A 9 page article but right up with Sy Hersh's work as far as a chilling tale that
not only was going into Iraq a mistake but the handling of the war by Rummy & Wolfowitz
was so screwed up that failure of the mission was certain.
:hi: Media people who use DU for your research want to try to cover this story?
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/04/iraqgenerals200704?currentPage=1The Night of the Generals
The six retired generals who stepped forward last spring to publicly attack Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's
handling of the Iraq war had to overcome a culture of reticence based on civilian control of the military. But while
each man acted separately, all shared one experience: a growing outrage over the administration's incompetence,
leading some of the nation's finest soldiers to risk their reputations and cross a time-honored line.
by David Margolick April 2007
snip
Only a few months had passed since the attacks of September 11. The war in Afghanistan was just under way; officially,
the enemies were al-Qaeda and the Taliban. But what interested Rumsfeld now was Baghdad, Basra, and beyond. To
Newbold and many others, Iraq seemed irrelevant to the problems America faced, and besides, things there appeared
largely under control; Saddam Hussein had been more or less handcuffed through sanctions and other diplomatic measures.
Yet here was a sign, one of several, that Saddam, and not Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar, was most on the Bush administration's mind.
Around a conference table in the Pentagon's E-ring, the brass gathered. Newbold sat next to Rumsfeld, with the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, General Richard Myers, to Newbold's right, and Myers's deputy, General Peter Pace, next to him. Nearby
were Rumsfeld's number two, Paul Wolfowitz, and his personal military assistant, Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr. Newbold
began reviewing the plan to invade Iraq, several years old by that point, which called for 500,000 troops—a figure Rumsfeld summarily dismissed. Surely 125,000 would suffice, he said, and with a little imagination, you could probably get away with far fewer than that.
snip
Among the six, Paul Eaton has one clear distinction. He was dealt the worst hand: to create a new Iraqi Army from scratch.
That much was evident from the moment he landed in Kuwait early one morning in June 2003 to undertake the job. First,
no one was there to meet him. Then no one had arranged to take him to Baghdad; he had to thumb a helicopter ride there.
Then he couldn't get into the Green Zone. Then, to build a new military force for 26 million people, he'd been given a
munificent staff of five.