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Firstly, there's no indication that partitioning countries solves the underlying problems - historically, it's an option that's been tried many times in attempts to solve civil wars and it usually results in (a) even greater bloodletting, (b) massive social and economic dislocations, (c) the creation of new states that are far weaker and more dependent on their neighbors than the preceding state, (d) less democracy, and (e) long-term perpetuation of a conflict. Without the warring groups contained with the same political framework, there is no incentive to eventually bridge their differences and conflicts wind up perpetuating. More fragmentation often ensues.
That isn't to say it ALWAYS is a bad idea - sometimes it's really the only option left. But the reasons I don't think these apply to Iraq are (a) there's no indication that the majority of Iraqis favor such an idea. Most of the major Shia parties are split over it with many in active opposition (i.e. neither the Sadrists nor the followers of Ayatollah Sistani support it) and the Sunnis are dead against a partition too. The most popular recent historical figure in Iraq remains Abdul Qarim Kasim, the president/leftist-dictator of Iraq in the late '50s/early '60s (overthrown by a Ba'athist coup encouraged by the CIA), who was half-Arab/half-Kurdish/half-Sunni/half-Shia and the proponent of a vigorous non-sectarian nationalism. Witness the outcry over the U.S. attempt to impose "walls" between different Sunni and Shia neighborhoods in Iraq.
Now, I'm not doubting that sectarian violence has spun wildly out of control. But in a power vacuum, these kinds of things are often the result of powerful but well-organized minority factions that are able to run rampant without anybody able to exercise restraint or control over them.
Eventually, a partition of Iraq may well occur (especially vis-a-vis the Kurdish north). If it happens in the Arab region, between Sunni and Shia, it won't be pretty and it may well make things worse. Nevertheless, whether it happens or not is up to the Iraqis - the U.S. has neither the moral authority nor the practical authority to make it happen. It's not our right to impose such a solution on the Iraqis (and in fact, historically, the effects of partition have been far worse when it's been imposed by outsiders) and, moreover, we can't control the country as is - our authority barely extends outside the Green Zone and other bases. How on earth does Biden expect that we'll be able to exercise the authority to split the country in the 3 separate ones?
And even if Biden ultimately proposes a weak central government, weak confederal states rarely work in a war setting; there is simply far too little holding any group back from declaring complete independence. Admittedly, Bosnia is an exception (so far) and it's possible that such a solution may work in the much-larger Iraq if the international community is absolutely adamant that they will not support any secession from the new, looser Iraq. But it would still be very difficult to control.
Honestly, we should just remove our troops from Iraq to bases in Kuwait and Turkey, maintain diplomatic connections and work to promote an actual power-sharing agreement and then if that government requests peacekeepers, we can agree to send peacekeepers to war-torn areas as part of a UN-authorized, international force including many troops from other countries. I see no reason why that idea is any less likely to result in a favorable outcome in the long-term than either a soft or hard partition.
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