition including our NATO allies and the North Atlantic Council if we're going to have to bring forces to bear. We should not be using force until the personnel, the organizations, the plans that will be required for post conflict Iraq are prepared and ready. This includes dealing with requirements for humanitarian assistance, police and judicial capabilities, emergency medical and reconstruction assistance and preparations for a transitional governing body and eventual elections, perhaps even including a new
constitution.
Ideally, the international/multinational organizations will participate in the readying of such post conflict operations, the United Nations, NATO, other regional organization, Islamic organizations, but we have no idea how long this campaign could last, and if it were to go like the campaign against the Afghans, against the Taliban in which suddenly the Taliban collapsed and there we were.
We need to be ready because if suddenly Saddam Hussein's government collapses and we don't have everything ready to go, we're going to have chaos in that region. We may not get control of all the weapons of mass destruction, technicians, plans, capabilities; in fact, what may happen is that we'll remove a repressive regime and have it replaced with a fundamentalist regime which contributes to the strategic problem rather than helping to solve it.
So, all that having been said, the option to use force must remain on the table. It should be used as the last resort after all diplomatic means have been exhausted unless there's information that indicates that a further delay would represent an immediate risk to the assembled forces and organizations. And, I want to underscore that I think the United States should not categorize this action as preemptive. Preemptive and that doctrine has nothing whatsoever to do with this problem.
---snip---
The honest truth is that the absence of intelligence is not an adequate reason to go forward to war in and of itself, and so what we have to do is we have to build a program that builds, that encourages other nations to share our perspective. We can do it relatively quickly. We should not discard inspections. They have done some
measure of good, otherwise Saddam wouldn't object to them so strongly.
---snip---
But I will say this, that the administration has not proceeded heretofore in a way that would encourage its friends and allies to support it. One of the problems we have is the overhang from a number of decisions taken by the administration which have undercut its friends and allies around the world and given the impression that the
United States doesn't respect the opinions of other.
---snip---
That having been said once we move into the area, what we can expect is a complete breakdown of governmental authority. It's not only Saddam Hussein but it's the people who, as you suggested, the henchmen and all of the people who are complicit in that regime who have illegally confiscated land, carried out his orders for executions and torture, and forced name changes and identity changes. Revenge will be exacted.
---snip---
So, you have the question of the successor regime and then you have the problem of the long-term presence of the American forces in the region. One of the things that we've seen is that when you put American forces into a region, we tend to be a lightning rod.
In the case of Kosovo, we're the strongest element there and the Albanians look to us for protection. In the case of Iraq, we're going to be infidels in a Muslim land, and one of the things that's going to happen when you break the authority of Saddam Hussein is that you're going to have a resurgence of support for the Muslims in the region by the radical elements, both Sunni -- or both Wahhabi and Shia and they will be in there and they will be preaching anti-Americanism.
And, as we take the necessary actions with our force in the occupation or some have termed it the liberation of Iraq, we're going to put Americans in a position where they have to exercise authority. We're not going to enforce Islamic law, so there are a number of fundamental issues that are troublesome in the long run. We need to put together the right organizations and people to think through these issues and be ready to deal with them because you could look at a potential requirement to implement this plan less than two weeks after the initiation of hostilities.
---snip---
Since then (1973), we've encouraged Saddam Hussein and supported him as he attacked against Iran in an effort to prevent Iranian destabilization of the Gulf. That came back and bit us when Saddam Hussein then moved against Kuwait. We encouraged the Saudis and the Pakistanis to work with the Afghans and build an army of God, the mujahaddin, to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan. Now we have released tens of thousands of these Holy warriors, some of whom have turned against us and formed Al Qaida.
My French friends constantly remind me that these are problems that we had a hand in creating. So when it comes to creating another strategy, which is built around the intrusion into the region by U.S. forces, all the warning signs should be flashing. There are unintended consequences when force is used. Use it as a last resort. Use it multilaterally if you can. Use it unilaterally only if you must.
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Let Ed Gillespie point to this testimony all he wants in the General Election, it will only make it clearer that Clark would have done a much better job at handling Iraq than Bush did. It will also show that he did not support Bush's policy or the resolution to give Bush authority to go to war, and that Clark's views on use of force and multilateralism and America's position in the world are exactly what the Democratic party stands for.
Face it, Clark nailed the most important foreign policy issue in the past four years to the wall. This is why I don't really see any comparison between Kerry's foreign policy credentials and Clark's. Dean and Edwards won't win by running on foreign policy, and this election is going to have a lot to do with foreign policy and national security.
Foreign policy starts and ends with the President. The most important characteristics for a President to have are character, judgement, and the ability to deal with foreign policy.
Clark is the man.
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