US Secretly Deployed Nuclear Bombs In 27 Countries
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/19991020/NSC 26 SERIES: PLANS FOR DENIAL OF MIDDLE EAST OIL RESOURCES TO HOSTILE COUNTRIES (Please note: some of the NSC 26 papers have been declassified but many significant documents on this topic remain classified)
Newly Declassified Material from the
Harry S. Truman Papers
Meeting 57-May 18, 1950
Memorandum from James Lay, Jr. to the NSC on NSC 26/2, May 9, 1950, with attachment on the removal and demolition of oil facilities and supplies in the Middle East
Meeting 65-August 17, 1950
Memorandum from Sidney Souers to the NSC, May 25, 1949 3
Memorandum from Sidney Souers to the NSC, June 21, 1949 16
Memorandum from James Lay, Jr. to the NSC, June 29, 1950, with NSC 26/3 8
Memorandum from James Lay, Jr. to the President, August 18, 1950 1
Memorandum from James Lay, Jr. to the NSC on NSC 26/3, August 14, 1950, with attachments 4
NSC 26/4: "Demolition and Abandonment of Oil Facilities and Fields in the Middle East," August 18, 1950 2
Memorandum from James Lay, Jr. to the NSC on NSC 26/2, September 1, 1950
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/declass.htmPlanning for the use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East began in earnest in the early 1950s as military planners looked for ways to redress Soviet conventional military superiority around the world. In June 1950, the National Security Council issued a report (NSC 26/3) titled Demolition and Abandonment of Oil Facilities and Fields in the Middle East. The report addressed the possibility of plugging Saudi oil wells ". . .as a means of conservation and denial during enemy occupation." Nuclear weapons were looked at as a possible tool to deny the Soviets access to the oil fields. The report found, "Denial of wells by radiological means can be accomplished to prevent an enemy from utilizing the oil, but it could not prevent him from forcing ‘expendable' Arabs to enter the contaminated areas to open well heads and deplete the reservoirs. Therefore, aside from other ill effects on the Arab population, it is not considered that radiological means are practicable as a conservation measure."
<snip>
The NPR (Nuclear Posture Review released in January 2002) strongly implies a U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Israel, stating that an "immediate contingency" that might lead to the use of nuclear weapons includes ". . .an Iraqi attack on Israel. . .." While such an attack clearly has been obviated with Saddam's removal, it stands to reason that the same logic would apply to a Syrian or Iranian attack on Israel. Both Syria and Iran maintain well-established WMD capabilities, and both maintain longstanding and overt hostility towards Israel. This chain of logic suggests that defending Israel from an attack by Syria or Iran is a core mission for the strategic deterrent.
<snip>
In applying the strategic arsenal to actual wartime use, the Bush administration repeats formulations from previous administrations reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in certain contingencies. As stated in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction: "The United States will continue to make clear it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force – including through resort to all our options – to the use of WMD against our forces abroad and friends and allies.
http://www.mepc.org/public_asp/journal_vol11/0409_russell.asp