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They will never willingly accept either responsibility or accountability. So, how shall we respond?
--------------------------------------------------------------- Dear Ms. XXX:
Thank you for taking the time to contact me concerning a British memo about pre-Iraq war intelligence.
As you may know, on May 1, 2005, the London Sunday Times published a memo written by British foreign policy aide Matthew Rycroft based on notes he had taken during a July 2002 meeting with Prime Minister Tony Blair and his advisors. The memo reflected Mr. Rycroft's opinion that the U.S. was intent on removing Saddam Hussein from power and was fixing intelligence around that policy.
Clearly there have been shortcomings in intelligence about Iraq 's prewar capabilities. However, the U.S. was not alone in our assessment about Saddam's weapons programs. Foreign intelligence agencies, including the British and Australian services, as well as the UN, believed Saddam had weapons of mass destruction ( WMDs ). UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which passed unanimously in 2002, stated that Iraq posed a threat to international peace and security because of its WMD proliferation.
After Saddam was removed from power, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was assigned the task of investigating Saddam's WMD program. The ISG report by Charles Duelfer details Saddam Hussein's attempts to end U.N. sanctions against him while preserving his capacity to reconstitute his WMD programs once the sanctions were lifted.
Saddam Hussein used WMDs against his own people and clearly did not abandon his WMD ambitions. He personally directed efforts to hide and preserve documentation related to Iraq 's nuclear program and prevented Iraqi scientists from leaving Iraq , enabling him to restart his WMD programs. Although stockpiles of WMDs were not found in Iraq, the facts contained in the Duelfer report show that Saddam Hussein maintained the capacity to rebuild his WMD programs in a short amount of time, and that he was actively undercutting the sanctions against him. Given the multiple sources of pre-war intelligence, as well as the findings of the Duelfer Report, there is little evidence to support the Rycroft memo.
In order to address failures with pre-war intelligence, however, I worked closely with my colleagues in the 108 th Congress to construct and pass a comprehensive intelligence reform bill, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (S. 2845) which became public law on December 17, 2004. I also supported Ambassador John Negroponte to be the first Director of National Intelligence for the United States and oversee this major intelligence reorganization.
Thank you once again for contacting me. I value your advice. If I may be of further assistance to you in the future, please do not hesitate to contact me again.
Sincerely, Norm Coleman United States Senate
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