N.H. Among Few Using Paper in Vote Records

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http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20040128/ap_on_el_ge/low_tech_voting_4

AP Wire Story by Rachael Konrad

The technology troubles that could bedevil elections this year in California, Georgia, Florida and elsewhere were absent in New Hampshire this week. That's because it is among the few states that require a paper record for every ballot cast.

Succinct and to the point.

New Hampshire's relatively low-tech system — adopted after disasters with both antiquated punch cards and touch-screen computers — could become a nationwide model as scrutiny over electronic voting grows.
"Maybe people elsewhere trust machines more than they trust humans, but that would be totally out of the question here," said Secretary of State Bill Gardner, one of the longest-serving elections officials in the country. "I'm aghast that other places are considering touch-screen computers."

In 1995, New Hampshire passed a law requiring a paper record of every ballot cast, effectively banning touch-screen election computers that don't produce such receipts.

Amazing!

In Keene, N.H., Larry Phillips, 57, said he had no doubts that workers at his local recreation center counted his vote for Howard Dean properly in Tuesday's primary. "I have confidence in the process, in the fact that I know the people when I walk into the polling place, and ultimately in the little machine the ballot is fed into," said Phillips, a psychologist. "Maybe New Hampshire is an anomaly, but I'd suspect people would want the same confidence wherever they are in any system they're using."

[hedda_foil]

1. And your point is ....?

[nadinbrzezinski]

2. The point is that some take the threat of BBV seriosly

and this State does... now if the rest do it would be nice

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3. It's a info post to balance the questions raised about the system there

If New Hampshire thought it needed a recount it would do it. They are no stranger to contested elections. No sign that they intend to do any thing concerning the primary, notwithstanding the 'anomolies' between exit polls and the actual vote that has agitated some here.

[hedda_foil]

4. You are correct that NH has a required paper ballot trail

And that they have the best SofS in the country on these issues. Somebody still needs to request a recount. See, the point is that the optical scan machines use exactly the same counting software as the touch screen machines. Moreover, the version of that software used in NH by Diebold, in particular, is uncertified. It is definitely an issue and NH is a great place to study the possibility of manipulation because of its paper ballot requirements.

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5. What standard is there for requesting such a recount?

I mean, you can't just have a recount on a whim. I don't even think that exit polls are enough to request one. I don't actually know.

It would be helpful to know what the threshold for such a request is.

[Dookus]

7. Yup!

That is exactly the question: what criteria should be used to require a recount?

The fact that the results didn't satisfy a certain voting bloc is insufficient, imo.

There is absolutely NO evidence that anything unusual happened in NH. The only problem is the results were outside the expectations of Dean supporters, despite the fact that the results were consistent with polls leading up to the race.

A difference in results correlated to the type of counting mechanism used is NOT evidence of anything at all, unless you account for geographic differences first. Nobody has done this.

[ngGale]

6. Paper ballots and...

an election? Maybe we all need to go back to paper ballots instead of trusting the BBV. Then again, sometimes the ballots disappear. Will we ever feel secure again when we cast our votes?

[Bearly]

8. The error of assuming a paper record protects against manipulation

I don't normally add my opinion here but I was linked here by a friend. I have read some of the threads that were written last week regarding New Hampshire and then the quoted article from AP talking about paper protecting the sanctity of the vote.
Some background is in order to clear up some misunderstandings:
New Hampshire requires that any application for a recount be done by the Friday after the election (three days). That is not enough time to do any analysis of specific anomalies. The cost of the recount must be paid by the applicant on a sliding scale depending upon the percentage of difference.
The ballots are destroyed 60 days after the election.
In NH there is no manual audit of the electronically counted ballots to authenticate the accuracy of the count. Here in California, and some other states, the Election Code requires that a minimum of 1% of the precincts in a county have their ballots manually
counted to to compare them to the electronic results. This is to check the accuracy of the electronic count.
There are two places that optical scan equipment can be used to alter the true vote: In the instructions programmed into the optical scanner itself, including ballot definitions and what to do about anomalies in the ballot and feed; in the vote tabulating software used at election central known with Diebold equipment as GEMS (Global Election Management System). Without a manual
audit of a statistically valid percentage of the ballots there is no way of assuring that the electronic method of counting the votes was acccurate. All the poll watchers in NH saw was ballots fed into a machine. There was no audit afterwards to see if the count was accurate.
Every study done to date (Hopkins, SAIC, COmpuware, and RABA) found that GEMS could be accessed and ballot definitions and voting results altered, both from within and without. The Compuware Report also evaluated ES & S and found simialr security vulnerabilities with their ballot tally programs.
In the San Jose Mercury News article on February 1, they reported that Alameda County, while using their optical scanning equipment to count (paper) absentee ballots during the recall election, discovered that part way through the counting process it unexplainably started crediting an obscure candidate with votes for Cruz Bustemonte. A Diebold technician who was there "fixed" the problem but claimed it was a "software" failure. No one ever ascertained just exactly what type of software program could cause that. It was only caught because the elections staff were comparing the absentee ballots to the figures being generated by the machines. If election officials just run ballots through optical scan machines and do not do an audit afterwards there is no way of catching such "software" glitches.
I read some responses that Dean supporters were just being "sore losers". The people who write such statements just don't get it. This is a non-partisan issue and has nothing with who "lost". We know for a fact that with the computerized voting, whether it is optical scan or touch-screen, as currently configured, system integrity is critically flawed. If votes can be re-apportioned during a primary, they can be re-apportioned during the November elections. If I was a citizen of NH or any other state that does not have mandatory audits of electronic results, I would demand there be such. Without an audit there is no way of catching error or fraud.
If anyone wants to do further research I would recommend going to Google and type in " Secretary of State elections " and do reasearch. Check out the Election Code and Regulations. The process for certification (if there is one).
The more you learn the more you realize our voting system in this country is highly susceptible to error and fraud. It is time citizens quit voting on faith. Our form of government is based upon we the people choosing our representatives. The process to do that must be above any suspicion. Never assume that the elections officials are taking care of everything, as we have discovered here in California, they are not.