The Rycroft (Downing Street) Memo

[paineinthearse]

http://www.startribune.com/stories/562/5436890.html

POSTED IN FULL AS THE DOCUMENT IS NOW IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

Last update: June 2, 2005 at 7:16 PM
Secret no more: Downing Street memo

Published June 3, 2005

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL -- UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING

From: Matthew Rycroft

Date: 23 July 2002

S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq. This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents. John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the U.S. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad U.S. options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 U.S. troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. U.S. forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The U.S. saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the U.S. had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in U.S. minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the U.S. congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the U.S. battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions. For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the U.S. would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, U.S. and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be U.S./UK differences. Despite U.S. resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the U.S. did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of U.S. planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the U.S. military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

[Name removed]

1. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[paineinthearse]

3. sigmund

Welcome to DU

:hi:

[paineinthearse]

7. I went to the Star Tribute to look for more supporting info

That's all, folks. Just the memo, no embellishment.

:shrug:

[whistle]

2. Who were...Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General

...and other un-named persons referred to in the document?

[indy_azcat]

10. the players

• Foreign Policy Advisor - David Manning
• Matthew Rycroft - aide to Manning, wrote up the minutes of the meeting.
• Defence Secretary - Geoff Hoon
• Foreign Secretary - Jack Straw
• Attorney-General - Lord Goldsmith
• Cabinet Secretary - Sir Richard Wilson
• Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee - John Scarlett
• Director of GCHQ - Francis Richards, head of the UK's "signals
intelligence establishment", an intelligence agency, which reports
to the Foreign Secretary
• Director of SIS (aka MI6) - Sir Richard Dearlove, identified as 'C' in the
meeting minutes, heads the UK's foreign intelligence service
• Chief of the Defence Staff - Admiral Sir Michael Boyce
• Chief of Staff - Jonathan Powell
• Head of Strategy - Alastair Campbell
• Director of Political & Govt Relations - Sally Morgan

from:

http://www.downingstreetmemo.com/

[paineinthearse]

4. Memo deleted from Star Tribune's server?

I just tried it - http://www.startribune.com/stories/562/5436890.htm -and got an error message. Maybe the rethugs forced it off?

We're Sorry. The page you requested, http://www.startribune.com/stories/562/5436890.htm, could not be found. It may have been moved; more likely it has been removed from our servers. Most articles are automatically purged from startribune.com's free news database after three weeks. Exceptions include obituaries, recipes and movie reviews.

Can anybody help locating it again?

:shrug:

[paineinthearse]

8. It's back

The link now works.

Here is a link to the printer-friendly version - http://www.startribune.com/dynamic/story.php?template=print_a&story=5436890 (may require registration for a free account)

[ingabingabunga]

5. Hard copy of actual memo?

This may have already been addressed before and I want to apologize in advance if it was, but does anyone have an actual hard copy of the memo in original form?

I was asked that question by a person I was explaining it to. I did show them the various articles that I had read it in and we can presume that the quotes by various sources most likely were verified, But this question did get me wondering if a hard copy is out there.

I have located and read several displays of the contents of the memo but not an actual physical copy of the memo. Does anyone know where it can be found? Or maybe it was copied from a source document that was not made public?

Anyone able to help fill in this gap?

[paineinthearse]

6. ingabingabunga

Welcome to DU!

:hi:

I'd start at the website in my footer - www.AfterDowningStreet.org

If Bonifaz does not know, nobody does.

[paineinthearse]

9. Ho hum, noting to read/see here, move on

Nothing of interest to DU'ers.

[ewagner]

11. As near as I can tell,

at least three different people were aware that Bush* had already made up his mind to go to war. They were:

"C",who said, "C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action. Note: when "C" is talking about the NSC, is he talking about Condi?

The Defense Secretary who said, " The Defence Secretary said that the U.S. had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in U.S. minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the U.S. congressional elections.

and:

The Foreign Secretary who said, said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

So much for the "It's just one person's opinion" meme coming from the other side......here are three seperate people who KNEW AND CONFIRMED that Bush was going to attack in 2002.

[Supersedeas]

12. timeline beginning 30days before the U.S. Congressional elections??

the war plans were fixed around Rove's political maneuvering???
NO WAY!!!