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Edited on Sat Jan-27-07 07:38 PM by necso
1) The clock's ticking on that 60-day deadline for Iran to suspend enrichment, which it seems unlikely that they'll meet. (They don't seem to take the threat of US military action very seriously (such action would be irrational; but when did that ever stop irrational people) -- and perhaps some Iranian players even wish for it, as it would strengthen the militarists -- and provide them with grounds for forceful retaliation (quite-possibly, popularly-demanded retaliation). Besides, changing policies can take time, and even if certain factions want policy changes, the time remaining before the deadline may not be adequate to bring these about.)
2) There are plenty of neocons who believe that air/missile-strikes (with some special-forces type operations) would be enough to accomplish "regime change" (whatever) in Iran (patent nonsense; this would likely strengthen the extremists' hold on the people, not weaken it). Of course, some of these believers probably believe this nonsense because there's no serious ground-forces option available -- and they have to believe something that "supports" their position.
3) w believes he has the authority to attack Iran without Congressional approval. And the UNSC resolution gives him another fig-leaf. (How much do you think the average American understands of these things.)
4) Unlike a ground invasion, the necessary build-up for an air assault is relatively small and low-profile (although still large in other terms). (It would likely involve a build-up of naval forces, and some advance positioning of aircraft and supplies. Sending additional forces to Iraq would also be supportive, as would other measures that improve defenses against Iranian retaliation.)
5) Between all the talk about Iran's involvement in Iraq (if Iran really wanted to hurt us in Iraq, they'd transfer many advanced antiaircraft and antitank missiles/weapons to the various factions fighting us there), the hype about Iran's nuclear program (where's the beef?), the hype about Iran's threat to Israel (which is mostly indirect, direct action would invite massive retaliation -- so why not cut a deal with Syria and distance it from Hezbollah and Iran), and the dreadful state of domestic politics -- the sort of opposition in Congress (and among the establishment-powerful generally) necessary to preempt any such attack will probably be difficult to develop. (Although politicking, posturing and ass-covering are probably in order.)
6) There are influential players who are pressing for "action on Iran". And there has been the same sort of a drumbeat-for-war/propaganda-fest relative to Iran as there was for Iraq.
7) Neocons generally don't give much useful thought to the unpleasant-consequences/failures of their actions. And should disaster obviously loom down some path they're determined to take, generally they'll take it anyway. Like with Hitler, it's a matter of "will" with them.
8) Many neocons salivate at the prospect of using nuclear weapons; which would be a neocon-tempting response (at least), if initial attacks fail of their grand objectives and/or Iran retaliates effectively (a near-certainly, methinks).
With all the previous episodes of concern about attacking Iran, and all the phony-deadlines (deadlines by which "Iran must be stopped") that have been talked-up feverishly -- then passed-by without anything happening -- it can be hard to accept that the neocons may eventually treat one of these deadlines (before 2009) like it's real.
And some looming deadline (the 60-days, some fueling event; plus some delta perhaps, like for troop/materials positioning) could be the one. (Or not.)
Everything acts according to its nature; be prepared for the neocons to again demonstrate their "will".
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