http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf#search=%229%2F11%20commission%20report%22some more...
http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=39828great info on Condi's world view here:
http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/week_2004_03_21.phpClark v. Rice
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/04/08/clarke.rice/index.htmlGood questions and Condi doublespeak here:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040328.htmlhttp://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0403/24/lkl.00.htmlKING: Was 9/11 preventable?
CLARKE: Well, we'll never know. But let me compare 9/11 and the period immediately before it to the millennium rollover and the period immediately before that. In December, 1999, we received intelligence reports that there were going to be major al Qaeda attacks. President Clinton asked his national security adviser Sandy Berger to hold daily meetings with the attorney general, the FBI director, the CIA director and stop the attacks. And every day they went back from the White House to the FBI, to the Justice Department, to the CIA and they shook the trees to find out if there was any information. You know, when you know the United States is going to be attacked, the top people in the United States government ought to be working hands-on to prevent it and working together.
Now, contrast that with what happened in the summer of 2001, when we even had more clear indications that there was going to be an attack. Did the president ask for daily meetings of his team to try to stop the attack? Did Condi Rice hold meetings of her counterparts to try to stop the attack? No.
And if she had, if the FBI director and the attorney general had gone back day after day to their department to the White House, what would they have shaken loose? We now know from testimony before the Commission that buried in the FBI was the fact that two of the hijackers had entered the United States. Now, if that information had been able to be shaken loose by the FBI director and the attorney general in response to daily meetings with the White House, if we had known that those two -- if the attorney general had known, if the FBI director had known, that those two were in the United States, Larry, I believe we could have caught those two. Would that have stopped...
KING: But who knew -- you knew they were in the United States, who else knew?
CLARKE: No, I didn't. I didn't know.
KING: We should have known is what you're saying.
CLARKE: The people in the FBI knew. Not the director.
KING: They did know.
CLARKE: Some people in the FBI knew. And if Condi Rice had been doing her job and holding those daily meetings, the way Sandy Berger did, if she had a hands-on attitude to being national security adviser, when she had information that there was a threat against the United States, that kind of information was shaken out in December 1999, it would have been shaken out in the summer of 2001, if she had been doing her job.
CONDOLEEZZA RICE, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER: Richard Clarke had plenty of opportunities to tell us in the administration that he thought the war on terrorism was moving in the wrong direction, and he chose not to. In fact, when he came to me and asked if I would support him with Tom Ridge to become the deputy secretary of homeland security, a department which he now says should never have been -- never have been created. When he asked me to support him in that job, he said he supported the president. So frankly, I'm flabbergasted.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KING: Mr. Clarke, what would you say to the flabbergasted Dr. Rice?
CLARKE: I'd say, let's get back to the main issue. Before you went to the break, Larry, you had the president saying that George Tenet was briefing him regularly on the threat. He was. George Tenet told me that, and I saw the briefings. The president was being told on a regular basis that an al Qaeda threat was coming, an al Qaeda attack was coming.
Now, what does the president say in his own words to Bob Woodward in "Bush at War?" He says, Bush acknowledged that bin Laden was not his focus or that of his national security team. "I was not on point," the president said. "I didn't feel a sense of urgency."
Well, how can you not feel a sense of urgency when George Tenet is telling you in daily briefings, day after day, that a major al Qaeda attack is coming? That's my point. That's one of my points. The other point is, which I'd like to get to, that by fighting the war in Iraq, the president has actually diminished our ability to fight the war on terrorism.