CREDIT FOR THIS COMPILATION GOES TO FrenchieCat. I am only PARTLY reposting it here:
USA Today editorial from September 9, 2002,
in which Clark wrote:
Despite all of the talk of "loose nukes," Saddam doesn't have any, or, apparently, the highly enriched uranium or plutonium to enable him to construct them. Unless there is new evidence, we appear to have months, if not years, to work out this problem.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2002-09-09-oplede_x.htmIn his Op-Ed dated October 10, 2002, "Let's Wait to Attack." Clark states:
In the near term, time is on our side. Saddam has no nuclear weapons today, as far as we know.
....there is still time for dialogue before we act.
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/10/timep.iraq.viewpoints.tm/U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
Hearing Before the
House Armed Services Committee
Sept. 26, 2002
...CLARK: Well, if I could answer and talk about why time is on our side in the near term, first because we have the preponderance of force in this region. There's no question what the outcome of a conflict would be. Saddam Hussein so far as we know does not have nuclear weapons. Even if there was a catastrophic breakdown in the sanctions regime and somehow he got nuclear materials right now, he wouldn't have nuclear weapons in any zable quantity for, at best, a year, maybe two years.
So, we have the time to build up the force, work the diplomacy, achieve the leverage before he can come up with any military alternative that's significant enough ultimately to block us, and so that's why I say time is on our side in the near term. In the long term, no, and we don't know what the long term is. Maybe it's five years. Maybe it's four years. Maybe it's eight years. We don't know.
I would say it would depend on whether we've exhausted all other possibilities and it's difficult. I don't want to draw a line and say, you know, this kind of inspection, if it's 100 inspectors that's enough. I think we've got to have done everything we can do given the time that's available to us before we ask the men and women in uniform, whom you know so well (inaudible).
(FROM LATER IN THE SAME HEARING TESTIMONY):
...we've encouraged Saddam Hussein and supported him as he attacked against Iran in an effort to prevent Iranian destabilization of the Gulf. That came back and bit us when Saddam Hussein then moved against Kuwait. We encouraged the Saudis and the Pakistanis to work with the Afghans and build an army of God, the mujahaddin, to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan. Now we have released tens of thousands of these Holy warriors, some of whom have turned against us and formed Al Qaida.
My French friends constantly remind me that these are problems that we had a hand in creating. So when it comes to creating another strategy, which is built around the intrusion into the region by U.S. forces, all the warning signs should be flashing. There are unintended consequences when force is used. Use it as a last resort. Use it multilaterally if you can. Use it unilaterally only if you must.
http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/us/hearingspreparedstatements/hasc-092602.htm#WC10/10/02: Retired General Reflects on United States’ Policy Towards Iraq
www.umb.edu/news/2002news/reporter/november/iraq.html
University of Massachusetts at Boston
Retired General Reflects on United States’ Policy Towards Iraq (October 10, 2002)
By Michael McPhee
Wesley K. Clark, retired general of the US Army, was the distinguished guest of the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs on October 10. Over seventy-five people came to hear the former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe discuss his reflections on the US policy towards Iraq.
Edmund Beard, director of the McCormack Institute, introduced Clark and gave an account of the general’s impressive military career, which includes command at every level from company to division. Clark is both a soldier and scholar, graduating first in his 1966 class of the United States Military Academy at West Point and holding a master’s degree in philosophy, politics, and economics from Oxford University, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar.
Clark, who was the NATO commander in charge of the effort to stop the crisis in Kosovo in 1999, spoke of his experiences in Bosnia, where he learned first-hand about the chaos of unleashed ethnic hatreds. It is exactly this chaos that has led Clark to raise a voice of concern over possible conflict with Iraq. Clark believes that a military war with Iraq could be over in as little as two weeks. He is concerned with the lack of a long-range plan for the chaos that would ensue among the Kurds, Shiites, and those factions loyal to Saddam Hussein, which Clark believes would play out on a much larger scale than what took place in Bosnia.
Clark spoke of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, seeing it as a time when the U.S. lost its adversaries and failed in its foreign policy strategy. At that time there were two groups in Washington debating the role of the military; one group saw the military merely as the fighter and winner of wars; another group, led by Madeleine Albright, saw the military as a useful tool in aiding third world countries.
In comparing the two most recent presidencies, Clark described the Clinton administration as pursuing a foreign policy of engagement and reaching out as opposed to the Bush administration’s preemption policy and striking out.
Clark, when asked where the push to invade Iraq was coming from, rejected the idea that it was the military that wanted to go to war. He blamed civilian advisors to President Bush who were pushing in that direction.
Clark stated his view that terrorism is the problem, not Iraq. He also voiced concern that Americans not blame Islam, and spoke of his belief that US interests are best served in reaching out to those who do not embrace the ideals of radical Islam.