Need talking points from DUers educated on electronic voting

[Sperk]

I'm going to a town hall meeting on saturday with my congressman Marty Meehan of Mass. I'm bringing a copy of Mark Crispin Miller's book "Fooled Again" as a gift.

I have to admit, I don't think I'll have time to read it myself before I go.

I don't know how much time I'll have for questioning but I wanted to get as much in as possible.

My main points are...3 private companies run by partisan republicans count ? million votes? I know it's a lot,, any one know the numbers?

The software is copywrited, therefore secret and the votes cannot be independently verified.

They, write the software, tally the votes and tell us what the out come was...am I correct on this?

Question to Congressman Meehan....WHY is this allowed? Can he look me in the eye and tell me that he doesn't believe that THIS group of thugs in the White House would NOT steal an election if they had the means, motive and opportunity.....

Also...question of exit poll irregularites being enough of a reason for a revote in Ukrain, but not in America?

[NMDemDist2]

1. ask in the Election Reform forum, they'll be glad to help!

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topics&forum=203

[Sperk]

2. thanks will do

n/t

[RufusEarl]

3. Try this link

it should give you a quick way to get talking points, and more info on the problem. Hope it helps, and good luck Sat.

http://www.electronic-vote.org/TERMINI/vvpat_en.php

[Fredda Weinberg]

4. It's not so simple

You'd have to have a hell of a conspiracy to pull off fraud - the code is inspected by the independent testing authorities - different for every state.

It's allowed because that's the way nearly all government is delivered - proprietary and without source code.

Your best bet is to avoid mentioning conspiracy theories and stick to this metaphor - would you walk away from an ATM without a receipt?

[Wilms]

5. It's very simple to hack an election.

It's easy to screw one up when you aren't even trying...(read: Ballot Definition Settings.

The ITA's doing the inspection is hardly anything to feel secure about, even if they weren't paid by the vendors.

But I do agree the best bet is to avoid mentioning conspiracy theories, at least until they understand election management systems.

Your metaphor is inappropriate, I believe.

First, NO ONE can leave a poll with a receipt. That's the royal road to vote selling.

Are you saying once you have a paper trail, thing are cool? Hardly.

[Fredda Weinberg]

10. Paper ballots have errors too

And recounts are rare.

If you're trying to dissuade others from taking the easy path, don't confuse the issue with honest mistakes and vulnerabilities. Stick to the main topic - without a paper trail, no audit is possible, not even a sampling verification.

Unfortunately, this subject has gotten so heated with hostile rhetoric that it's nearly impossbile for even a computer engineer to make a rational argument. If you want to avoid that pitfall, ignore the conspiracy theories because *none have proved true when evidence was available*.

[Wilms]

14. Let me apologize for the hostile tone of my previous post,

and for the sarcasm in this reply's subject line.

Of course paper ballots can be fussed with. Did I assert otherwise?

If I understood the 'main topic' it's about electronic voting. Their vulnerabilities to error and fraud are talking points, to some.

Nor did I advocate talking up unsubstantiated claims of fraud. There are a number of OpScan elections where a hand recount overturned the result. As reported in the press, the cause of the problem was, essentially, in the Ballot Definition Settings. The ones of which I'm aware had "straight-party" settings as part of the erroneous tally.

Without discussing error and fraud, it can be pointed out that the system has vulnerabilities.

Was that a rational argument?

[Fredda Weinberg]

16. It even sounds convincing

Electronic voting has the potential advantage of being cheap, more reliable than existing systems (especially here in NY, where we use lever machines that have never provided an audit trail) and provide accessibility to the handicapped.

So we can't just dismiss the technology - nor can we reject the existing mechanisms by which governments adopt these systems. Unless and until we can present an alternative, proprietary systems will be selected and existing authorities will influence the decision-makers.

But citizens can make a difference ... again, I use a metaphor everyone can understand: you wouldn't walk away from an ATM without a receipt, nor should voters allow potentially malicious code to affect an election.

But as a practical issue, we can't expect a paper recount for every race - but if there is a paper trail, officials will conduct statistical samples to verify the reliability of the results. The audit trail must include a voter verifiable component or the system remains vulnerable to tampering.

I think we can agree on this ... years ago, I called the League of Women Voters headquarters when they were solidly behind DREs and made this argument - and got a friendly response. Citizens can make a difference if we're willing to act.

[Wilms]

19. I guess we disagree.

Electronic voting has the potential of being more expensive, more fraud prone, and no more reliable than existing systems even there in NY where they use lever machines.

I'm not advocating lever's per se, their not providing an audit trail being compelling. But there are a number of ways to provide accessibility to the handicapped without getting rid of levers and using touch screens.

"We the People" absolutely can just dismiss the technology, when it's built inadequately especially. And we can challenge, even reject, the existing mechanisms by which governments adopt these systems. That's in the Constitution.

Alternative are abound. Proprietary systems have no place in election management.

And again, I don't know why you use the metaphor an ATM without a receipt. NO ONE can leave a poll with a receipt, so why add to the confusion over that? :shrug:

[Fredda Weinberg]

21. Pick your own metaphor

But you're fighting something with nothing. Saying alternatives abound without being specific isn't useful.

I don't mind that we disagree ... and if you think the receipt metaphor is confusing I'll accept that. But I've worked at too many levels of government for too long to accept that proprietary systems have no place - sayin' it just don't make it so and without a basis for your argument, it won't be persuasive.

Unless you're in this business, you're not qualified to judge whether the technology is built adequately. From my perspective, I see genuine experts consulted regularly and their feedback is being heeded. Disagree if you will, but all I ask is that you do it without resorting to personal attacks.

My point in this thread is that different states are consulting various authorities - so it's highly unlikely that everyone is participating in a conspiracy to conceal deliberately malicious code.

[Wilms]

23. Must I apologize for "personal attacks" I have not made?

VotePAD is one electronic-less option, assuming you hand-count the ballots.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x410798

Auto-Mark, another.

As far as qualifications, I offer not my creds, but the GAO's...among others.

I didn't allege a conspiracy, nor do I argue one is not occurring. It's a fact that the public lacks access. It's a fact that NDA's have been signed. It's a fact that vendors have considerable, and questioned influence over the standards making process.

[Fredda Weinberg]

25. Yes NDAs have been signed - and that's biz as usual

But I note that Diebold waived their agreement in the Alaska dispute.

As far as qualifications go, the loudest voices have been coming from those with the least - when raising this issue in public, it helps to quote the experts literally and offer references whenever possible.

And as far as vendor influence is concerned, that again is a larger issue, one I've dealt with for a long time. We can both question it, but addressing it effectively should be our mutual concern. However, in the case of voting systems, I know that the public has had many opportunities for input - I remember one HAVA commission meeting in NYC that was sparsely attended ... I listened while the deals were being discussed and no one except me was a disinterested observer.

But please remember, I have mobilized an effective public response to verifiable official misconduct. In this case, I'm trying to advise someone who wants to participate in the process on the most constructive way to adress the issue. Eliminating extraneous concerns, such as the method by which software is routinely commissioned for government purposes, will advance constructive advice already provided by recognized authorities.

Maybe it's my own predisposition, but I don't see us going back to hand-counting ballots. I remember Professor Mercurio's recommendation, offered a long time ago, that voting machines should be used as elaborate printers used to prepare ballots for optical scanning. I still find merit to her argument.

[Wilms]

27. "biz as usual" does not make it acceptable.

Nor are the files offered by Diebold in AK source code.

I agree that "to quote the experts literally and offer references whenever possible" is the best approach. I just referrenced the GAO.

You should know that there is a difference between the public's opportunity for "input" and what winds up written in the regs.

The method by which software is routinely commissioned for government purposes is not an extraneous concern.

[Fredda Weinberg]

30. When the accusation is conspiracy, biz as usual is a rebuttal

You may not want contradiction to your proposition but you'll get it from officials who can justifably claim that they haven't changed the rules for election software. Whether or not you - or I - find it acceptable, that is the system as it stands now. Vendors are routinely pre-qualifed, delivered software is proprietary and nothing about election systems makes them an exception to routine purchase practices.

As for the GAO, you dropped the name but did not provide a reference. Have you read the report "Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed"? Here it is

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf

It lists the same vulnerabilities and weaknesses we've been discussing - but in no way supports conspiracy theorists or those who want to abandon computerized elections.

I repeat: it is possible for informed citizens to change the way government works - I've done it. But before I had indisputable proof, I didn't discuss my suspicions publicly. Once I had it, I didn't need PR professionals to get the word out - we have the means available. In this case, it's been abused.

[Wilms]

31. Have I asserted conspiracy?

:shrug:

[Fredda Weinberg]

33. This thread's not about you

It began by talking about "3 private companies run by partisan republicans" and assumed that because the "software is copywrited" (sic) it was "therefore secret". Then came the ominous sounding, "They, write the software, tally the votes and tell us what the out come was...am I correct on this?"

I'm pointing out what's wrong with that summation. As I noted when I began, the situation is more complicated.

[Wilms]

34. This thread's not about me being argued with because you disagree w/others

I usually don't bring up the subject that way.

And WTF? The software IS kept secret from the public. Major execs in those companies HAVE acted in a partisan manner.

They,indeed, "... write the software, tally the votes and tell us what the out come was..."

Ominous sounding? How about just ominous, period?

[Fredda Weinberg]

37. Others haven't examined Diebold's code

Keep your opinions - everything I've been claiming for years has been backed up by legitimate experts.

[Wilms]

38. Yes, mommy.

[Fredda Weinberg]

41. Funny, but my manager calls me 'Mom'

at the network operations center I launched for a NYC agency I'd rather not name. Spent most of the day, though, working on the new intrusion detection system ... you can never be *too* security conscious.

But the NY Times this morning editorialized that our state capital is in the thrall of lobbyists who will probably circumvent the legislature's preference for a voter verified paper trail. So there's real work to be done - I've got some lucid correspondence to compose.

But first, a birthday celebration ... Nastrovya!

[Boredtodeath]

6. Bzzzzt, WRONG

You'd have to have a hell of a conspiracy to pull off fraud - the code is inspected by the independent testing authorities - different for every state.

The testing and certification is done by a SINGLE designated agency (chosen by NASED) according to FEDERAL STANDARDS.

It would take ONE person per state writing ballot definition files to manipulate the entire election. And who creates ballot definition files? Why, the voting machine vendors do, that's who!

Don't let Fredda's BS take you off track.

[Fredda Weinberg]

9. Get your facts straight

Maryland commissioned reports by SAIC and RABA Technologies. In addition Ohio commissioned reports by InfoSentry and Compuware

http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/myth-fact-md.html


Georgia hired Kennesaw State University

So no, it's not just the three certified federal ITAs

If you're going to try to influence decision makers - have your facts in order!

[Boredtodeath]

24. You wouldn't know a FACT if it bit you in the ass

Try reading your own links. Those tests were conducted on federally certified systems after they were proven to have FAILED in an election.

I have my facts in order - just not your version of them.

Oh, and BTW, you might mention that all those TESTS conducted by RABA and SAIC and Infoware, etc. found HUNDREDS of security violations in those very same certified systems after they were certified.

As for KSU, see Newt Gingrich and GOPAC.

[Fredda Weinberg]

26. A security violation is not deliberately coded fraud nor is it a conspirac

I've been paying close attention to this issue for years and agree with every technical objection raised so far by the experts. What's made this issue so frustrating is that those who don't understand the criticisms are the ones who characterize them as deliberate attempts to alter the results of an election.

Are you claiming that UC Berkeley is part of the conspiracy?

http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/060217/clf044.html?.v=23

As for KSU, Professor Avi Rubin sat next to Brit Williams during a HAVA commission hearing and had nothing but praise for him. I'll take his evaluation over yours any day of the week.

[Wilms]

32. Link for Avi's praise? n/t

[Fredda Weinberg]

35. I think I've been over this before with you

As far as I know, there is no transcript of the hearing and if you weren't interested enough at the time to watch the proceedings on C-Span - then I'm sorry, but you missed a cordial discussion. Here's a pictorial review of the hearing

http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,92973,00.html

[Wilms]

36. You may presume I wasn't "interested enough", or whatever. FWIW

Thanks for the link with all the smiling faces.


Britt Williams

[Amaryllis]

7. MOre than three companies, just three main companies. Here:

www.whoscounting.net check out the info on the companies

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040816/dugger
How they could steal the election this time, for some numbers on who counts what.

I'd stay off exit polls. Too complex when you dont have much time. Emphasize the secret vote counting aspect; this is much harder to argue. No one can argue that secret vote counting has any place in a democracy.

Talking points: Our votes are being counted on trade secret software, that is not accessible even to our election officials, programmed by private corporations with extremely partisan political and financial conflicts of interest (see www.whoscounting.net for dirt on this) who are asking us to trust them. Trust has no place in an elections. Checks and balances do. We have no way to verify that the results are accurate. We have to take their word for it, thus we have no basis for confidence in our election results.
Elections should be transparent (meaning we can see how our votes are bieng counted and we can VERIFY through independent audits that the results are accurate.

Listen to this for great talking points if you have time Listening to this several times is where I got my talking points down:
Hartmann and Lehto on the Corporate takeover of America’s elections at the Unitarian Church in Portland on July 16, 2005.

Thom Hartmann...about 33 minutes

www.PhilosopherSeed.org/realaudio/thartman.ram

www.PhilosopherSeed.org/mp3/thartman.mp3

Paul Lehto....about 32 minutes

www.PhilosopherSeed.org/realaudio/plehto.ram

www.PhilosopherSeed.org/mp3/plehto.mp3

[Sperk]

8. thanks so much

n/t

[Wilms]

15. Amaryllis, where's the link(s) with the info on the companies?

Home pages are nice, but you know what I'm saying.

www.whoscounting.net

[Amaryllis]

28. Here, but if you look on the left side of the home page, there is a list

of all the topics that are also links.
http://www.whoscounting.net/TheCompanies.htm

[BeFree]

11. That's a good question, Sperk

Question to Congressman Meehan....WHY is this allowed?

They write the software, tally the votes and tell us what the out come was...

Why is that allowed? Sounds to me like an easy way out of counting the millions of votes. Is that what America has come to? Taking the easy way out? Because that's all the rationale election officials have given for allowing e-voting: "Its Easy".

Congress decides how votes for federal offices are to be cast and counted. Congress has allowed this travesty; this easy way out. Congress can, with the wave of its collective hand, return the Vote to an open and more honest system. Yeah, its harder to count all those Votes by hand, but it will make elections much more trusted - the way they used to be.

There is a Congressional bill...HR550, that needs to be passed, ASAP.

You might want to consider raising a little hell before and after the assemblage, Sperk. Get some folks thinking about this issue. Because, the more people know, the more they will see: E-voting is a cancer upon our Democracy.

[Amaryllis]

13. THis is a good question: Why is secret vote counting allowed?

[Amaryllis]

12. This may help:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=132&topic_id=2488172&mesg_id=2488172

[BlueIris]

17. Just remember, 1 in 13.6 TRILLION.

In the beginning, I kept messing that up and thinking (or occasionally saying) 3.6 trillion, forcing TruthIsAll to smack me around. Don't let that figure slip your mind. It's important.

[GuvWurld]

18. Stick to election conditions

Rather than using data to argue "facts" which people seem to arbitrarily accept or reject...I encourage you to talk about the conditions that are known to exist for your next election...unverifiable votes, privatized source code, and secret vote counting ensure we can never know the true results...we are guaranteed to have inconclusive outcomes that will not receive universal acceptance...we have no basis for confidence...and they have no right to ask for our blind trust.

Read the Voter Confidence Resolution. If it resonates, consider passing out copies at your community forum. See if you can organize support to get your City Council to adopt it.

[Amaryllis]

29. Guv and I agree on this (see my post #7) They will argue with

facts, but if you read my talking points, you will see they are pretty much the same as his. YOu want talking points they can't argue with.

[Justice Is Comin]

20. There couldn't be anything more forceful

than the Government Accounting Office report. The agency whose job it is to show fraud or corruption in government programs.

They showed preposterous inconsistencies almost to the exclusion of anything but manual manipulation. If he sits down and spends an afternoon reading that, he would have to be insane not to come to the same conclusion.

[Lydia Leftcoast]

22. Ask why we need instant results other than to give the TV networks

something to blather about.

Ask how we conduct a recount (assuming an undiscovered software glitch or a chip in the computers burning out) if the only record of the votes is the one processed by the buggy software or malfunctioning hardware.

Tell them that I (with my one computer programming course taken 25 years ago) can think of 2 algorithms for undetectable cheating.

[paineinthearse]

39. I have some Massachusetts leads for you

send a PM.

[paineinthearse]

40. Ask Secretary of State Galvin

Ask Galvin what protocols his office used to approve the Accu-Vote & Optech systems in use in most cities and towns.

I did, and have yet to receive a reply.

edited typo.