This morning's
editorial in
The New York Times debunks the unified executive theory (at least the Nixonian version on which the Bushies are falling back):
Since Mr. Bush regularly denounces leakers, the White House has made much of the notion that he did not leak classified information, he declassified it. This explanation strains credulity. Even a president cannot wave a wand and announce that an intelligence report is declassified.
To declassify an intelligence document, officials have to decide whether disclosing the information would jeopardize the sources that provided it or the methods used to gather it. To answer that question, they closely study the origins of the intelligence to be disclosed. Had Mr. Bush done that, he should have seen that the most credible information made it clear that the Niger story was wrong. (In any case, Iraq's supposed attempt to buy uranium from Niger happened four years before the invasion, and failed. The idea that this amounted to a current, aggressive and continuing campaign to build nuclear weapons in 2002 — as Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney called it — is laughable.)
That last sentence also pretty much sums up the junta's case for war. It was (and still is) laughable in a grotesque sort of way. Tens of thousands of people have died as a result of this invasion and a nation has been plunged into civil war.
The editorial also lays out, at least in part, the junta's MO:
The White House says Mr. Bush was not aware of that report, and was relying on an assessment by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. This is hardly the first time we've been told that intelligence reports contradicting administration doctrine somehow did not make it to Mr. Bush's desk. But it does not explain why he and Mr. Cheney went on talking about the trailers for weeks, during which the State Department's intelligence division — about the only agency that got it right about Iraq — debunked the mobile-labs theory.
Of course, the inaccurate report saying that the trailers were bioweapons labs was made public, immediately, while the accurate one was kept secret until a reporter found out about it.
What
The Times omits is that intelligence had been cooked by visits to Langley by Cheney and Libby and in the Pentagon under the watchful eyes of Douglas Feith.
What we mustn't forget is that the NIE was a piece of crap in the first place. That was no accident. The intelligence was bad because they wanted it bad. They had good information and chose to hide it. It's purpose was to provide a justification for war and set up the CIA and DIA as the fall guys for any part of pre-war assertions against Saddam that fell apart later. In fact,
every pre-war assertion about Iraq's military programs and ties to terrorism turned out to have been wrong.
Given that, the only thing that can save Mr. Bush personally now would destroy everybody around him: Bush must convince the American people that he was lied by his aides, who didn't let him see all the facts. That would mean throwing Cheney, Libby and Rumsfeld to the wolves. However, in Bob Woodward's book, we learn that Bush did see a CIA presentation of the case against Saddam and was unimpressed; Mr. Tenet, who was present, then gave his now infamous "slam dunk" remark. Also, we learn from the latest leaked memo from London that Bush was indeed aware that the case against Saddam was weak and talked to Prime Minister Blair about going into Iraq without an authorizing resolution from the UN Security Council and even some bizarre ways that only a real idiot could imagine to provoke an by from Saddam, providing a pretext for action.
In short, there can be no doubt that Bush was a central figure in the conspiracy to cook intelligence in order to persuade the American people that what was in fact a tawdry colonial invasion of a sovereign state was related to the war on terrorism and national security. He may have achieved regime change in Iraq, but his behavior and the behavior of his subordinates also justify regime change in America.