Is she also saying the IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency reported the attempted sale supposedly from Niger to Iraq?
That would be an even bigger lie, if so.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1595&proj=znpp'
Niger Uranium: Still a False Claim
By Joseph Cirincione Publisher: Carnegie
Proliferation Brief, Volume 7, Number 12
Of all the controversies surrounding the non-discovery of WMD in Iraq, none has dominated the news cycle over the past year as much as the Niger uranium hullabaloo-and none has been so misconstrued by experts and pundits alike. A year ago, revelations by Joseph Wilson, a former ambassador sent to Niger to investigate whether Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Iraq, forced the administration to recant its public statements on the subject. Now, with the Butler inquiry's conclusion that the British intelligence judgment was "well-founded" and the Senate Intelligence Committee's claim that Wilson's report had little impact on officials, some are calling for Wilson to publicly apologize. A little common sense shows that a Niger uranium sale-even if attempted-was always highly improbable and was never a serious threat.
Allegations Abound
In late September, a British white paper judged that "Iraq has . . . sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power programme that could require it." In December 2002 and January 2003, several administration officials, including Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld, repeated the allegation-without citing the British report. In his January State of the Union address, President Bush said the now-infamous sixteen words, "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."
Evidence Deflates
Iraq purchased uranium from Niger, Portugal and Brazil during the early stages of its nuclear program in the 1970s, but by the next decade halted these imports because it became self-sufficient in uranium production. In March 2003, Iraq had an inventory of over 500 tons of natural uranium and almost two tons of low-enriched uranium. This uranium was kept under IAEA seal and checked annually by the nuclear agency-theoretically unavailable to the Iraqi regime for use in a nuclear program.
No unclassified CIA assessment prior to 2002 discussed Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium from Africa, although most noted, "A sufficient source of fissile material remains Iraq's most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon." The now-declassified October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) claimed, however, that Iraq "began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake," reportedly in Niger, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The NIE said that "foreign government service" reports indicated that in early 2001 Niger and Iraq "reportedly were still working out arrangements for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake," although the NIE said it could not confirm the reports on possible Iraqi uranium procurement. (The Department of State's intelligence bureau, INR, noted in a separate dissent: "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are . . . highly dubious.")
The primary evidence for the Niger uranium claim was a series of documents purporting to show a uranium purchase deal with Iraq. On March 7, 2003, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei concluded that the documents provided to the IAEA by the United States were unsubstantiated and likely forged. He told the UN Security Council, "Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents, which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transaction between Iraq and Niger, are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded."
.It was not until July 2003, however, that the administration acknowledged the problems with the forged documents-when Joseph Wilson revealed that he had visited Niger at the CIA's request in February 2002 to investigate the alleged uranium sale. Wilson said that he not only found the allegation "bogus and unrealistic," but said that his conclusions were likely forwarded to the vice president, who made the initial inquiry in a CIA briefing...'