http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A20349-2004Mar24?language=printer(snip)
Both the DCI and the deputy director for operations, James Pavitt, invoked lessons learned from the Iran-Contra scandal: The CIA should stay well behind the line separating policy-maker from policy- implementer... Yet, as a member of the National Security Council, the DCI is one of a handful of senior officials who advises the president on national security. The DCI's operational judgments can and did influence key decisions on the U.S. government's policy toward Al Qaida. In the case of Al Qaida, the line between policy-maker and policy-implementer is hard to discern.
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Disruptions of suspected terror cells thwarted numerous plots against American interests abroad, particularly during high-threat periods. After the embassy bombings of 1998, the U.S. disrupted planned attacks against at least one American embassy in Albania. In late 1999, preceding the millennium celebrations, the activities of 21 individuals were disrupted in eight countries. In two subsequent phases of intensive threat reporting, the Ramadan period in late 2000 and the summer prior to 9/11, the CIA again went into what the DCI described as millennium threat mode, engaging with foreign liaison and disrupting operations around the world. At least one planned terrorist attack in Europe may have been successfully disrupted during the summer of 2001.
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By early 1997, the OBL station knew that bin Laden was not just a financier, but an organizer of terrorist activity. It knew that Al Qaida had a military committee planning operations against U.S. interests worldwide and was actively trying to obtain nuclear material. Although this information was disseminated in many reports, the unit's sense of alarm about bin Laden was not widely shared or understood within the intelligence and policy communities. Employees in the unit told us they felt their zeal attracted ridicule from their peers.
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After the East Africa bombings, President Clinton signed successive authorizations for the CIA to undertake offensive operations in Afghanistan against bin Laden... The CIA's Afghanistan assets reported on about a half a dozen occasions before 9/11 that they had considered attacking bin Laden usually as he traveled in his convoy along the rough Afghan roads. Each time the operation was reportedly aborted. Several times the Afghans said that bin Laden had taken a different route than expected. On one occasion security was said to be too tight to capture him; another time they heard women and children's voices from inside the convoy and abandoned the assault for fear of killing innocents in accordance with CIA guidelines.
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The Predator: The plan resulted in increased reporting on Al Qaida. Still, going into the year 2000, the CIA had never laid American eyes on bin Laden in Afghanistan. President Clinton prodded his advisers to do better. National Security Council Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke helped Assistant DCI for Collection Charles Allen and Vice Admiral Scott Fry of the joint staff work together on the military's ongoing efforts to develop new collection capabilities inside Afghanistan... In December 2000, the CIA sent this to the NSC staff. The memo recommended increased support to anti-Taliban groups and to proxies who might ambush bin Laden. The counterterrorism center also proposed a major effort to back Northern Alliance forces in order to stave off the Taliban army and tie down Al Qaida fighters, thereby hindering terrorist activities elsewhere.
No action was taken on these ideas in the few remaining weeks of the Clinton administration.
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